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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER OF PUBLIC SCHOOL BOARD To DISCHARGE
TEACHERS

INVOKING

PRIVILEGE

AGAINST

SELF

INCRIMINATION

IN

COMMUNIST INVESTIGATION. [Massachusetts and New York]
Since the conclusion of World War II, a vital civil rights controversy has arisen out of a dash between enforcement of the governmental policy of removing Communists from the educational field
and the protection of the individual's constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination. In recent cases, this conflict of interests has
been presented to the courts as a result of a discharge of public school
teachers because of their having invoked the privilege against self-incrimination to avoid answering questions about their Communist affiliations and activities.
The Massachussetts Supreme Court, in Faxon v. School Committee
of Boston,' upheld the discharge of a public school teacher by a school
committee for his assertion of the constitutional right against selfincrimination in federal legislative hearings, in the face of questions
concerning his membership in, and activities on behalf of, the Communist Party. The school committee complied with statutory procedural
requirements of notice, charges and hearing, so that the fundamental
question was whether a teacher employed "at discretion," as was petitioner, can be dismissed for asserting his constitutional right not to
answer the questions.
The law of Massachusetts was stated to be that a school committee's power to discharge teachers extends to any ground which is not
"arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, or irrelevant to the committee's
task of building up and maintaining an efficient school system." 2 Thus,
the court substantially adopted the standard phraseology under which
this rule is applied by state and federal cases-i.e., that any discharge
is constitutional which has a reasonable relation to fitness.3 It was
then decided that dismissal of teachers who successfully claim the privilege against self-incrimination before a United States Senate com112o N. E. (2d) 772 (Mass. 1954).

Faxon v. School Committee of Boston, 12o N. E. (2d) 772, 774 (Mass. 1954).
3See, e.g. Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York, 342 U. S. 485 at 493,
72 S. Ct. 38o at 385, 96 L. ed. 517 at 524 (1952); Argenta Special School Dist. v.
Strickland, 152 Ark. 215, 238 S. W. 9 at 10 (1922); Stiver v. State, 211 Ind. 38o, i

N. E. (2d) ioo6 at 1oo8 (1936), rehearing denied, 211 Ind. 380, 7. N. E. (2d) 183
(1937); Cooke v. Dodge, 164 Misc. 78, 299 N. Y. Supp. 257 at 262 (1937)-
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mittee when asked about their affiliation with the Communist Party,
is within the power of the school committee because of popular objection to the retention of such teachers and the consequent undesirable effects upon the school system. To the contention that such dismissals violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
through "derogation" of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment, the Massachusetts court, on
the basis of both state and federal cases, reasoned that public employment it not a matter of right, but may be conditioned upon a waiver
of certain constitutional rights so that public confidence in the school
system may be preserved.
Discharges under similar circumstances were also upheld recently
by the New York Court of Appeals in Daniman v. Board of Education of City of New York. 4 In that case, public school and college teachers were found to have been properly discharged by operation of a
self-executing New York City charter provision which terminates the
employment of a city employee who refuses, on the ground of self-incrimination, to answer any question put by any authorized legislative
committee if relating to his official conduct. The New York court relied
on Adler v. The Board5 and McAuliffe v. Mayor6 in reaching its decision that the condition which the city charter placed upon public
7
employment was a reasonable one.
The way was prepared for the Faxon and Daniman decisions by the
United States Supreme Court in the Adler case, which ruled that
persons have no right to work for the state in the school system on
'Daniman v. Board of Education of City of New York, 3o6 N. Y. 532, 119 N. E.
(2d) 373 (1954). In a memorandum decision the New York Court of Appeals later
denied motions for reargument of this case. The court also denied motions to amend
the remittitur to the effect that a question under the Federal Constitution had
been passed upon by the Court of Appeals, except as to one teacher, Slochower, who
was the only petitioner to present such a question to that court. Daniman v. Board
of Education, 307 N. Y. 8o6, 121 N. E. (2d) 629 (1954). Slochower appealed to the
United States Supreme Court sub nom Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of
City of New York, and probable jurisdiction has been noted. 23 U. S. L. Week
3198 (Feb. 8, 1955).
rAdler v. Board of Education of City of New York, 342 U. S. 485, 72 S. Ct. 380,
96 L. ed. 517 (1952).
6McAuliffe v. Mayor of City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N. E. 517 (1892).
7In the Daniman case, the dissent by Judge Desmond argued that teachers are
not "employees" of the city within the meaning of the Charter, and that the words
"any legislative committee" were not intended to include federal legislative committees. The majority opinion dwelt primarily upon the applicability of the
Charter provision to public school and college teachers, finding such teachers to be
public employees as there described. 3o6 N. Y. 532, 119 N. E. (2d) 373 (1954)-
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their own terms, but only on the reasonable terms laid down by the
proper state authorities. This is not to say, however, that a public
servant can be excluded from his job arbitrarily. Phrased affirmatively,
in Wieman v. Updegraff, it was said that "constitutional protection
[under the Due Process Clause of he Fourteenth Amendment] does
extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is
patently arbitrary or discriminatory." 8 Further, in upholding the discharge of public employees, including teachers, for refusal to answer
proper questions and for other reasons, state and federal courts have
been consistently influenced by the principle announced by the Massachusetts Supreme Court through Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v.
Mayor: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are
few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the
implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he
takes the employment on the terms which are offered him. On the same
principle, the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding
offices within its control." 9 This appraisal of the status of a public
employee has been said to indicate that public employment is merely
a privilege.' 9 However, as suggested by Justice Frankfurter in his separate opinion in Garner v. The Board," an individual's interest in
public employment seems to be neither a privilege nor a right but
stands between the two, since the power to discharge does exist but
is subject to limitations. The correct terminology is somewhat an
academic matter to the public employee in view of the working rule
set forth in the Adler case, that a condition on the obtaining or continuing of public employment is constitutional so long as it is not arbitrary.
The feature of the Faxon and Daniman cases which distinguishes
them from earlier cases regarding discharge of public school teachers
is that the right to discharge for refusal to answer certain questions is
therein opposed by the previously unexercised right of the teacher
8344 U. S. 183, 192, 73 S. Ct.

215, 219,

97 L. ed.

216, 222 (1952).

9155 Mass. 216, 29 N. E. 517 (1892).
10Note (1953) l1 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 119o at 1i96. A teacher's employment in
the public schools was designated a "privilege" in Board of Education of City of
Los Angeles v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal. App. 127, 270 P. (2d) 82 (1954).
uGarner v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 341 U. S. 716, 71 S. Ct.
909, 95 L. ed. 1317 (1951). Justice Frankfurter concurred in part and dissented in
part.

195]

CASE COMMENTS

12
under the Federal Constitution to refuse to answer those questions.
The two forces operate in opposite directions, the former toward securing an answer, the latter toward withholding an answer. In the Daniman case, in fact, the exercise of the latter privilege is specified in the
New York City charter as the very reason for discharge. Thus, a
major problem has now been presented as to whether the right of the
state to require disclosure by an employee of matters relating to his
fitness or the right of the employee to avoid self-incrimination should
prevail.
The only mention of this problem in the Daniman decision by
the Court of Appeals of New York was in the passing comment that the
majority in the Appellate Division had found "that the Charter
provisions do not abridge the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination."' 3 In support of its terse declaration of that ruling, the
Appellate Division had cited Canteline v. McClellan' 4 and the McAuliffe case. In the Canteline case, it was decided by the New York
Court of Appeals that police officers may be discharged for refusing
to waive the right against compulsory self-incrimination in grand jury
proceedings, in accordance with the New York Constitution which
provided for such discharge as an express limitation upon the conventional right against self-incrimination. The question of abridgement
of the constitutional right does not appear, therefore, to have arisen
in the Canteline case since authority for the discharge was contained as
part of the total constitutional description of the right itself. The Daniman case marks a direct extension of the McAuliffe doctrine, which
involved a policeman's duty to refrain from talking politics, to cover

'-In other cases involving the discharge of public school teachers for refusal
to divulge information, neither the right against self-incrimination nor any other
state or federal constitutional right appears to have been successfully invoked.
Garner v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 341 U. S. 716, 71 S. Ct.
909, 95 L. ed. 1317 (1951); Steinmetz v. California State Board of Education, 271
P. (2d) 614 (Cal. App. 1954); Board of Education of City of Los Angeles v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal. App. 127, 270 P. (2d) 82 (1954); Adler v. Wilson, 282 App. Div. 418,
123 N. Y. S. (2d) 655 (1953). However, in at least one case not involving a teacher,
assertion of one's exemption from self-incrimination in answer to questions concerning subversive activities has been the basis for the discharge of a public employee. Koral v. Board of Education of New York City, 197 Misc. 221, 94 N. Y. S.
(2d) 378 (1950) (engineer employed by school board). In order that the infringement of one's right against self-incrimination be in question at all, it is prerequisite that the right was explicitly and personally claimed at the proper time. Rogers
v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 71 S. Ct. 438, 95 L. ed. 344 (1951); United States
v. Monia, 317 U. S.424, 63 S.Ct. 409, 87 L. ed. 376 (1943).
"3o6 N. Y. 532, 119 N. E. (2d) 373, 378 (1954).
"282 N. Y. 166, 25 N. E. (2d) 972 (1940).
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the requirement that a teacher waive his right against compulsory
self-incrimination.
In the Faxon case the contention that "the action of the school
committee is unconstitutional as in derogation of the privilege against
self incrimination ' 15 was considered at great length. As to state constitutionality, that contention was held answered by the principle of
the McAuliffe case. In support of federal constitutionality the court
in Faxon goes on to say that United Public Workers of America v.
17
Mitchell16 should be conclusive, and if not, Garner v. The Board
is indistinguishable and controlling. The United Public Workers case
upheld the Hatch Act which prohibits government employees from
exercising the constitutional right of citizens generally to engage in
active political party work, and the Massachusetts court concluded that
the right against compulsory incrimination does not stand "on any
higher ground in a democracy than the right to take an active part in
elections."' s The reference to the Garner case draws upon the right of
a state agency to inquire into matters relating to fitness, which right
was there determined to support an affidavit requirement regarding
Communist affiliation.
In determining that refusal to answer certain questions is sufficient
ground for discharge from government employment, the crucial issue
would seem to be the source of the right to require an answer. It is
submitted that the basic source of this right is the effect on fitness which
attends the failure to answer such questions. This matter was touched
upon in the Faxon case by the statement: "The school committee could
find that under existing conditions the harm was done by the mere
public refusal to testify .... "9-an obvious reference to the public disfavor currently attached to invoking the exemption from self-incrimination, especially in matters relating to Communism. 20 It has been
l'12o N. E. (2d) 772, 774 (Mass. 1954).
33o U. S. 75, 67 S. Ct. 556, 91 L. ed. 754 (1947).
"341 U. S. 716, 71 S- Ct. 909, 95 L. ed. 1317 (1951). The matter of discharge of

public employees for refusal to disclose information came up in this case concerning a Los Angeles oath and affidavit requirement. The oath was an affirmance
of past and present loyalty, while the affidavit was a sworn statement as to whether
or not the affiant had ever had Communist affiliations. The Court upheld the oath
by a five-to-four majority and the affidavit by seven-to-two.
Faxon v. School Committee of Boston, 12o N. E. (2d) 772, 775 (Mass. 1954).
"12o N. E. (2d) 772, 776( Mass. 1954).

1"This condition was discussed generally elsewhere in the Faxon opinion as
follows, in part: "It cannot be doubted that multitudes of people in this community regard with abhorrence the Communist Party.... Nothing the Court can
do or say will prevent the public from drawing its own inferences from refusals to
testify." 12o N. E. (2d) 772, 774 (Mass. 1954).
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said that a teacher's conduct which evokes "the dislike, disrespect and
contempt of the pupils, the parents and the public" is such that it
"can, therefore, reasonably be said to have a very material and quite
detrimental bearing on her fitness, efficiency and influence in the
school room as a teacher." 21 Hence, the discharge for refusal to answer
on the grounds of possible self-incrimination falls within the accepted
doctrine that a discharge is valid on any ground having reasonable
relation to fitness, and this would be true without regard to the relation of the context of the question asked to fitness, in view of the
public reaction following from the teacher's refusal to answer. This
explanation derives support from the United States Supreme Court's
remarks in the Adler case, in confirming the result of the Garner case:
"A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes
the attitude of young minds toward the society in which they live. In
this, the state has a vital concern. It must preserve the integrity of the
schools. That the school authorities have the right and the duty to
screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society, cannot be
doubted." 22 In the Garner case itself, the Court took the position that a
state agency has in common with private industry the right to inquire
into matters of employee fitness, and that past conduct and loyalty reasonably relate to such fitness. The natural assumption is apparently
made by the Court that a duty of the teacher to answer is concomitant
23
with the right of employer to inquire.
To summarize, two justifications have been presented in favor
of the existence of the public school teacher's duty to answer certain
questions in order to obtain or retain employment: First, the state em2

Hayslip v. Bondurant, 194 Tenn. 175, 250 S. W. (2d) 63, 66 (1952).
-Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York, 542 U. S. 485, 493, 72 S. Ct.
380, 385, 96 L. ed. 517, 524 (1952).
=A California district court of appeals, in a case decided shortly before the
Faxon case, furnished another justification for the duty of a teach to cooperate with
the state in responding to inquiries into loyalty. In upholding a discharge of a
public school teacher for refusing to answer questions before a state legislative committee as to her membership in the Communist Party, the court said:
"In the life-and-death struggle into which our people have been plunged by
the monstrous conspiracy called communism, it is becoming more and more apparent that it is essential for the continuance of our national life that we know
who is for us and who is against us. This is no time to allow any person who would
destroy us, our liberties, our religious convictions, and our government to be employed in any branch of the government '.. . to bite the hand that feeds it.' The
men and women of America who pay their salaries have a right to know whether or
not any of their employees are communists." Board of Education of Los Angeles
v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal. App. 127, 270 P. (2d) 82, 86 (1954).
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ployer, like a private employer, is entitled to the information requested; and, secondly, contumacious teachers have no place in school
systems because of the public antipathy which they arouse.
It should be emphasized that the right to discharge a public em-

ployee for refusal to answer questions regarding membership in the
Communist Party must be distinguished from the right to discharge for
membership itself. Discharge on the basis of organizational membership
is supportable only if the subversive purposes of the organization were
known to employee while he belonged to it.24 To sustain a discharge
for refusal to answer, however, the questions asked need only relate

to fitness. The mere fact of membership in the Communist Party re-'This requirement of scienter has been illustrated by an interesting sequence
of United States Supreme Court cases. First, in Gerende v. Board of Sup'rs of Elections of Baltimore City, 341 U. S. 56, 71 S. Ct. 565, 95 L. ed. 745 (1951), the Court held
constitutional a Maryland requirement that each candidate for public office file
an affidavit to the effect that, among other things, he had not been a member of
any group engaged in an attempt to overthrow the government. That decision, according to Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 at 189, 73 S. Ct. 215 at 218, 97 L.
ed. 216 at 221 (1952), was based on an oral statement by the Attorney General of
Maryland to the Court that he would advise the proper authorities to accept the
oath of a candidate to the effect that "he is not knowingly a member of" a proscribed organization, and upon the Court's interpretation of a Maryland decision
to the effect that such an oath would be sufficient.
Subsequently, in Garner v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles,
341 U. S. 716, 71 S. Ct. 909, 95 L. ed. 1317 (1951),

the Court assumed scienter to

be implicit in a California test oath disclaiming the employee's membership in
certain groups organized against the government where there was no indication that
a contrary construction had been, or would be, placed upon the oath by the
California courts.
Later, in Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York, 342 U. S. 485, 72
S. Ct. 38o, 96 L. ed. 517 (1952), New York's Feinberg Law, providing that membership in certain organizations should be prima -facie evidence of disqualification for
office in the New York public schools, was upheld by the Court in view of the
construction placed on the statute by the New York courts that knowledge of organizational purpose is necessary before it may apply.
Finally, in Wieman v. Updgraff, 344 U. S. 183, 73 S. Ct. 215, 97 L. ed. 216
(1952), an Oklahoma oath which was substantially the same as that in the Garner
case-i.e., a simple denial of affiliation. with certain groups, was struck down by
the Court. The Garner case had been decided after the petitioners in the Wieman
case had failed to take the Oklahoma oath, but before the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held against them. The United States Court therefore made the following conclusions: ". . with our decision in Garner before it, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
refused to extend to appellants an opportunity to take the oath. In addition, a petition for rehearing which urged that failure to permit appellants to take the
oath as interpreted deprived them of due process was denied. This must be viewed
as a holding that knowledge is not a factor under the Oklahoma statute.... Indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion
of arbitrary power. The oath offends due process." 344 U. S. 183, 189, 73 S. Ct. 215,
218, 97 L. ed. 216, 221 (1952).
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lates to fitness since only by disclosure of this fact will the public
authorities be enabled to make further critical inquiry as to whether
the membership was knowing or innocent. The public school teacher
or other public employee who is being questioned by officials about
his Communist affiliations has two choices: he may answer or he may
refuse to answer. If he refuses, his discharge is warranted. If he answers, then under the decision in Wieman v. Updegraff,25 he is secure
from discharge unless it is discovered by further questioning that his
membership is a knowing one, which fact raises a presumption of unfitness.26

EDWARD E. ELLis

CRIMINAL LAW-EFFECT OF MARRIED WOMAN'S AcTs ON HUSBAND's LIA-

BILITY FOR LARCENY OF WIFE'S PROPERTY. [New York]

At common law the husband cannot be guilty of larceny of the
property of his wife because of the legal relationship existing between
them.' Under the concept of unity of husband and wife, it is reasoned
5344 U. S. 183, 73 S. Ct. 215, 97 L. ed. 216 (1952).
- 3In Garner v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 341 U. S. 716,
71 S. Ct. 909, 95 L. ed. 1317 (1951), the matter of scienter was made clear by the
fact that both an affidavit and an oath were there involved. The former resembled a
question in that it required a statement as to whether or not the affiant was, or had
been, a member of he Communist Party or the Communist Political Association.
The oath, however, was a prescribed form which negatived, among other things,
one's membership in any group advocating the overthrow of the government by
force or violence. The only way to "answer" such an oath is to swear to it as it
stands, and the exclusion from employment which thus operates on those unable
to take it truthfully must be justified by a reasonable, non-discriminatory relation of the terms of the oath to one's fitness for the employment. Such a relation
cannot exist between organizational membership and employment unless knowledge
of the purposes of the organization concurred with that membership. The affidavit
requirement, however, operated as an exclusion from employment upon no one
except those who flouted, by refusing to disclose the information, the right of
the state to inquire into matters relating to their fitness. The Court there said,
"Not before us is the question whether the city may determine that an employee's
disclosure of such political affiliation justifies his discharge." 341 U. S. 716, 720, 71
S. Ct. 909, 912, 95 L. ed. 1317, 1322 (1951). That question was before the Court in
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 73 S. Ct. 215, 97 L. ed. (1952), which said that
discharge for membership without knowledge of organizational purpose is unconstitutional. The Garner decision, in upholding the affidavit requirement, thus
amounts to a recognition of the state's right to know deficiencies of its employees
which fall short of constituting grounds for discharge.
"Watkins v. State, 6o Miss. 323 (1882); Walker v. Reamy, 36 Pa. 410 (1860);
State v. Parker, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint 551 (1882); Rex v. Creamer, [igi] 1 K. B. 564
at 569; Madden, Domestic Relations (1931) § 70. For the same ruling in a community
property state, see Overton v. State, 43 Tex. 616 (1875); de Funiak, Principles of
Community Property (1943) § 154.
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that one cannot steal from the other; and under the common law rule
that title to the woman's personal property, 2 which she possesses at
the time of the marriage or acquires during the marriage, vests exclusively in her husband, 3 the husband has no opportunity to commit
larceny of his wife's goods since she literally has no property susceptible to theft. It is to be noted that the reciprocal rule that the wife
cannot steal the property of her husband is not sustained by the
merger of property theory, but the courts have considered the unity
of spouses resulting from the marital relationship as sufficient to sup4
port the rule.
However, a few earlier cases have indicated that in certain exceptional situations, the common law rule does not apply. For instance,
where the wife has committed adultery and induced her paramour to
steal from her husband, both may be guilty of the crime of larceny. 5
Futhermore, other courts have contended that if the wife has deserted
the husband or if the spouses are separated, the wife may be guilty
of larceny of the husband's goods wrongfully taken when leaving.0
'Personal property here should be distinguished from a wife's paraphernalia
such as her wearing apparel and personal ornaments. Like other personalty, they
belonged to the husband at common law, but if not disposed of by him during his
lifetime, they become her absolute property. Tipping v. Tipping, 1 P. Wins. 729, 24
Eng. Rep. 589 (1721).
'Madden, Domestic Relations (1931) § 28. But the husband may waive his
right and permit the wife to own and control such personalty as her separate
estate. Boldrick v. Mills, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 852, 96 S. W. 524 (19o6).
'State v. Banks, 48 Ind. 197 (1874); Lamphier v. State, 70 Ind. 317 (188o);
Reg. v. Tollett, Car. & M. 112, 174 Eng. Rep. 432 (1841); Reg. v. Kenny, L. R. 2
Q. B. Div. 307, 3 Am. Crim. Rep. 448 (1877). "By marriage, the husband and wife
are one person in law, that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into
that of the husband." 1 Bi. Comm. 442; 2 Bl. Comm. 433.
An exception to this rule of unity was made with regard to crimes of personal
violence between the spouses. The criminal law normally applies in that situation
as if the marriage relationship did not exist. 3 Vernier, American Family Laws
(1935) 162.
6See, as to the paramour, State v. Banks, 48 Ind. 197, 199 (1874); Rex v. Tolfree,
i Moody, Cr. Cas. 243, 168 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (1829); Reg. v. Tollett, Car. & M.
112, 174 Eng. Rep. 432 (18 41)z In Reg. v. Featherstone, i Dearsly 369, 6 Cox Cr.
Cas. 376, 169 Eng. Rep. 764, 765 (1854), Lord Campbell said: "The general rule
of law is, that a wife cannot be found guilty of larceny for stealing the goods of
her husband, and that is upon the principle that the husband and wife are, in the
eye of the law, one person; but this rule is properly and reasonably qualified when
she becomes an adulteress. She thereby determines her quality of a wife, and her
property in her husband's goods ceases." Also, see Madden, Domestic Relations (1931)
226.

6Rex v. James, [1902] 1 K. B. 54o; Rex v. Creamer, [1919] i K. B. 564 (following § 36 of Larceny Act of 1916 which provides that no proceedings under the act
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In both of these situations the marriage has in fact been disrupted, but
in neither has the marital unity been legally dissolved, and the courts
therefore had to ignore the concept of legal unity in order to conclude
that one spouse could be guilty of stealing from the other. Perhaps
this is some indication that the basic reason why the courts generally
continued to hold to the rule that a husband cannot steal from his
wife lay not in the unity theory but in the fact that the husband was
the legal owner of all property of both spouses-and in the desire of
the courts to preserve domestic tranquility by refusing to recognize
as unlawful certain acts of the spouses directed toward one another.
If this be so, then it may well be argued that the true bases for the
common law rule have been destroyed in that: First, it is usually dear
that the marital ties have already been irretrievably broken by the
time charges of larceny between spouses are brought to the stage of a
criminal prosecution; and secondly, Married Woman's Statutes7 have
been widely adopted making the wife capable of owning property
independently of the husband.
While varying in detail, the Married Woman's Acts generally give
the wife a number of rights which she did not have at common law
by providing that she may make contracts and sue and be sued as a
single woman. Some statutes go further and expressly allow the wife to
sue her husband for torts to the person. But of greater significance in the
present discussion is the fact that one of the main purposes of such
legislation is to allow married women to acquire and hold as their
own both real and personal property,8 and thereby the common law
concept of merger of the wife's property into that of the husband has
shall be taken by a husband against his wife while they are living together unless
property has been wrongfully taken by the wife when leaving or deserting). See
Overton v. State, 43 Tex. 616, 618 (1875), where the court indicated that where
there was a distinct and definite separation between spouses, and where the husband has abandoned or surrendered possession of the property, then he may be
found guilty of larceny of such property.
'Mississippi, in 1839, was the first state to pass a married woman's property
statute. Maine, in 1844, was the first northern state to pass such legislation. On
the early development of the movement, see Goebel, Cases and Materials on the
Development of Legal Institutions (1946) 553 et seq. For a comparison of the law
before and after the passage of a married woman's statute, see Note (1948) 32 Minn.
L. Rev. 262.
'A typical statute is New York Domestic Relations Law (1950) § 5o: "Property,
real or personal, now owned by a married woman, or hereafter owned by a woman
at the time of her marriage, or acquired by her as prescribed in this chapter, and
the rents, issues, proceeds and profits thereof, shall continue to be her sole and
separate property as if she were unmarried, and shall not be subject to her husband's control or disposal nor liable for his debts."
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been abrogated. However, even after the widespread enactment in the
latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of this legislation, most courts have continued to adhere to the rule that a husband
cannot commit larceny against the separate property of the wife. 9
They reason that the concept of marital unity still exists1 0 and that the
ultimate purpose of the common law rule to preserve the peace and
sanctity of the family is still in effect. It is their contention that to
allow one spouse to bring criminal charges against the other would
tend only to create another means of weakening the stability of married life, and that whatever tends to undermine the family seeks to
destroy the foundation of society."3
These courts further contend that since the Married Woman's
Acts do not explicitly provide that the husband may be guilty of
larceny from his wife, the language of the statutes should not be construed as changing the applicable criminal law. It is argued that
neither the effect of the Married Woman's Acts nor the scope of the
criminal law can be expanded by implication, especially in derogation
of the common law. 12 On such basis, the Minnesota court in State v.
Arnold 3 took the position that the purpose of the married woman's
'Thomas v. Thomas, 51 Ill. 162 (1869); State v. Arnold, 183 Minn. 313, 235
N. W. 373 (1931); People ex rel. Troare v. McClelland, 146 Misc. 545, 263 N. Y.
Supp. 403 (x933); State v. Phillips, 85 Ohio St. 317, 97 N. E. 976, 40 L. R. A. (N. s.)
142 (1912).

10In Heffernan v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 33 Ohio App. 207, 169 N. E.
33, 34 (1929), where the insurance company sought to recover money paid to the
wife for an automobile stolen by the husband, the court stated, in a very conservative expression of opinion, "that notwithstanding the vast latitude in the
rights of women, so far as contracting and being contracted with, and so far as
owning property separate and independent of her husband, are concerned, the
fiction still remains that, so far as criminal acts are concerned, the husband could
not steal from the wife, nor the wife from the husband, for, however incongruous
the relations may be, however strained, however long they may have lived apart
from each other, however much they may contract and enforce contracts between
themselves, they are in the eyes of the law one, and the property of the one is the
property of the other, to the extent, at least, that one of the parties cannot be
found guilty of stealing from the other."
EState v. Phillips, 85 Ohio St. 317, 97 N. E. 976 (1912).
2'Snyder v. People, 26 Mich. 1O6 (1872); People ex rel. Troare v. McClelland, 146
Misc. 545, 263 N. Y. Supp. 403 (1933); State v. Phillips, 85 Ohio St. 317, 97 N. E. 976
(1912); Heffernan v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 33 Ohio App. 207, 169 N. E.
33 (1929). It is accepted law that criminal statutes should be narrowly construed
especially if they are in derogation of the common law. People v. Phyfe, 136 N. Y.
554, 32 N. E. 978 (1893); Scholtens v. Scholtens, 23o N. C. 149, 52 S. E. (2d) 350
(1949); Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R. I. 452, 25 A. (2d) 354, 141 A. L. R. 170 (1942).
'3182 Minn. 313, 235 N. W. 373 (1931); see Note (1931) 15 Minn. L. Rev. 589.
The decision has become a leading case and has drawn a considerable amount of
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legislation is to protect and extend the rights of the married woman,
and not to create public offenses. The reasoning employed was that if
the legislature desired to create the crime of larceny in cases of this
character, it had the undoubted power to do so, but a failure of action
indicates an absence of intention. Notwithstanding the declaration of
the statute that "every person" who does the proscribed acts "shall be
guilty of larceny,"' 4 the court concluded that the use of this phraseology did not include the defendant spouse-another example of the
refusal to create a crime by implication.
Demonstrating the continuing vigor of this point of view is the
recent New York case of People v. Morton.0 Here, the husband was
indicted for grand larceny for theft of personal property of his wife,
and consequent to a motion by the defendant upon the grand jury
minutes to dismiss the indictment, an issue was raised as to whether
the facts as stated in the indictment charged the defendant with the
commission of a crime. In granting the motion for dismissal, the court,
after restating the basis for the common law rule, considered the
legislative enactments abolishing disabilities imposed upon a married woman as creating and enlarging only special civil rights and
liabilities and " not creat[ing] criminal responsibility where none such
existed at common law."' 6 Here again the larceny statute was held not
to encompass within its provisions an offense by either husband or
wife against the other.Y
This conservative viewpoint, however, has not gone unchallenged.
It is met with the contrary reasoning of several courts that since the
comment and criticism. Position criticized in Note (194o) 25 Iowa L. Rev. 351 at
356-36o; discussed in Note (1941) 16 St. John's L. Rev. 78 at 82-83; Note (1948) 32
Minn. L. Rev. 262 at 289-290.
U,... every person who, with intent to deprive or defraud the true owner
of his property, or of the use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate the same
to the use of the taker, or of any other person ... steals such property, and shall
be guilty of larcency." Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 10358.
2 o4 Misc. io63, 127 N. Y. S. (2d) 246 (1954).
11204 Misc. 1o63, 127 N. Y. S. (2d) 246, 247 (1954).
"7The court in the principal case based its decision heavily on a narrow construction of criminal statutes and on the concept that every citizen should be
given unequivocal notice before conduct on his part can be a means of depriving
him of his liberty. It is of further significance to note the action of the New York
legislature in regard to compulsory prostitution. Penal Law § 246o, is titled "Compulsory Prostitution of Women" with the statute describing the victims as "women,"
"girls," or "females." Nonetheless, a separate section, Penal Law § logo, was enacted,
describing the crime of "Compulsory Prostitution of Wife." It would be consistent,
therefore, to construe the larceny statute of New York as not pertaining to spouses
in their relationship with one another.
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Married Woman's Acts have swept away virtually all of the incidents
which gave rise to the doctrines of unity of spouses and merger of
property, there is no basis for continuing to imply an immunity as
between spouses in the criminal law field. 18
The precursor of cases which represent this more modern policy
is Beasley v. State,19 in which the Indiana court interpreted the Married Woman's Acts as emancipating the wife from almost all of her
common law disabilities. It was concluded that statutes granting the
wife the right of ownership of her separate property should logically
be interpreted as providing as well for the protection of her property.
In regard to the application of the larceny statutes, this court reasoned
that a husband may steal from his wife "where the circumstances attending the wrongful act are such that, if performed by another, it
would constitute a felonious asportation." 20 By previous judicial decision, it has been determined that a husband was guilty of arson
when he burned the dwelling of his wife, 21 and since both larceny
and arson are crimes against property, it was a simple exercise in
judicial reasoning to conclude that a husband may also perpetrate the
crime of larceny of the wife's goods.
Other courts following this point of view have considered the
sweeping scope of the statutes relative to a wife's separate property
rights and have concluded that this legislation seems to have abandoned
the traditional proposition that this is a "man's world." 22 EmphasizsHunt v. State, 72 Ark. 241, 79 S.

W. 769 (19o4); State v. Herndon, 158 Fla.

124 Kan. 216, 257 Pac. 944 (1927).
39138 Ind. 552, 38. N. E. 35 (1894). This case was decided just thirteen years
after the passage of the Married Woman's Act in Indiana. Seven years prior to these
statutory enactments, State v. Banks, 48 Ind. 197 (1874) was decided following the
common law rule. There was no specific mention in the Beasley case of the Banks
decision, but the court does seem to overrule the prior case by implication when
it states: "Prior to the enactment of the several sections of the statutes of this state,
the common-law fiction prevailed of the legal unity of husband and wife ... but the
effect of such statutes is to sever the unity of person and community of property
heretofore existing between husband and wife." Beasley v. State, 138 Ind. 552, 38 N. E.
35, 36 (1894).
2138 Ind. 552, 38 N. E. 35, 37 (1894).
"Garrett v. State, lo9 Ind. 527, 1o N. E. 570 (1887). But compare Snyder v.
People, 26 Mich. 206 (1872), where the question was whether the married woman's
legislation had changed the common law rule that a husband who is living with
his wife and who is in possession jointly with her of a dwelling house which
she owns, can be guilty of arson in burning it. In deciding that the common law
rule ,had not been abrogated by statute, the court concluded that the husband
resides in the dwelling by right, as part of the legal unity known to law as a
family, and although the property was hers, the residence was equally his.
115, 27

S. (2d) 833 (1946); State v. Koontz,

"Whitson v. State, 65 Ariz. 395, 181 P. (2d) 822 (1947); People v. Graff, 59
Cal. App. 7o6, 211 Pac. 829 (1923).
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ing the moral necessity for such decisions, the Florida court in State
v. Herndon stated:
"... it is [the court's] duty to harmonize constitutional and statutory precepts with reason and good conscience, otherwise they
may become ridiculous when applied to changing concepts....
"[The common law rule] has not only been abrogated by law
it has been abrogated by
custom, the very thing out of which the
23
common law derived."
Following another line of thought, some courts contend that the
argument that the common law rule is essential for the preservation
of the marriage and the harmony of the home is untenable because
once a situation has arisen in which one spouse is making serious
criminal accusations against the other, any chance for the preserva24
tion of the marriage has already been virtually destroyed.
A controversy involving a similar problem of interpretation of
the Married Woman's Acts has long been raging as regards the right
of a wife to sue her husband for personal torts. Many statutes have
granted to women the right to sue and be sued in their own name
but have not expressly provided for suit against the husband, and the
courts have been troubled, as in the larceny cases, with the issue of
whether the legislature's intent was to authorize suits between spouses.
Until gio, the year of the Supreme Court decision in Thompson v.
Thompson,25 it appears that no jurisdiction in this country permitted
2158 Fla. 115, 27 S. (2d) 833, 835 (1946).
"Following the passage of the Married Woman's Acts, the conclusiveness of
the doctrine of marital unity was to some extent disrupted. As a result, courts
continuing to follow the common law rule have had to consider this unity as
consisting in the social institution of marriage. State v. Arnold, 182 Minn. 313, 235
N. W. 373 (1931). It seems, however, that the social aspects of unity are no longer
existent when one spouse has stolen from the other. This appears to be a practical
conclusion; yet few courts have found it advantageous to sponsor such an argument
in criminal cases because it has no formal legal foundation. However, in People
v. Graff, 59 Cal. App. 7o6, 211 Pac. 829, 831 (1923), the court stated: "We cannot
believe that such events can be so smothered in the family circle that no ripple,
or that but a slight ripple, will disturb the serenity of the home. A spouse will not
lightly forgive a robbery committed against him by his marital partner, and a
home in which one of the partners will steal the property of the other cannot be
regarded as one resting on a particularly solid foundation."
In the analogous situation of allowing civil suits between the spouses for
personal torts, it seems the courts have been less reluctant to point out the present
instability of the marriage. Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335, 6 A. L. R.
1031 (1917) (wife sued her husband for assault); Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124,
140 Pac. 1022, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 189 (1914) (wife recovered for injuries received from
gunshot wound maliciously inflicted by her husband).
;2i8 U. S. 61l, 31 S. Ct. i1, 54 L. ed. ii8o, 3o L. R. A. (N. s.) 1153 (19o), discussed in Notes (igi) 9 Mich L. Rev. 44o; (191o) 24 Harv. L. Rev. 403; (1913) 22
Yale L. J. 250.
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such a suit.26 Although this case followed precedent, the view expressed

in the dissenting opinion seems to have created the first inducement to
oppose the majority rule, 27 and a distinct division of authority now

exists on the question.2 s The arguments advanced and the language
used by the courts to justify or reject the continued application of
the common law rule in regard to a tort liability are quite similar
to those found in the decisions dealing with the larceny controversy.
In regard to both criminal and tort liability between spouses, the
probable majority of jurisdictions are still reluctant to abrogate the
common law rules without an express legislative mandate. 29 By rejecting the more modern viewpoint and by clinging to outmoded
legal concepts, the New York court in the principal case reached a
result in accord with this majority but inconsistent with several expressions of other New York courts which have stressed the need for
liberal interpretation of the Married Woman's Acts. 30
2Notes (191) 9 Mich. L. Rev. 440; (1913) 22 Yale L. J. 250, 251.
nSee Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 619, 31 S. Ct. 111, 113, 54 L. ed.
ii8o, 1183, So L. R. A. (N. s.) 1153, 1i57 (ig1o). Justice Harlan, with whom Justices
Holmes and Hughes concurred, delivered the dissenting opinion and pointed out
that since the District of Columbia statute granted to the wife the right to sue for
personal torts as if she were unmarried, there is no need for statutory construction to preclude the husband from being a tortfeasor. In other words, if a woman
may sue a man for personal torts committed against her before marriage, she
may sue that same man if he should later become her husband. In accord with this
view see: Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atd. 889, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) x85 (1914),
where the Connecticut Married Woman's Act was construed to authorize an action
by the wife against her husband for assault and battery and false imprisonment,
although the statute did not expressly authorize such action; Crowell v. Crowell,
i8o N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206 (1920), 181 N. C. 66, io6 S. E. 149 (1921), the first case
in this country in which the tort sued upon was infection with venereal disease;
Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 140 Pac. 1022, 52 L. R. A. (N. s.) 189 (1914).
25
See Notes (1949) 6 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 213 and (1952) 9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
235 for discussions of various aspects of this controversy.
5
See cases cited note 9, supra, as to criminal liability. Prosser, Torts (1941) 901,
as to tort liability.
-"People ex rel. Rossiter v. Rossiter, 173 Misc. 268, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 30 (1940),
where the court contended that the legislature never intended to impose such a
limitation on the rights of a woman to protect her property; People ex rel. Mattiello
v. Mattiello, 200 Misc. 61g, 11o N. Y. S. (2d) 359, 360 (1951), where the husband was
found guilty of larceny after driving off with his wife's Cadillac, the court stated:
"Logic, realism and the economics of our day support the view that a married
woman may not only own property individually and separately from the husband,
but as the owner of property is entitled to all the protection that the various laws
extend to all other individuals." See People ex rel. Carr v. Martin, 286 N. Y. 27,
35 N. E. (2d) 636, 637 (1941), where under facts similar to the principal case, but
with the court proceeding on the issue of the jurisdiction of the lower court to
issue a writ of habeas corpus, the question of larceny between spouses was not
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In view of the widening divergence of opinion among the courts
as to whether the Married Woman's Acts should be construted as
making the husband guilty of larceny against the wife's property and
liable for injuries to her person, it is time for the legislatures to take
note of the ambiguities in the statutes and to enact revisions to clarify
this phase of the law. Until such time as the statutes are amended,
however, the courts should recognize the incongruity of the rule of construction which attributes to the legislatures the intention to grant
wives the right to own separate property but to permit the husbands
to steal it with impunity.
NIcHoLAs

G. MANDAK

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-MARRIAGE IN STATE AS BASIS FOR JURISDICTION OF

Ex PARTE DIVORCE ACTION WHEN NEITHER

SPOUSE Is

DOMICILED

IN STATE. [New York]
Within the past year, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Altqn v. Alton' was presented with the issue of
whether the domicile of at least one of the parties is a necessary prerequisite under the United States Constitution to the exercise of divorce jurisdiction when both parties are before the court. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, but the case was later dismissed as moot.
The issue was again presented to the Third Circuit Court in the case
of Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith and dealt with in a per curiam
opinion which said: "This case is the same with regard to all operative
facts and principles of law as Alton v. Alton.... That decision must
3
govern this."2 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari.
discussed. However, the court unequivocally pronounced in dictum that the women's
emancipatory acts have so changed the status of husband and wife that few
vestiges are left of the common law concept of unity of spouses or of the husband's
right to possess and control his wife's chattels.
1207 F. (2d) 667 (C. A. 3d, 1953), noted (1954) 11 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2oo.
Certiorari was granted, 347 U. S. 911, 74 S. Ct. 478, 98 L. ed: (advance p. 352)
(1954), and the case was argued on April 7, 1954, but was dismissed on June 1, 1954
as moot because the husband had by then obtained a valid divorce in Connecticut. In dissenting, Justice Black was of the opinion that the wife was entitled
to have her case tried in the Virgin Islands, since under the holding of Williams
v. North Carolina the Connecticut divorce would not necessarily protect the wife
from a conviction of bigamy in the Virgin Islands or elsewhere. 347 U. S. 965, 745
S. Ct. 774, 98 L. ed. (advance p. 66o) (1954).
2214 F. (2d) 820 (C. A. 3 d, 1954).
Cert. granted, 23 U. S. L. Week 3o82, October 14, 1954.
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In the Alton case the wife, who had previously lived in Connecticut, after six weeks residence in the Virgin Islands filed suit for a
divorce. The husband entered a general appearance, which satisfied
the jurisdictional requirements of the Virgin Islands statute. 4 The
United States District Court for the Virgin Islands asked the wife for
further proof of her domicile, but she gave none, relying on the
statute. The District Court then dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction and the Court of Appeals affirmed that action, by a vote of
four to three.
In the recent case of David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss5 a New York Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction of an ex parte divorce action, although neither party was domiciled within the state, under
Section 1147 of the Civil Practice Act which states: "In either of the
following cases, a husband or wife may maintain an action against
the other party to the marriage to procure a judgment divorcing the
parties and dissolving the marriage by reason of the defendant's adultery: ... Where the parties were married within this state."0 The com-

plaint did not allege that either party was a resident of New York, so
that New York divorce jurisdiction could only be based on the fact
of marriage within the state. The husband, who was in France, was
served by publication, and an order was made sequestrating his property and appointing a receiver. The husband moved to vacate the
orders of publication and sequestration, contending that Section 1147
of the Civil Practice Act does not mean what it says, and that if it does,
then it is clearly unconstitutional.
In Barberv. Barber,7 the first New York case in which this clause
of the Civil Practice Act was construed, the Supreme Court of New
York in overruling the argument for a literal construction of the clause,
said: "The presumption is against the construction contended for. In
view of this fact, and of the evil results to follow such construction... I
'Bill No. 55, 17th Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands passed May ig,
1953, amending Section 9 of the Divorce Law of s944 which states: "Notwithstanding
the provisions of Section 8 and 9 hereof, if the plaintiff is within the district at
the time of the filing of the complaint and has been continuously for six weeks
immediately prior thereto, this shall be prima facie evidence of domicile, and
where the defendant has been personally served within the district or enters a
general appearance in the action, then the Court shall have jurisdiction of the
action and of the parties thereto without further reference to domicile or to the
place where the marriage was solemnized or the cause of action arose."
'25 Misc. 836, 129 N. Y. S. (2d) 649 (1954).
ON. Y. Practice Manuel (Clevenger, 1954) § 1147.
789 Misc. 519, 151 N. Y. Supp. 1064 (1915).
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think the mere fact of the marriage within the state, irrespective of the
residence of the parties, is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction." s And in
Huneker v. Huneker0 a later case with facts similar to those of the
principal case, a New York Supreme Court, after citing Barber v.
Barber with approval, went on to say that inasmuch as hundreds of
service men who were neither residents of the state nor intending to
reside in New York, were getting married every week in New York,
it would be contrary to public policy to allow one of the spouses to
come back into the state later and obtain a divorce merely on the
ground that the marriage was performed within the state. Thus it
would appear from the earlier New York decisions on this point that.
contrary to the principal case, the lower New York courts have been
dubious of the validity of Section 1147 and have tried to avoid the
issue by asserting that it does not mean what it says.
In Becker v. Becker,'0 an annulment case, a New York Supreme
Court, drawing an analogy between jurisdiction for divorce and annulment, implied that since marriage within the state in itself is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction in annulment cases it should likewise
be sufficient in divorce cases."' This was apparently the law at the
time the Becker case was decided under Section 1743 of the Civil
Practice Code, but it is not the law in New York today. Under Section
1165-a of the Civil Practice Act, domicile is required to annul a marriage. The Restatement of Conflicts provides that "A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to nullify a marriage from its beginning under the same circumstances which would enable it to dis2
solve the marriage by divorce."'
In the principal decision, the court not only adopted a literal in889 Misc. 519, 151 N. Y. Supp. 1064, 1o67 (1915).
"57 N. Y. S. (2d) 99 (1945)_
1058 App. Div. 374, 69 N. Y. Supp. 75 (igo).
"From a bare reading of the opinion it may appear that the court is merely
pointing out that the New York statute specifically provides that the New York
courts have jurisdiction to decree divorce of parties married in the state even
though neither resides in the state. However, it must be remembered that other
New York courts have not been willing to apply this provision of the statute
literally, and have required residence as a basis of jurisdiction. In the Becker
case, the court was indirectly refuting the idea that residence is essential, on the
basis of the analogy to annulment jurisdiction. Since under the statute the fact
that the marriage was celebrated in the state is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on
New York courts to annul the marriage even though the parties do not reside in
New York, then marriage within the state should also confer jurisdiction on New
York courts to divorce the parties even though they do not reside in New York, as
the statute makes the same provision regarding both divorce and annulment.
'-Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 115.
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terpretation of the statute, but also advanced reasoning to justify the
provision for 'divorce jurisdiction of the state of the marriage. It
argued that, "the validity of a marriage is determined by the law of
the place where it is contracted.., and as the law of that place determines the validity of the marriage, I cannot see why that place
is not, also, at least an appropriate place for determining whether or not
and for what causes that marriage may be dissolved. For a variety of
other purposes, also, the law of the place where a marriage takes place
determines many of the rights and obligations of the parties, as, for
example, the rights each acquires in the property which the other
had and thereafter acquires."' 3 The court appears here to be putting
forward a tacit contract theory of marriage in respect to divorce jurisdiction, though this is a unique application of the theory inasmuch as
it had previously only been associated with the marital property
rights of the parties. The concept of a tacit contract "is founded on an
idea ... that where the parties marry without an express contract, they
must be presumed to contract in relation to the law of the country
where the marriage took place, and that this tacit contract follows
them wherever they go."'1 4 The leading English case expounding this
theory is De Nicols v. Curlier,'3 wherein the parties were domiciled
and married in France, and had made no express agreement as to
what law was to govern their respective property rights. The court held
that they impliedly contracted with reference to French law, and
even though the parties had moved to England, their property rights
were still governed by French law.
The majority of American jurisdictions today have rejected the tacit
contract idea and hold that the law of the domicile at the time the property is acquired governs. 16 The leading American case on the subject is
Saul v. His Creditors,"7 which in rejecting the tacit contract theory,
ruled that the law of the place of marriage can govern only in so far as it
could bind the parties and also stated: "The extent of the tacit
agreement depends on the extent of the law. If it had no force beyond
the jurisdiction of the power by which it'was enacted; if it was real,
1205 Misc. 836, 129 N. Y. S. (2d) 649, 655 (1954).
"Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (N. s.) (4 La. Ann.) 569, 599 (1827). For complete discussion of the tacit contract theory see Story, Conflict of Laws (6th ed. 1865)
218 ff.
5[19oo] 2 Ch. Div. 410.

16Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Hume, 121 Ala. 68, 25 So. 8o6, 77 Am. St.
Rep. 43 (1899); Muus v. Muus, 29 Minn. 115, 12 N. W. 343 (1882); In re Majot's
Estate, 199 N. Y. 29, 92 N. E. 402 (1910).

-5Mart. (N.s.) (4 La. Ann.) 569 (La. 1827).
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and not personal, the tacit consent of the parties cannot turn it into
a personal statute. They have not said so; and they are presumed to
have contracted in relation to the law, such as it was to have known
its limitation, as well as its nature, and to have had the one as much
in view as the other."'I s Thus, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held
that the law of the domicile would govern gains acquired from separate
property removed from a common law state into a community property state. The fallacy in the tacit contract theory is that it assumes
knowledge of legal relations which the average layman does not possess.
Also even in jurisdictions in which it has been adopted, it has not been
applied to other situations in which it would have been just as appropriate as it is in regard to marital property. 19 The tacit contract
theory is rejected in the Restatement of Conflicts, which declares that:
"Interests of one spouse in movables acquired by the other during the
marriage are determined by the law of the domicile of the parties
20
when the movables are acquired."
The court in the principal case found further justification for the
statute vesting divorce jurisdiction in the courts of the state of the
marriage in stating that "if in lieu of domicile there could be substituted, as the foundation of divorce jurisdiction, the definite, certain,
easy to prove and unchanging fact of place of marriage, there would
be no migratory divorce, and the perplexing confusion and uncertainty
which attend it would disappear." 21 Some jurisdictions have held that
the state where the marriage is performed has jurisdiction to annul,
22
notwithstanding the fact that both parties might be non-residents.
23
Other jurisdictions and the Restatement of Conflicts
treat the
requisite for jurisdiction to annul as being domicile, as in divorce cases.
The great weight of authority today supports this latter view,24 the
6

" Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (N.s.) (4 La. Ann.) 569, 603 (La. 1827).
""If one dies without a will, we do nat say he tacitly accepted the statute of
distributions, but that the statute governs because he died intestate. If one commits a battery upon another, his liability to pay damages is not a matter of contract, tacit or otherwise, but a legal obligation imposed regardless of his consent." Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed. 1949) 587.
-Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 29o.
-David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N. Y. S. (2d) 649, 657 (1954).
"Sawyer v. Slack, 196 N. C. 697, 146 S. E. 864 (1929); Becker v. Becker, 58 App.
Div. 374, 69 N. Y. Supp. 75 (19o) [According to Huneker v. Huneker, 57 N. Y. S.
(2d) 99 at 1oo (1945), the Becker case was overruled by Powell v. Powell, 211 App.
Div. 750, 208 N. Y. Supp. 153 (1925)]; McDade v. McDade, 16 S. W. (2d) 3o4 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1929).
Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 115.
-Hamlet v. Hamlet, 242 Ala. 70, 4 S. (2d) 9oi (1941); Davis v. Davis,
2

ig9 Conn.
194, 175 At. 574 (1934); Hanson v. Hanson, 287 Mass. 154, 191 N. E. 675 (1934);
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 2o6 N. Y. 541, 99 N. E. 845, 43 L. R. A. 355 (1912).
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reasoning being that in annulment suits the domiciliary state has the
prime interest in the parties, 2 and as in divorce actions a status is
involved.2 6 The view that the state where the marriage was performed
is the proper jurisdiction to annul has generally been rejected because of its obvious inconveniences, 2 7 for even if the plaintiff did bring
suit in the state of celebration there is no way to force a non-resident
defendant to appear, because "the courts are practically unanimous
in holding that such jurisdiction may not be exercised under a constructive service of process upon the nonresident defendant by publi' 28
cation or personally without the state.
It does not necessarily follow that because some jurisdictions hold
that the state of celebration has jurisdiction to annul it could also have
jurisdiction to divorce. The basic concept of annulment and divorce
are not the same. Divorce is the dissolution of a concededly valid
marriage because of some subsequent act, while in an annulment the
court is in legal effect saying that no valid marriage ever took place
because of some prior acts or conditions. 29 "The divorce decree, in
short, cuts off and destroys the ill-favored marriage plant, annulment
tears it up by the roots."8 0 Thus, it is clear that the legal effect of the
two are not the same. A declaration of nullity is more drastic in that
it affects events which occurred between the time of the marriage and
the declaration of nullity. 31
Since annulment and divorce are based on entirely different concepts, the basis of jurisdiction would not necessarily be the same in
the two types of cases. The whole issue of jurisdiction over the individual in annulment cases centers around the issue of whether the action
is one in personam or in rem.3 2 By the weight of authority it is treated
2'Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed. 1949) 418: "... [it] is the state of the
domicile which has the greatest interest in the domestic relations of its citizens."
Goodrich in a previous article was one of the chief advocates of the view that the
state of celebration ought to have jurisdiction. Goodrich, Jurisdiction to Annul a
Marriage (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 8o6.
-"In re Crump's Estate, 161 Kan. 154, 166 P. (2d) 684 at 688 (1946); Callow v.
Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N. E. (2d) 637 at 639 (1948); Barney v. Cunves, 68 Vt.
51, 33 Ad. 897 at 898 (1895).
2Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed. 1951) 322.
2SNote (1940) 128 A. L. R. 61, 73.
21 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) § 115-1; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed.
1951) 321.

I°Goodrich, Jurisdiction to Annul a Marriage (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 8o6, 807.
OaFor examples, see Goodrich, Jurisdiction to Annul a Marriage (1919) 32 Harv.
L. Rev. 8o6, 807. See McMurray and Cunningham, Jurisdiction to Pronounce Null
a Marriage Celebrated in Another State or Foreign Country (1930) 18 Calif. L. Rev.
1o5, 113 for a discussion on applying the doctrine of "relating back."
"Note (194o) 128 A. L. R. 61, 73.
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as an action in personam for which the court must have personal jurisdiction over both parties. 33 As a matter of logic this would appear to
be true, for the court in any event would be applying the law of the
place of celebration, and not the law of the forum as in divorce actions.3 4 Where both parties are before the court there appears to be
little ground for complaint as to due process, but where there is constructive service on a non-resident, if the action is considered to be in
personam, it would be a violation of due process. 35 However, if the
action is deemed an in rem action like divorce, then constructive
service on a non-resident defendant would be good. 36 The Restatement
of Conflicts, not distinguishing between divorce and annulment, recognizes this problem as follows: "Two interests are involved in the granting of a divorce; that of the state of domicile in the existence of the
status and that of the defendant spouse in the plaintiff spouse. Since the
result of the action is to deprive the defendant spouse of his interest in
the other spouse, the court must in some way acquire jurisdiction over
that interest." 37 However, a divorce proceeding is generally conceded
to be an in rem action for jurisdictional purposes, and the law of the
forum governs whether or not a marriage is to be dissolved.38 Thus
3The majority reasons that since an action of annulment is for the purpose
of determining whether or not a valid marriage ever existed, there is no "res" upon
which the court can act; therefore the action being in the nature of an in personam
action, the court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Owen v. Owen,
257 P. (2d) 581 (Co1. 1953); Gayle v. Gayle, 3oi Ky. 613, 192 S. W. (2d) 821 (1946);
Pepper v. Shearer, 48 S. C. 492, 26 S. E. 797 (1897).
3
'The courts are generally in accord that the law to be applied in determining
the validity of the marriage in annulment cases is the law of the state where the
marriage was performed. McDonald v. McDonald, 6 Cal. (2d) 457, 58 P. (2d) 163,
104 A. L. R. 1290 (1936); Levy v. Levy, 3o9 Mass. 230, 34 N. E. (2d) 65o; Noble v.
Noble, 299 Mich. 565, 3oo N. W. 885 (1941). Also see Restatement, Conflict of Laws
(1934) § 115, comment b.
"Under the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877) in
order to satisfy due process in in personam actions the court must have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant; constructive service is not sufficient.
*The difference between this view and the majority seems to be based on different reasoning as to what is involved. The majority of the courts believes that
what plaintiff is asking for is a determination of a personal right-that is, to have
the marriage declared void as to him-while under the minority view the courts
reason that the plaintiff is asking for a determination of his status, the action thereby being classified as in rem. Buzzi v. Buzzi, 91 Cal. App. 823, 205 P. (2d) 1125 (1949);
Bing Gee v. Chan Gee, 89 Cal. App. 877, 202 P. (2d) 36o (1949); Piper v. Piper,
46 Wash. 671, 91 Pac. 189 (1907).
3Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 13, comment a. It must be remembered
that the Restatement makes no distinction between divorce and annulment for
jurisdictional purposes.
Zieper v. Zieper, 14 N. J. 551, lO3 A. (2d) 366 (1954); Tonti v. Chadwick, i
N. J. 531, 64 A. (2d) 436 (1949); Sasse v. Sasse, 41 Wash. (2d) 363, 249 P. (2d) 380
0953). Also see Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed. 1949) § 128.
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domicile in ex parte divorce proceedings is essential in order to satisfy due process, for without it the court would have no jurisdiction
either in personam or in rem.
JosEPH H.

CHUMBLEY

EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY IN PROSECUTION FOR DRUNKEN DRIVING OF
ACCUSED'S REFUSAL To SUBMIT TO BLOOD TEST. [Virginia]
Recognizing that the intoxicated driver of an automobile is a
menace to the public on the highways, many state legislatures have
enacted statutes which severely penalize intoxicated drivers.' But such
statutes will aid in keeping the highways safe only if they can be effectively enforced, and enforcement can only be accomplished when evidence is available to prove that the degree of intoxication of the accused was sufficient to sustain a conviction. Science has perfected the
blood test to the point where it is sufficiently reliable as a strong indication of intoxication,2 but the use of this means of obtaining evidence may be thwarted by the refusal of the accused in a criminal
prosecution to submit to a blood test. In such a situation a problem
arises as to whether the fact of the accused's refusal to take the test
is admissible in a criminal prosecution as evidence of his guilt.
In Gardner v. Commonwealth,3 a case of first impression in the
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has recently
held that the refusal of the accused, when requested by the arresting
officer, to submit to a blood test to determine the amount of alcohol
in his system was admissible in evidence. 4 A police officer, having
seen defendant driving his automobile from side to side of the two

'See statutes applied in: Helmer v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 48
Cal. App. 140, 191 Pac. 1oo (1920); State v. Lorey, 197 Iowa 522, 197 N. W. 446 (1924);
Commonwealth v. Black, 230 Ky. 677, 20 S. W. (2d) 741 (1929); People v. Nester,
275 N. Y. 628, 11 N. E. (2d) 790 (1937); State v. Jones, 181 N. C. 543, io6 S. E. 827
(1921); Commonwealth v. Ellett, 174 Va. 403, 4 S. E. (2d) 762 (1939). 9-1o Huddy,
Encyclopedia of Automobile Law ('93') § 15.
2State v. Duguid, 5o Ariz. 267, 72 P. (2d) 435 (1937); Commonwealth v. Capalbo,
38o Mass. 376, 32 N. E. (2d) 225 (1941). 11 N. Y. Consol. L. Serv. (Baker, Voorhis,

1952) Vehicle and Traffic Law § 70 (5). 4 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1954 Supp.) §
17-75.1. Notes (1945) 159 A. L. R. 209; (1940) 127 A. L. R. 1513; (1953) 39 Va. L. Rev.
215; (1954) 11 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 211.
3195 Va. 945, 81 S. E. (2d) 614 (1954).

'However, the conviction of the defendant was reversed on another ground.
The trial court permitted an erroneous instruction, which defined intoxication too
broadly, to go to the jury with prejudicial effect against the defendant.
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north-bound lanes of the highway, arrested him for driving while intoxicated. 5 Defendant immediately denied that he was intoxicated.
At the scene of the arrest, again while he and the officer were enroute
to a justice of the peace to obtain a warrant, and again after he had
been taken to jail, defendant was asked by the officer if he would like to
submit to a blood test, and the defendant refused each offer. In the
trial court, over defendant's objection, the officer was allowed to testify that defendant had refused to submit to the blood test. Defendant
contended that the admission of the officer's testimony was a violation
of Section Eight of the Virginia Constitution, which provides that an
accused shall not "be compelled in any criminal proceeding to give
evidence against himself." However, the Court of Appeals ruled that
such evidence was admissible as an attending circumstance of the
arrest pointing toward defendant's guilt. The constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination was held to be inapplicable in
situations in which the testimony to which accused objected was not
a statement made by him as a witness in any judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings. The court specifically relied upon its earlier decision in
Owens v. Commonwealth, which asserted the theory that the privilege
extends only to testimonial compulsion in court. 6
The evidence of the accused's refusal to submit to a blood test
in the principal case was held to be relevant and pertinent, as it tended
to show that within his own mind he believed he was guilty. The rule
has been stated that: "Any indications of a consciousness of guilt
by a person suspected of or charged with crime, or who may after such
indications be suspected or charged, are admissible evidence against
him." 7 It is obvious that the inward feeling of guilt, though it may be
inferred only from outward conduct, is strong evidence against the
accused. Certain circumstances tend strongly to show the feeling of
guilt, and the fact-finders should be allowed to consider them and
draw inferences therefrom. However, inferences drawn from an accused's conduct are often erroneous due to the unsolved, intricate
mechanisms of the human mind.8 In determining what circumstances
4 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 18-75.
0186 Va. 689, 43 S. E. (2d) 895 (1947). The Owens case involved a prosecution

for grand larceny, in which the court fully discussed the theory of tacit admissions
and held that the constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination was not
thereby violated.
7
McAdory v. State, 62 Ala. 154, 159 (1878).
8"No one doubts that the state of mind which we call 'guilty consciousness' is
perhaps the strongest evidence... that the accused is indeed the guilty doer;

84

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XII

reasonably tend to indicate consciousness of guilt, the general doctrine of relevancy should be considered. 9
The criterion of relevancy is whether the "evidence ... tends to
cast any light upon the subject of the inquiry."' 0 The conduct of the
accused, his demeanor, his attitude and relations toward the crime,
and his voluntary oral or written admissions of guilt are relevant, and
any statement or conduct tending to indicate a consciousness of guilt
when he is charged with or suspected of crime, or thereafter, is admissible as a circumstance against him.11 The following actions of accused persons have been classed as circumstances relevant to a showing of a consciousness of guilt: flight, 1 2 concealment of identity, 3 en-

deavor to escape after arrest,' 4 incriminating demeanor when arrested,' 5 contradictory statements made to conceal the true facts,' 6 and
reluctance to have one's shoe measured for the purpose of comparison
with tracks near the scene of the crime. 7 Further, it has been held that
accused's refusal to submit to an intoximeter test when requested to
nothing but an hallucination or a most extraordinary mistake will otherwise explain its presence. But, in the process of inferring the existence of that inner consciousness from the outward conduct, there is ample room for erroneous inference;
and it is in this respect chiefly that caution becomes desirable and that judicial
rulings upon specific kinds of conduct become necessary." 2 Wigmore, Evidence
(3rd ed. 1940) § 273.
"The evidencing of this mental condition raises different and more complicated questions as to the significance of conduct; hence a consideration of the
state of the law upon the various uses of the present sort of evidence can best be
made in connection with the rules of conduct-evidence." i Wigmore, Evidence
(3rd ed. 1940) § 172.
"State v. Page, 215 N. C. 333, 1 S. E. (2d) 887, 888 (1939).
"Holmes v. State, 29 Ala. App. 594, 199 So. 736 (1941); Ramirez v. State, 55
Ariz. 441, 1o3 P. (2d) 459 (1940); People v. Moore, 70 Cal. App. (2d) 158, 16o
P. (2d) 857 (1945); State v. Benson, 230 lowa 1168, 3oo N. W. 275 (1941); State v.
Caliendo, 136 Me. 169, 4 A. (2d) 837 (1939); Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa.
419, 32 A. (2d) 889 (1943).
"United States v. Heitner, 149 F. (2d) io 5 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945); People v. Hoyt,
20 Cal. (2d) 3o6, 125 P. (2d) 29 (1942); State v. Hedinger, 126 N. J. L. 288, 19 A.
(2d) 322 (1941); Bowie v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 381, 35 S. E. (2d) 345 (1945).

-"People v. Waller, 14 Cal. (2d) 693, 96 P. (2d) 344 (1939); State v. Shoup, 26
N. C. 69, 36 S. E. (2d) 697 (1946). See State v. Lambert, 1o4 Me. 394, 71 Ad. 1092,
1093 (1908).
"State v. Wilson, 172 Ore. 373, 142 P. (2d) 68o (1943); State v. Mayle, 136 W.
Va. 936, 69 S. E. (2d) 212 (1952).
"Holmes v. State, 29 Ala. App. 594, 199 So. 736 (1941); State v. Dennis, 119
Iowa 688, 94 N. W. 235 (1903); Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A. (2d)
889 (1943).
"People v. Gentekos, li8 Cal. App. 177, 4 P. (2d) 964 (1931); State v. Golden,
67 Idaho 497, 186 P. (2d) 485 (1947).
"7State v. Brown, 168 Mo. 449, 68 S. W. 568 (192o).

19551

CASE COMMENTS

do so by an arresting officer was an action by which he revealed a
consciousness of guilt of drunken driving.1 8 The Virginia court ill
the Gardner case felt that the accused's refusal to submit to a blood
test was a relevant circumstance indicating a consciousness of guilt on
his part.
Although the accused's refusal to submit to a blood test may be
evidence that shows a consciousness of guilt, it is not necessarily strong
evidence of that fact. Experience demonstrates that no fixed relations of inferences can be drawn from the same type of conduct in
different persons because such conduct is often the result of exactly
opposite psychological conditions. 19 Thus there is a grave danger that
the jury will be misled unless an alternative explanation of his conduct is advanced by the accused.
It has been suggested that the admissibility of evidence of accused's
refusal to submit to a blood test could be based upon the theory of implied admissions. 20 The general rule is that when an incriminating statement is made in the presence of the accused and he remains silent, failing to object to or deny such accusation, both the accusation and his failure to deny it are admissible in a criminal prosecution against him as
evidence of his acquiescence in truth of the charge. 21 The analogy
18People v. McGinnis, 267 P. (2d) 458 (Cal. App. 1953).
""The conduct of one accused of crime is the most fallible of all competent
testimony. Those emotions or acts which might be produced in one person by a
sense of guilt, or by the stings of conscience, might be exhibited by another, differently constituted, by an overwhelming sense of shame, and the degradation
consequent upon a criminal accusation. The same cause producing opposite effects
in different persons, owing to weakness or strength of nerve, and other inexplicable
moral phenomena." Smith v. State, 9 Ala. 990, 995 (1846).
For an expansive discussion on the theory of consciousness of guilt see:
Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Consciousness
of Guilt (1929) 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 725.
"'People v. McGinnis, 267 P. (2d) 458 (Cal. App. 1953); State v. Benson, 230
Iowa 168, 5oo N. W. 275 (1941), noted (1942) 40 Mich. L. Rev. 907.
"Love v. State, 69 Ga. App. 411, 25 S. E. (2d) 827 (1943); Commonwealth v.
Cavedon, 3oi Mass. 3o7, 17 N. E. (2d) 183 (1938); State v. Brown, 209 Minn. 478, 296
N. W. 582 (1941); Commonwealth v. Karmendi, 325 Pa. 63, 188 At. 752 (1937);
Winfree v. State, 174 Tenn. 72, 123 S.W. (2d) 827 (1939).
"The basis of such rule is that the natural reaction of one accused of the commission of a crime or of implication therein is to deny the accusation if it is unjust
or unfounded. The hearsay character of the incriminating statement made to the
accused would render it inadmissible, except for the fact that the statement is not
offered in evidence as proof of a fact asserted but as a predicate to the showing of
the reaction of the accused thereto. Caution must be exercised, however, in receiving evidence of a statement made to the accused and his failure to deny it. In
order that the silence of one accused of crime following a statement of a fact tend-
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drawn is that the officer's request that defendant submit to a blood
test is the accusation, and the accused's refusal to submit is similar
to remaining silent. 22 Thus, if the general rule is strictly adhered to,
such evidence would be admissible as an implied admission.
However, when, as in the Gardner case, an accused is confronted
with the charge while under arrest, the courts have modified the application of the implied admissions rule. Some hold that the mere
fact of arrest is sufficient to render inadmissible any testimony to the
23
effect that the accused failed to deny the charges made in his presence,
because when a man is under arrest, whether innocent or guilty, it
is more conducive to his welfare to remain silent.24 His silence in the
face of such accusations is explained, not by the fact that he acquiesces
in the truth of the statement, but by the fact that he stands upon his
constitutional right to remain silent as the best way out of his predicament. 25 Other courts have held that the mere fact of arrest alone is not
sufficient to render the testimony inadmissible but rather that such
fact should be considered along with other circumstances in determining whether the accused was merely afforded an opportunity to deny
or whether he was naturally called upon to do so. 2 0
The analogy of the problem in the principal case to the implied
admission theory is not altogether sound. The officer's request that
the defendant take the blood test is not necessarily an accusation of
ing to incriminate him may have the effect of a tacit admission, he must have
heard the statement and have understood that he was being accused of complicity
in a crime, the circumstances under which the statement was made must have been
such as would afford him an opportunity to deny or object, and the statement
must have been such, and made under such circumstances, as would naturally call
for a reply. The test is whether men similarly situated would have felt themselves
called upon to deny the statements affecting them in the event they did not intend
to express acquiescence by their failure to do so." 2o Am. Jur. 483. Owens v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 689, 43 S. E. (2d) 895 (1947).
2State v. Benson, 23o Iowa 1168, 3oo N. W. 275 (1941). It could also be argued
that defendant's refusal to submit to a blood test is analogous to his denial of guilt.
Then the testimony would be inadmissible because it would be hearsay. Pinn v.
Commonwealth, 166 Va. 727, 186 S. E. 169 (1936).
2State v. Ferrone, 97 Conn. 258, 116 At. 336 (1922); Diblee v. State, 202 Ind.
571, 177 N. E. 261 (1931); People v. Pignataro, 263 N. Y. 229, 188 N. E. 720 (1934);
State v. McKenzie, 184 Wash. 32, 49 P. (2d) 1115 (1935).
"People v. Rutigliano, 261 N. Y. 1o3, 184 N. E. 689 (1933); 2o Am. Jur. 486.
'Towery v. State, 13 Okla. Crim. Rep. 216, 163 Pac. 331 (1917); 2o Am. Jur. 486.
OPeople v. Amaya, 134 Cal. 531, 66 Pac. 794 (1901); State v. Won, 76 Mont. 5og,
248 Pac. 2o (1926); State v. Booker, 68 W. Va. 8, 69 S. E. 295 (191o); Note (193o) 8o
A. L. R. 1259.
For further references concerning tacit admissions see: Notes (1932) 8o A. L. R.
1235; (1938) 115 A. L. R. 1510.
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intoxication. It can just as well be regarded as offering an opportunity
to the accused to prove that he is not intoxicated. Even if the request
to take the test is regarded as an accusation of intoxication, the defendant did not remain silent in the face of the accusation, but rather
vocally denied it. To say that he made an implied admission by refusing to take the test is to say that the only way he could make a
denial was to submit to the test. This is not true, for he exercised
another means of denying-i.e., by oral statements that he was not
drunk.
If the evidence of defendant's refusal to submit to a blood test is
considered to be admissible because it shows a consciousness of guilt
or because it is an implied admission, the problem still remains as
to whether the admission of such evidence would violate defendant's
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. It is said that: "The
privilege protects a person from any disclosure sought by legal process
against him as a witness."'2 7 However, in State v. Gatton,28 involving the
same problem was the Gardnercase, the Ohio court ruled that since the
constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination relates only to
disclosures by utterances, and since the testimony of accused's refusal
to take the test was given by the arresting officer, no violation of accused's privilege was involved. To state the argument differently, the
essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion-i.e.,
that the accused cannot be forced to testify against himself in the course
of a judicial proceeding-and that in situations like that of the principal case the defendant is not required to give testimony during
his trial. 29 Further, the court in the Gardner case indicated that such
evidence as the defendant provides by his refusal to take the test was
voluntarily given by him.3 0 Thus, some courts have answered the constitutional argument by limiting the scope of the privilege, or by ruling
that the testimony was not that of the accused, or by asserting that
the evidence was voluntarily given.
However, whether or not defendant is required to testify against
8 Wigmore, Evidence (Ord ed. 1940) 363.
n6o Ohio App. 192, 2o N. E. (2d) 265 (1938).
Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 182 N. E. 865 (1932); O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38,
25 N. E. 137, 9 L. R. A. 323 (1890); Owens v. Commonwealth 186 Va. 689, 43 S. E.
(2d) 895 (1947).
"'The defendant was not forced to testify, nor was he compelled to take the
stand in his own behalf. The objectionable evidence was given by a witness for the
Commonwealth in describing the incidents of the arrest, the condition of the defendant, and his declarations voluntarily made." Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195
Va. 945, 950, 81 S. E. (2d) 614, 617 (1954).
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himself in the technical sense, the fact remains that unreliable inferences are permitted to be drawn against him at his trial, and that as
a result of the rule making his refusal to take the test admissible in
evidence, an accused has no real means of protecting himself against
prejudice when an arresting officer suggests that he take an intoxication test. If he takes the test, it may indicate intoxication; and if he
does not take it, his refusal is admissible to show a consciousness of
guilt.
In the Gardner case, the Virginia court relied almost entirely on
the Gatton case 3 ' and the Iowa case of State v. Benson3 2 as authority
for the proposition that evidence of the accused's refusal to submit to
a blood test is admissible in a criminal prosecution. However, it must
be noted that in both Ohio and Iowa the prosecuting attorney is
allowed to comment on the fact that the accused does not take the
stand and testify,33 while in Virginia such comment is not allowed, and
the jury is not permitted to draw inferences from accused's failure to
testify 3 4 That this difference in the law of the jurisdictions is significant
is confirmed by the Iowa court's reasoning that defendant's refusal to
submit to a blood test is analogous to his refusal to testify, and that since
his refusal to testify can be considered, it follows that his refusal to
submit to a blood test can also be considered.3 5 If this approach to
31

In a prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, evidence
that accused had refused to submit to a blood test to determine the amount of
alcohol in his system when arrested was admissible, as against the contention that
the admission of such evidence contravened his constitutional right not to be compelled to give evidence against himself. State v. Gatton, 6o Ohio App. 192, 20 N. E.
(2d)265 (1938).
3
21n a prosecution for driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated, evidence of
accused's refusal to submit to a blood test was held admissible as it showed his
attitude or relation toward the crime. There was no provision in the state constitution prohibiting self-incrimination, and the state due process clause was not
regarded as rendering the testimony inadmissible. 23o Iowa 1168, 3oo N. W. 275
(1940""No person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against
himself; but his failure to testify may be considered by the court and jury and may
be the subject of comment by counsel." Ohio Const. (1851) Art. i,§ io. The basis
for the rule in Iowa is found in: state v. Ferguson, 226 Iowa 361, 283 N. W. 917
(1939); State v. Stennett, 220 Iowa 388, 26o N. W. 732 (1935).
""...
but his failure to testify shall create no presumption against him, nor be
the subject of any comment before the court or jury by the prosecuting attorney."
4 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 19-238.
"State v. Benson, 230 Iowa ix68, 3oo N. E. 275 (1941). Also, the Iowa court
indicated that although the basis for the decision of the Gatton case "is not the
same as that given by us, the decision can be readily reconciled with our own." 230
Iowa 1168, 3oo N. W. 275, 277 (1941). If the Gatton case can be reconciled with the
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the question were to be applied in Virginia cases, the court would be
compelled to reason that since the fact that defendant refused to
testify cannot be introduced in evidence or considered by the jury, his
refusal to submit to a blood test, likewise, cannot be introduced or
considered.
Further authority for the exclusion of accused's refusal to take
the intoxication test is derived from the recently enacted Section
18-75.1 of the Virginia Code,3 6 which provides that in a criminal prosecution for driving while intoxicated, though the accused is not required to submit to a blood test, he may request in writing to take
one, but the failure of defendant to request a blood test shall not be
evidence of his guilt nor the subject of comment at the trial. It must
be obvious that if, under the Gardner case rule, evidence of defendant's refusal at the officer's request is admissible, then in any case
in which defendant does not request a blood test, the officer could
evade the effect of the latter clause of the statute by merely asking
defendant if he would submit. If defendant refused, the evidence of
his reluctance to submit would then be admissible, and the legislature's intended protection of the accused's choice not to take the test
would thereby be circumvented. Thus, it appears that in order to assure
that his rights under both the statute and the common law rules of
evidence will be protected, evidence of accused's refusal to submit to
a blood test when charged with driving while intoxicated should be
held inadmissible.
RIcHARD F. BROUDY
Benson case because in both states the prosecuting attorney is allowed to comment
on the accused's refusal to testify, then it can neither be reconciled with nor be
pertinent authority for the decision of the Virginia court in the Gardner case.
-rThe statute, quoted below, was approved by the General Assembly on April
3, 1954. Va. Acts (1954) c. 4o6. The effective date of the statute is ninety days
after the adjournment of the session of the General Assembly at which it was enacted. i Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 1-12. Thus, the statute was not in effect
when the Gardner case was decided on May 3, 1954. 4 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1954

Supp.) § 18-75.1: "In any criminal prosecution under § 18-75, no person shall be
required to submit to determination of the amount of alcohol in his blood at the
time of the alleged offense as shown by chemical analysis of his blood, breath, or
other bodily substance, but should the accused request in writing such a determination the arresting authorities shall render full assistance in obtaining such a determination. There shall be no formal requirements for the rewriting....
"Other than as expressly provided herein, the provisions of this section
shall not otherwise limit the introduction of any competent evidence bearing
upon any question at issue before the court. The results of a determination which
are properly obtained shall be admissible as other evidence relating to the intoxication of the accused. The failure of the accused to request such a determination is not evidence and shall not be subject to comment in the trial of the
case."
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EVIDENCE-APPLICATION OF FEDERAL WIRE TAPPING STATUTE TO RECORDING AUTHORIZED BY INFORMER WITHOUT CONSENT

OF ACCUSED.

[Federal]

Within the past few decades, the employment of various wire
tapping devices by law enforcement agencies to obtain evidence of
criminal activities has created a new phase of the old legal controversy concerning the use of illegally obtained evidence to secure convictions in criminal prosecutions. The ancient rule of the common
law that evidence will be received without regard to the method by
which it is obtained' has been applied by the American state courts

-for well over a century 2 in numerous decisions involving the illegal
4
3
obtention of evidence by private individuals and public officers.
The reason generally assigned for ignoring the method by which the
evidence was obtained was that the court would not halt a trial to
determine the "collateral" issue of the legality of the means of obtaining the evidence, this issue having no bearing on the final outcome
of the case. 5

In 1886 the Supreme Court of the United States began to deviate
from the common law rule, 6 and finally in 1914, in Weeks v. United
1
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 at 462, 48 S. Ct. 564 at 567, 72
L. ed. 944 at 95o (1928); Rosenzweig, The Law of Wiretapping (1947) 32 Corn.
L. Q. 514 at 515. This is thought to be one of the oldest rules of the common law.

Note (1911) 136 Am. St. Rep. 135 at 137.

-One of the earliest American cases to adopt this common law rule was
Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Metc. 329, 337 (Mass. 1841), where it was observed: "If
the search warrant were illegal, or if the officer serving the warrant exceeded his
authority, the party on whose complaint the warrant issued, or the officer, would
be responsible for the wrong done; but this is no good reason for excluding the
papers seized as evidence, if they were pertinent to the issue, as they unquestionably
were. When papers are offered in evidence the court can take no notice how they
were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully; nor would they form a collateral
issue to determine that question."
'Imboden v. People, 40 Co1. 142, 90 Pac. 6o8 at 62o (1907); Commonwealth
v. Everson, 123 Ky. 330, 96 S. W. 46o (19o6); State v. Mathers, 64 Vt. 101, 23 Atl.
590 (1892).

'People v. Cotta, 49 Cal. 166 (1874); State v. Flynn, 36 N. H. 64 (1858).
Note (1911) 136 Am. St. Rep. 135, 142.
OIn Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 at 641, 6 S. Ct. 524 at 534, 29 L. ed.
746 at 752 (1886) there appeared dicta to the effect that evidence seized by an unlawful search and seizure would be equivalent to compelling a person to be a witness against himself within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. This conclusion
was reached without any discussion of the common law rule of admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. For general discussion of cases leading up to the Weeks
case see, Rosenzweig, The Law of Wiretapping (1947) 32 Corn. L. Q. 514 at 518-523.
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States,7 the Court invoked the Fourth Amendment 8 to bar the admission of evidence seized from the accused's house by a United States
marshall without benefit of a warrant. In the opinion it was observed
that "If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4 th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against
such searches and seizures, is of no value, and,... might as well be
stricken from the Constitution." 9 Though held not to be binding on
the states,' 0 the rule of the Weeks case has been reiterated in subsequent Supreme Court decisions" involving illegal searches and
12
seizures by federal officers.
It was in this setting that the first wire tapping case was presented
to the Supreme Court in 1928. In Olmstead v. United States13 the
U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. ed. 652 (1914).
""The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or thing to be
seized." U. S. Const. Amend. IV.
"Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 393, 34 S. Ct. 341, 344, 58 L. ed. 652, 656
(1914).
11
The Court has declared that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is applicable to the States, does not include the guaranties against an
unlawful search and seizure, and therefore the Due Process Clause does not require
that illegally obtained evidence be excluded from state court trials. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L. ed. 1782 (1949).
nAgnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 7o L.. ed. 145 (1925). Gouled
v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. ed. 647 (1921) held that the
surreptitious removal of papers from the office of the defendant by a federal agent
constituted an illegal search and seizure and that the admission of the papers in
evidence violated the defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. ed. 319
(1920) the Court extended the rule of the Weeks case by holding that the unlawful
act not only vitiates the evidence seized but extends to all other evidence discovered
as a result of the unlawful act. "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall
not be used before the court but that it shall not be used at all." 251 U .S. 385,
392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 183, 64 L. ed. 3!9, 321 (1920).
12 One significant limitation on the rule of the Weeks case is that the evidence
will be banned only if illegally obtained by a federal agent. The Fifth Amendment
is directed at the federal government. This, in essence, was the holding of Burdeau
v.McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L. ed. 1048 (1921), demonstrating that
the common law rule retains its vitality outside the constitutional periphery.
23277 U. S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. ed. 944 (1928). The defendants were convicted of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act. The facts disclosed
that the evidence leading to their conviction had been secured largely by intercepting messages on the telephone of the conspirators by four federal prohibition
officers. The tapping was accomplished without trespass on the property of the
defendants.
7232
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Court was squarely faced with the question of whether evidence
obtained by federal law enforcement officers by tapping the telephone
wires of an accused constituted an illegal search and seizure within
the purview of the Fourth Amendment. Conceding that the evidence
was not obtained in conformity to the "highest ethics," the Court in
a 5 to 4 decision held the evidence admissible because "The 4 th
Amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no
searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use
of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the
house or offices of the defendants."' 4 Justice Holmes, in a vigorous
dissent, characterized wire tapping as "dirty business" and declared
that it is "less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
Government should play an ignoble part."' 5 The Olmstead decision
emphasized the Court's dedication to the common law rule in the
area in which no constitutional infraction is involved which would
bring the disputed evidence within the rule of the Weeks case, and
further pointed out that any restriction upon the common law rule
must come from Congress.' 6
In 1934 Congress reacted to the Olmstead decision by enacting
the Federal Communications Act, Section 605 of which provided in
part as follows:
"... and no person not being authorized by the sender shall

intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of such
intercepted communication to any person.... "17
During the past two decades, this broadly phrased measure has
been the subject of two opposing lines of interpretation which have
"Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 464, 48 S. Ct. 564, 568,

72

L. ed. 944,

950 (1928).

"Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 470, 48 S. Ct. 564, 575, 72 L. ed. 944,
953 (1928). Justice Brandeis' dissent, which is a legal.classic,. urged that the Fourth
and Fifth amendments should not be construed so literally as to permit a breach
of the right of privacy which they were framed to safeguard. "And it is also immaterial that the intrusion was in the aid of law enforcement. Experience should
teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of
their liberty by evil minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." 277 U. S.
438, 479, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572, 7 L. ed. 944, 957 (1928).
6
"Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by
direct legislation, and thus depart from the common law of evidence." Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 465, 48 S. Ct. 564, 568, 72 L. ed. 944, 951 (1928).
1748 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 605 (1946).
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been illustrated once again in two recent decisions of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. The first of these cases,
United States v. Sullivan,1s concerned the admissibility of a recorded
conversation secured by government agents while the accused was
in conversation with an informer. The record was made at the informer's end of the line with his knowledge and consent. Judge Holtzoff,
relying upon United States v. Yee Ping Jong,19 held the evidence
was admissible, since consent of one of the parties to the conversation
is sufficient authorization within the meaning of Section 6o 5 , and
since there was no interception but a mere recording at one end of
the line.
Shortly thereafter, in United States v. Stephenson,2 0 Judge Pine,
also of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
differed sharply with Judge Holtzoff's conclusions. This case, like the
Sullivan case, involved the recording of accused's conversation with an
informer who had initiated the call. 2 ' The accused had no notice that
the conversation was being recorded and did not authorize it. The
22
court, adopting Judge Hand's opinions in United States v. Polakoff,

held: (i) that the conduct of the informer constituted an interception
within the meaning of Section 6o5; and (2) that the privilege conferred by Section 6o 5 is mutual and therefore both parties must consent to the interception of any part of their conversation.
Thus, these two decisions vividly represent the continuing controversy between the proponents of the strict regard for personal
rights and those chiefly concerned with the enforcement of the criminal
law. The result in the Sullivan case, which represents a triumph for
Mi 16 F. Supp. 480 (D. C. D. C. 1953).
"26 F. Supp. 69 (W. D. Pa. 1939). The court supported its adherence to the
Yee Ping Jong case by inferring that the Supreme Court had adopted that case
in Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 62 S. Ct. 993, 86 L. ed. 1322 (1942). In

the Goldman case, the Yee Ping Jong case was cited as authority for the court's
definition of "intercept." See note 33, infra. Judge Chase of the Second Circuit was
also of the opinion that the Supreme Court had adopted the conclusion of the Yee
Ping Jong case. See Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F. (2d) 691 at 697 (C. C. A. 2d,
1947).
1121 F. Supp. 274 (D. C. D. C. 1954).
"'Unlike the Sullivan case in which the recording was made by a government
agent who had caused the informer to call the accused, the recording in the Stephenson case was made by one Parsons; one of the parties to the conversation, who
afterwards provided the prosecution with a transcript of the recording and the
actual recording. The court found that the ban of Section 605 was broad enough
to include Parsons, and that its interdiction was not aimed only at strangers or
parties other than the participants in telephone conversation.
-211 F. (2d) 888 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
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federal law enforcement agencies, is predicated largely upon a tortured technical distinction, while the Stephenson case purports to
follow the purpose of the statute in enforcing the right of privacy.
Both points of view can be sustained by earlier decisions construing
the Federal Communications Act. Three years after the passage of
the Communications Act the Supreme Court, in Nardone v. United
States,2 3 ruled that Section 605 forbids government agents to tap wires
and divulge the information thus secured in court. Justice Roberts
in the majority opinion frankly acknowledged that the history of Section 6o5 gave no indication that Congress was dealing with a controversial rule of evidence. 24 However, the Court was of the opinion that
Congress had outlawed what was otherwise logically relevant proof
because it was "inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive
' 25
cf personal liberty.
In the years that have followed, subsequent decisions of the Court
have served to amplify and at times confuse the rule of the Nardone
case. In the next wire tapping case, the Court ruled that Section 605
not only bars evidence obtained as a direct result of wire tapping,
but also the "fruit of the poisonous tree" 26-i.e., derivative evidence
obtained as a result of having intercepted the message. During the
same term, Weiss v. United States27 further extended the prohibitions
23o2 U. S.379, 58 S. Ct. 275, 82 L. ed. 314 (1937). One lower federal court had
earlier ruled on the admissibility of evidence under Section 605 without discussing
the point. See Smith v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 556 (App. D. C. 1937). In the interim
between the passage of Section 605 and the Supreme Court decision in the Nardone case, the Federal courts sustained the admission of wire tap evidence on the
authority of the Olmstead case. See, United States v. Genello, io F. Supp. 754 (N.

D. Pa. 1935); United States v. Jenello, 78 F. (2d)

10o2

(C. C. A. 3 d,

1935).

Court pointed out that during 1932, 1933, and 1934 there was no discussion of the matter of wire tapping in Congress. "It is also true that the committee reports in connection with the Federal Communications Act dwell upon the
fact that the major purpose of the legislation was the transfer of jurisdiction over
wire and radio communications to the newly constituted Federal Communications
Commission." Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S.379, 382, 58 S.Ct. 275, 277, 82
Ld ed. 314, 316 (1937).
nNardone v. United States, 302 U. S.379, 384, 58 S. Ct. 275, 277, 82 L. ed. 314,
317 (1937)26
Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S.338, 341, 6o S. Ct. 266, 268, 84 L. ed. 307,
311 (1939). This was an appeal from a conviction secured in a new trial of the
same offenders involved in the "first" Nardone case. This decision imported into
the law of wire tapping the same ruling that had previously been enunciated in
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S.385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L. ed.
319 (192o) as to evidence seized by an illegal search and seizure in contravention
of the Fourth Amendment-i.e., the unlawful act vitiates the evidence seized and
all evidence traceable to it. See note ii, supra.
24The

2308 U. S. 321, 60 S. Ct. 269, 84 L. ed. 298 (1939).
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of Section 605 by barring the admission of intrastate communications.2- In the Weiss case the prosecution contended, among other

things, that Section 605 did not bar the disputed evidence since some
of the defendants who participated in the calls authorized the admission
of their conversations in evidence. The Court ruled that the calls were
not "authorized by the sender" within the meaning of Section 605
because the witnesses were compelled to testify by the fact that their
conversations were known to the government, and the witnesses were
induced to testify by grant of special favors.
In Goldstein v. United States the Court in a 5 to 3 decision ruled
that one not a party to an intercepted message has no standing to
invoke Section 605.29 And on the same day Goldman v. United States3o
held that the divulgence of a person's telephone conversation overheard as it is spoken into the transmitter does not constitute a violation of the Communications Act. In that case, instead of tapping
the accused's telephone wires, the Government agents working in a
room adjoining that of the accused, placed a device called a detectaphone against the partition. By means of this device the agents overheard the accused speaking into the telephone. The Court, by way
of dictum, stated that the word "interception," as used in Section 6o5,
"does not ordinarily connote the obtaining of what is to be sent before,
or at the moment, it leaves the possession of the proposed sender,
or after, or at the moment, it comes into the possession of the intended
receiver." 3' 1 Cited as authority for this statement was United States v.
Yee Ping Jong,32 one of the two lower court decisions which had considered the meaning of "interception" as used in Section 6o5 prior
to the Goldman case.
The Yee Ping Jong case involved a recording of a conversation
between an informer and the accused by means of a device attached
to the telephone wire inside the informer's house. Judge Gibson of
2wThis was, of course, a logical extenuation of the doctrine of the Nardone
case. An opposite result would have nullified Section 6o5, since the great majority of
all calls are intrastate.
"The court reasoned by analogy that since one not a victim of an illegal search
and seizure cannot be heard to protest against the admission of evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, "no broader sanction should be imposed upon
the Government in respect of violations of the Communications Act." Goldstein v.
United States, 316 U. S.114, 121, 62 S.Ct. iooo, 1oo4,86 L. ed. 1312, 1318 (1942).
1316 U. S.129, 62 S.Ct. 993, 86 L. ed. 1322 (1942).
"Goldman v. United States, 316 .U S.129, 134, 62 S.Ct. 993, 995, 86 L. ed. 1322,
1327 (1942).
L26

F. Supp. 69 (W.D. Pa. 1939).
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the Western District of Pennsylvania held that the recording of the
conversation did not constitute an "interception"3 3 within the meaning of Section 6o5 and was therefore admissible at the trial. His
reasoning was that the recording "was not obtained by a tapping of
the wire.., but was, in effect, a mere recording of the conversation
34
at one end of the line by one of the participants."
Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit reached an opposite
result in United States v. PolakofJ5 which involved a recording over
a telephone extension of a conversation between an informer and
the accused. The prosecution urged the admissibility of the recording
on the grounds that the informer, as "sender," had authorized its
admission, and that, in any event, the recording of the conversation
did not constitute an "interception." Both contentions were rejected.
As to the first, Judge Hand reasoned that every telephone conversation,
like other conversations, is antiphonal-i.e., each party is alternately
sender and receiver-and that it would deny all significance to the
privilege accorded by the statute to allow one party to surrender the
other's privilege. Further, it would be extremely unrealistic to hold
that each party had the power to consent to the interception of merely
what he said, for "in the interchange each answer may, and often
does, imply by reference some part of that to which it responds;" 36
therefore, both parties must consent to the interception in order to
make the communication admissible in evidence. Moreover, the court,
while noting that there was a technical distinction between the case
before it and those previously decided by the Supreme Court, 37 ruled
'""The manner in which the conversation in question was recorded does not
seem to present such an interception as is contemplated by the quoted statute.
Webster's New International Dictionary defines the verb 'intercept' in part as follows:
'To take or seize by the way, or before arrival at the destined place'." United States
v. Yee Ping Jong, 26 F. Supp. 69, 7o (W. D. Pa. 1939). In Goldman v. United
States, 316 U. S.129, 134, n. 8, 62 S. Ct. 993, 995, n. 8, 86 L. ed. 1322, 1327, n. 8 (1942)
the Yee Ping Jong case is cited as authority for the following statement: "As
has been rightly held, this word [intercept) indicates the taking or seizure by the
or before arrival at the destined place. It does not ordinarily connote the obtaining
of what is to be sent before, or at the moment, it leaves the possession of the proposed sender, or after, or at the moment, it comes into the possession of the intended receiver." [italics supplied]
'"United States v. Yee Ping Jong, 26 F. Supp. 69, 70 (W. D. Pa. 1939).
3112 F. (2d) 888 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940).
3United States v. Polakoff, 112 F. (2d) 888, 889 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) .
3TWeiss v. United States, 308 U. S.321, 6o S. Ct. 269, 84 L. ed. 298 (1939); Nardone
v. United States, 3o8 U. S.338, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. ed. 307 (1939); Nardone v. United
States, 302 U. S.379, 58 S. Ct. 275, 82 L. ed. 314 (1937). In these three cases the government agents had physically interposed some tapping device in the communications circuit, whereas in the Polakoff case the recording machine had been affixed
to an extension telephone.
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that the recording did constitute an "interception" within the meanof Section 6o5, since the action of the agents clearly violated the
purpose of the statute, which was to prevent breaches of the right of
privacy. 38
Although the recent ruling in the Sullivan case that the challenged
recording was admissible because its making did not constitute an
"interception," and because the introduction was authorized by the
sender, appears to circumvent the plain language and purpose of
Section 605, each of the reasons assigned finds some support in decisions of the Supreme Court. It is certainly arguable that in the
Goldman case the Supreme Court, by citing with approval the technical construction of "intercept" which Judge Gibson had invoked in
Yee Ping Jong to avoid the prohibition of Section 605, adopted a
restrictive interpretation of that word and thereby limited the scope
of the statute.30 However, since the Goldman case did not involve
an apparatus attached to a telephone wire, but dealt rather with a
situation clearly outside the ban of the statute, the approval of the
technical definition of the word "intercept" is mere dictum. If the
Court in a direct holding were to adopt this technical construction
of Section 605, it would constitute a definite limitation on the broad
prohibition originally given to the statute in the Nardone case, for as
a later decision has stated, the Nardone decision "was not the product
of a merely meticulous reading of technical language. It was the translation into practicality of broad considerations of morality and pub40
lic well-being."
Judge Holtzoff's holding that one party to a conversation may
consent to its interception 4' is also supported by authority. In Weiss
="The statute does not speak of physical interruptions of the circuit, or of
'taps'; it speaks of 'interceptions' and anyone intercepts a message to whose inter-

vention as a listener the communicants do not consent; the means he employs can
have no importance; it is the breach of privacy that counts." United States v.
Polakoff, 112 F. (2d) 888, 889 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
31Judge Chase of the Second Circuit was of this opinion: "Because I do not
believe that our decision in United States v. Polakoff ...has survived that of the
Supreme Court in Goldman v. United States.... I do not think that Sec. 6o5 of Title
47 U. S. C. A., can now be given the meaning and scope then attributed to it." Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F. (2d) 691, 697 (C. C. A. 2d, 1947).
45 Nardone v. United States, 3o8 U. S.338, 340, 60 S. Ct. 266, 267, 84 L. ed. 307, 311
(1939).
"On the point of consent, Judge Holtzoff adopted the following language from
United States v. Lewis, 87 F. Supp. 970, 973 (D. C. D. C. ig5o) which purported

to adopt the view of Judge Gibson in the Yee Ping Jong case: "In my opinion the
statute is violated if a third person, unbeknownst to either party to the conversation,

98

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIl

v. United States42 the Supreme Court held that the divulgence of the
accused's conversation had not been authorized as contended by the
prosecution, because the consent had not been voluntarily obtained.
However, it is implicit in the decision that any one party to a conversation may consent to its interception and divulgence if the consent is
gained voluntarily. 43
Thus, technically, the Sullivan decision is sound. However, it appears that the Stephenson decision more nearly accords with the original tenor of Supreme Court decisions in this field. In the Nardone
case, the Court unequivocally placed wire tapping within the ban of
Section 60544 and thereby conferred an unqualified privilege of privacy upon the participants in telephone conversations. 45 The technical construction given to Section 605 by the Sullivan case disputes
this privilege and thereby stultifies the "broad considerations of
morality and public well being" 46 which sustain the Nardone decilistens to what passes over the line and then divluges what he has heard, or, if
the third person causes the conversation to be recorded by a mechanical or electrical device, without the knowledge of either party to the conversation, and then
discloses what has been recorded. I hold that it is not a violation of the Statute if
the conversation is recorded, manually, mechanically, or electrically, at the instance
of or with the consent or knowing acquiescence of one of the parties to it." United
States v. Sullivan, 116 F. Supp. 480, 483 (D. C. D. C. 1953). The fallacy of this holding is obvious. In the first sentence the court says that a recordation of a conversation by a third party unknown to either party to the conversation, violates the
statute. It is a violation because (1) there is an interception and (2) the interception and divulgence have not been authorized by a party to the conversation. In
the second sentence the court states that the same conduct does not amount to a
violation of the statute if one party to the conversation knows or consents to the
recording. However, the court, in its eagerness to conclude that one party to a conversation may consent to its interception and divulgence, tacitly admits that the
recording of the conversation is an interception contrary to the express holding
of the Yee Ping Jong case.
4308 U.
4

S. 321, 60 S. Ct.

269, 84 L. ed. 298 (1939).

"The Act contemplates voluntary consent and not enforced agreement to
publication.... This divulgence was not consented to by either of the parties to
any of the telephone conversations." Weiss v. United States, 308 U. S. 321, 330, 6o
S. Ct. 269, 272, 84 L. ed. 298, 303 (1939). [italics supplied] There is no suggestion in
the opinion that Section 6o5 requires the consent of both parties to a conversation.
",... the plain words of Section 605 forbid anyone, unless authorized by the
sender, to intercept a telephone message, and direct in equally clear language that
,no person' shall divulge or publish the message or its substance to 'any person'."
Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379, 382, 58 S. Ct. 275, 276, 82 L. ed. 314, 316

(1937).
4

5Dean Wigmore vehemently rejected the "unguarded language of the opinion in
Nardone v. United States" for recognizing a privilege and called for its early repudiation. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1935) 544.
"ONardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 34 o , 6o S. Ct. 266, 267, 84 L. ed. 307,
311 (1939).
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sion. This evasion of the prohibitions of Section 605 by such strained
technical artifice drains the statute of its vitality and meaning, and,
as Justice Frankfurter has observed, "A decent respect for the policy
of Congress must save us from imputing to it [Section 605] a self47
defeating, if not disengenuous purpose."
The Sullivan and Stephenson decisions succinctly demonstrate the
need for a decisive interpretation of the scope and purpose of Section 605. Unquestionably this conflict cannot be resolved at the
lower federal court level; the solution must eventually come from
either the Supreme Court or Congress. If the Supreme Court is presented with an opportunity to pass upon the issue presented by these
cases, it should either reaffirm the broad policy ban of the Nardone decision or candidly admit that it has modified its attitude towards the
use of certain evidence obtained by wire tapping. In deciding whether
the conduct in question in these cases is prohibited by Section 605,
the Court should avoid any mechanical definition of wire tapping,
since any such definition will necessarily be incomplete and complex due to the great variety of devices and methods of wire tapping.
Since, however, the controversy stems from the interpretation of a
statute, it seems that supplemental legislation by Congress would be
the most effective solution.4 8 Obviously Congress cannot foresee and
provide for every possible situation that may arise under such a
statute, but by clearly defining the scope and purpose of its legislation
it can provide guidance to courts faced with problems of statutory
construction.
WILLIAM

R.

COGAR

EVIDENCE-VALIDITY OF STATUTE MAKING ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE

ADMISSIBLE IN GAMBLING PROSECUTION IN ONE COUNTY OF STATE.

[United States Supreme Court]
Persuasive reasoning has been advanced to support both the common law and federal rules as to the admissibility of evidence obtained
by illegal search and seizure. At common law, the evidence is admitted
'Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341, 6o S. Ct. 266, 267, 84 L. ed. 307, 311
(1939).
"SFor suggested remedial legislation, See, Brownell, The Public Security and
Wiretapping (1954) 39 Corn. L. Q. 195; Westin, The Wiretapping Problem: An
Analysis and a Legislative Proposal (1952) 52 Col. L. Rev. 165; Note (1950) 2 Stan.
L. Rev. 744.
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on the theory that the evidence itself is not bad and if it were not admitted many guilty persons would go free.' Courts which have followed
this theory, of course, hold that no constitutional provisions have been
violated. The federal courts have rejected illegally obtained evidence
since the decision in Weeks v. United States,2 in which the Supreme
Court held that to admit such evidence would be violative of the
Fourth Amendment guaranty of immunity from unlawful search and
seizure. On the other hand, in 1949 it was established in Wolf v. Colorado3 that the states may, without violating the constitutional rights
of the accused, admit evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure,
as long as they do not affirmatively sanction its obtention in this
manner. At the time of the Wolf decision thirty states rejected the
Weeks doctrine and seventeen states were in agreement with it.4
In 1929, the State of Maryland, which had theretofore rejected the
Weeks doctrine, passed the Bouse Act 5 which provided that illegally
obtained evidence should not be admissible in the prosecutions of misdemeanors, thereby substantially adopting the federal rule with regard to such prosecutions. In 1951, an amendment 6 to the Bouse Act
was adopted which exempted Anne Arundel County from its operation
in the prosecutions of certain gambling misdemeanors. As a result,
part of the state is governed by the federal rule and part of the state
by the common law rule; and even in the latter part, some gambling
misdemeanors are prosecuted under one rule of evidence, while other
gambling misdemeanors are prosecuted under a different rule.
'In People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13 , 15o N. E. 585, 589 (1926) Judge Cardozo
stated: "The question is whether protection for the individual would not be gained
at a disproportionate loss of protection for society." Also State v. Turner, 82 Kan.
787, 1o9 Pac. 654 at 657 (191o).
2232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. ed. 652 (1914).
3338 U. S. 25 at 30, 69 S. Ct. 1359 at 1362, 93 L. ed. 1782 at 1787 (1949). The
court stated that equally effective means were available to protect a person's right
to privacy and thus satisfy the Due Process Clause. The offending officers are subject
to the common law remedy of damages, and statutes provide for criminal punishment.
'See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 38, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 1367, 93 L. ed. 1782,
1791 (1949).
1
Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1947 Supp.) Art. 35, Sec. 5: "No evidence in the trial
of misdemeanors shall be deemed admissible where the same shall have been procured by, through, or in consequence of any illegal search or seizure...." Lawrence v. Maryland, 1o3 Md. 17, 63 Atl. 96 at 1o2 to 1o4 (i9o6) exemplifies Maryland
decisions applying the common law rule prior to the passage of the Bouse Act.
6
Md. Laws (1951) c. 704: "Provided, further, that nothing in this section shall
prohibit the use of such evidence in Anne Arundel county in prosecution of any
person for a violation of the gambling laws as contained in sections 288 to 307...."
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In the recent case of Salsburg v. Maryland,7 defendant was accused
of a gambling misdemeanor covered by the amendment, and a conviction was obtained by the use of evidence that had been obtained by
illegal search and seizure. Conceding that the legislature had the
power to choose either of the two rules if applied uniformly, defendant
contended in the original proceding that the Maryland statute was unconstitutional as denying him the equal protection of the law by allowing illegally obtained evidence to be admitted in one county and not in
another, and also for the reason that the evidence is made inadmissible in other prosecutions of substantially the same nature in Anne
Arundel County. Defendant further contended that the amendment
is invalid because it affirmatively sanctions illegal searches and seizures. The majority of the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction, sustaining the validity of the statute, though Justice
Douglas dissented, reasserting his earlier argument that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment guaranty of immunity from illegal search and seizure preclude the
use of this evidence. 8
The opinion of the majority, being made up of several unrelated
and sometimes seemingly contradictory assertions, is somewhat confusing. The Court began by stating that "Whatever may be our view as
to the desirability of the classifications, we conclude that the 1951
amendment is within the liberal legislative license allowed a state
in prescribing rules of practice." 9 It then observed that even though
a law is illogical and unscientific, it may still be valid.10 This reference was followed by the statement that "The Equal Protection Clause
relates to equality between persons as such rather than between
areas."" If this statement be true, then the Court's preceding and
subsequent discussion of the reasonableness of classification is irrelevant, since reasonableness is a requisite only in situations where
the Equal Protection Clause does apply.12 After asserting that the
"346 U. S. 545, 74 S. Ct. 280, 98 L. ed. (advance p. 207) (1954), afE'g Salsburg
v. State, 2o Md. 212, 94 A. (2d) 280 (1953).
8346 U. S. 545, 554, 555, 74 S. Ct. 280, 285, 98 L. ed. (advance pp. 207, 213) (1954).
Justice Douglas advanced this argument in his dissent in Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U. S. 25, 40, 41, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 1372, 93 L. ed. 1782, 1792 (1949).
0346 U. S. 545, 549, 74 S. Ct. 280, 282, 98 L. ed. (advance pp. 207, 211) (1954).
'ODominion Hotel, Inc. v. State of Arizona, 249 U. S. 265, 39 S. Ct. 273, 63 L. ed.
597 (1919); Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 33 S. Ct. 441,
57 L. ed. 730 (1913).
"346 U- S. 545, 551, 74 S. Ct. 280, 283, 98 L. ed. (advance pp. 207, 211) (1954).
"2The only instances in which a discussion of reasonableness of classification has
been found are those dealing with the question of whether the Equal Protection
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state legislature may constitutionally determine rules of evidence for
each of its local subdivisions, the Court returned to the factor of
reasonableness by holding that defendant did not carry the burden of
showing the classification to be unreasonable. In answer to the defendant's contention that the amendment of 1951 affirmatively
sanctioned illegal searches and seizures in violation of the Due Process
Clause, the Court simply declared that the text of the statute did not
suggest approval and that it offered no immunity to offending searchers and seizers.
In support of the principle that the Equal Protection Clause relates
to persons and not to areas, the Court relied heavily on Missouri v.
Lewis.'2 That case sustained a state statute which required that in the
city of St. Louis and four named counties, appeals in all except a few
specified types of cases14 were to be made to the St. Louis Court of
Appeals and not to the Supreme Court of Missouri as was done in
the other counties of the state. The basis of the decision was that "[the
Equal Protection Clause] means that no person or class of persons shall
be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place and under like circumstances."15
However, the decision in the Lewis case may not be absolutely controlling in the principal case because the Missouri legislation was aimed
at facilitating court procedure for all persons, while the Maryland
legislation was aimed at facilitating convictions of persons accused of
one special offense in one particular part of the state. The Maryland
statute was much more limited in its coverage than was the Missouri
statute. It is important to note that the Lewis case dealt with procedure from the standpoint of access to the courts and not with the type
evidence to be admitted. Admittedly, rules of evidence are procedural, 6
but they obviously tend to have a more substantial effect on the outcome of the case than do rules of court mechanics. The Missouri court
Clause of the 14th Amendment has been violated. The following authorities verify
this point: Loftin v. Crowley's, Inc., 15o Fla. 836, 8 S. (2d) 909 (1942); Fountain
Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465 (1927); Brannon, The Fourteenth
Amendment (1901) 323; Corwin, The Constitution of the United States of America

-(1953) 1145.
13101 U. S. 22, 25 L. ed. 989 (1879).
"Cases involving a sum greater than $2,5oo, cases involving a construction of

the Constitution of the United States, and some other cases of special characteristics.
25101 U. S. 22, 31, 25 L. ed. 989, 992 (1879).
"-Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 6oo,

Laws (1934) §§ 585, 597-

124

N. E. 477 (19ig); Restatement, Conflict of
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hinted at a reasonableness requirement when it observed that "Where
part of a State is thickly settled, and another part has but few inhabitants, it may be desirable to have different systems of judicature for
the two portions,-trial by jury in one, for example, and not in the
other. Large cities may require a multiplication of courts and a peculiar arrangement of jurisdictions."' 7 It would be a strikingly different
situation if the Maryland statute had established a different court
system for persons accused of gambling misdemeanors; the Lewis case
would be much stronger authority for such action.
The Court also cited Mallett v. North Carolina8 and Hayes v.
9
Missouri1
in support of its holding that the Equal Protection Clause
relates to persons and not to areas. There again, however, the legislation had dealt with the question of different court procedures for
different areas rather than with the substantially different question of
admissible evidence.
The decisions in the only cases found dealing with different rules
of evidence for different areas have not been decided on the theory
that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply. In Commissioner of
Public Welfare v. Torres,20 a New York intermediate court held that
a statute which required corroboration on the subject of access in
paternity proceedings in the city of New York but did not require it
elsewhere was unconstitutional as in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The classification was
found to be unreasonable since the evil which the statute sought to
combat existed in other parts of the state as well as in New York City.2 1
101 U. S. 22, 32, 25 L.

ed. 989,

992

(1879).

28181 U. S. 589, 21 S. Ct. 7,0, 45 L. ed. 1oi5 (igoi). This case dealt with appeals being allowed to the State Supreme Court from one district and not being
allowed from another district after the granting of a new trial to an accused
person.
112o U. S. 68, 7 S. Ct. 350, 3o L. ed. 578 (1887). This case involved a statute
which allowed fifteen peremptory challenges in jury trials in towns of over loo,ooo
persons and only eight such challenges elsewhere.
_63 App. Div. ig, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 101 (1941).
n12 63 App. Div. 19, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 101, 103, 104 (1941). The respondent contended that "the legislature could properly consider conditions peculiar to life in
a great city and because of the fact that persons in such a congested area can carry
on activities about which their neighbors know nothing, the problem of getting
persons to testify falsely in filiation proceedings is less difficult than in smaller communities, ... " The court stated, however, that "It has been held that criminal
laws are not necessarily unconstitutional even if they bear unequally on persons in
different parts of the state where the evil that the Legislature has in view exists
only in the great cities and not in rural districts. ... But the discrimination herein
cannot reasonably be construed as affecting an evil that exists only in one city of
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The decision clearly rests on the court's assumption that the Equal
Protection Clause does apply to area classification. The same result
was reached in another decision of an Appellate Division Court with
regard to a statute which admitted testimony of mothers as to nokn22
access in the city of New York but not elsewhere.
Thus, it would seem that while the Equal Protection Clause does
not apply to areas as such, yet when different treatment of different
areas results in discrimination against people in one area as compared
to people of other areas, then the Equal Protection Clause is violated
unless there is a reasonable basis for treating different people differently.
The rule that classification must not be capricious or arbitrary, but
must be reasonable and natural, is fundamental, 23 but the diffculty
arises in its application. The Court in the Salsburg case did not go
into this question at length because the burden of establishing that
the law is unreasonable was not on the attorney-general, 24 and the
Court ruled that defendant did not overcome the presumption of
reasonableness. The main requisite is that there must be some reasonable relation between the classification and the object sought to be
accomplished. 25 This "reasonable relation" test seems to dissolve into
the state and has no existence in all other parts of the state." The situation in the
Salsburg case seems to be closely analogous to this situation. The evil of gambling
certainly exists in other counties than Anne Arundel.
22Com'r of Public Welfare v. Ladutko, 256 App. Div. 775, i1 N. Y. S. (2d) 747
('939)3Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 3O U. S. 459, 57 S.
Ct. 838, 81 L. ed. 1223 (1937); Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers
Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 57 S. Ct. i39, 81 L. ed. log, io6 A. L. R. 1476 (1936); Atchison
T. & S. F. Rd. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 19 S.Ct. 6o9, 43 L. ed. 9o9 (1899); 12
Am. Jur., Const. Law § 48o.
2
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 55 S. Ct. 538, 79
L. ed. 1oo (1935); Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U. S.152, 39 S. Ct.
227, 63 L. ed. 527 (1919); Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 31
S. Ct. 337, 55 L. ed. 369 (1911); Atchison T. & S. F. Rd. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S.
96, 19 S. Ct. 609, 43 L. ed. 909 (1899).
2SOld Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 at
197, 57 S.Ct. 139 at 146, 81 L. ed. 1o9 at 121, 1o6 A. L. R. 1476 at 1485 (1936) (classification giving owners of goods identified by trademarks, brands or names privileges
with regard to contract provisions as to resale prices, which were not given to owners
of unidentified goods, held to be reasonable as object was to afford remedy for
injury to the good will which can result to owners of identifiable goods); Colgate v.
Harvey, 296 U. S.404 at 423, 56 S. Ct. 252 at 256, 8o L. ed. 299 at 307, 102 A. L. R.
54 at 61 (1935) (statute imposing tax on dividends earned outside the state and exempting dividends earned within the state held to be based on reasonable classification, because its effect was to equalize taxes since the domestic corporations had
to pay state franchise taxes); Atchinson, T. & S. F. Rd. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S.
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a simple "relation" test-i.e., if any relation can be found between the
classification and the object to be accomplished, the courts tend to
hold the relation reasonable. The presumption that the legislature
acts reasonably is a strong one, and "the courts need not be ingenious
in searching for grounds of distinction to sustain a classification that
may be subject to criticism." 26 On this basis, the classification dealing
with two types of gambling misdemeanors in two different ways might
be deemed by the courts as satisfying the test when it is shown that
the difficulty of obtaining evidence varies with the two offenses. Also,
on this basis it might be found that the classification between areas
was reasonable due to the fact that there were more gamblers present
in one area than the other. Neither of the above classifications, however, seem to be "reasonable," even though there are some reasons for
27
them.
The Supreme Court observed that there was no doubt that Maryland could, under the home-rule law, let each county determine which
rule of evidence it would apply, and thus the State might itself determine such an issue for each of its local subdivisions. Local home-rule
charters are subject to the constitution and to the public general
laws.2 8 The Maryland Constitution, as well as many other state constitutions,2 9 provides that "the General Assembly shall pass no special
law for any case for which provision has been made by an existing
96 at 104, 19 S. Ct. 6o9 at 612, 43 L. ed. gog at 912 (1899) (statute which gave plaintiff right to recover attorney's fees from railroads that negligently set fire to property
of plaintiff and which did not apply to other negligent corporations, held to be
based on valid classification, under police power of state to make railroads more
careful since they were cause of most such fires).
"'Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U. S. 152, 158, 39 S. Ct. 227,
229, 63 L. ed. 527, 531 (1919).
-"Examples of cases where classification was held to be unreasonable: State v.
Pate, 47 N. M. 182, 138 P. (2d) ioo6 (1943) (statute, which provided that nonresident motorists who are gainfully employed must obtain licenses and those who
are not gainfully employed do not have to obtain licenses for three months, was in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause as it was discrimination between nonresident motorists and not valid classification); Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn.
390, 103 S. W. 798 (1907) (statute that dealt with distress sale of property of delinquent taxpayers in city of Memphis in stricter manner than with other delinquent taxpayers was held to be unconstitutional as class legislation as there was
no good reason for discrimination); State v. Neveau, 237 Wis. 85, 294 N. W. 796 (1940)
(provision of statute relating to unfair competition and trade practices in barber
trade that statute should not apply to any county having population of 30,000 or
less was held void as making improper classification, because business of barbering
in these cities is no different than that in more populous counties).
"Md. Const. (1867) Art. XI A, § i.
"Ark. Const. (1874) Art. 5, § 25; II. Const. (187o) Art. IV, § 22; Ind. Const. (1851)
Art. 4, §§22, 23; Pa. Const. (1874) Art III, § 7-
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general law," 30 and the Maryland court has held many times that
special laws, as opposed to local laws, 31 are not allowed when there is
a general law on the subject. 32 In the Salsburg case, the Bouse Act
was a general law and the 1951 amendment was a special one. In
theory it was to be applied to all persons within the area, but in practice it was aimed at gamblers as a class. It is unconstitutional to divide
one class into two parts and then have one governed by a different
set of rules than the other. 33 This statute takes the class of persons
who violate misdemeanor gambling laws and divides it into two classes
with different rules of evidence applying to each.
The Court relied on two Maryland cases which are distinguishable
from the principal case as they involve local laws as opposed to special
ones. 34 The Court also cited the Arkansas case of Fort Smith Light &
TractorCo. v. Board of Improvement 35 in support of its ruling. Arkansas has a constitutional provision similar to that of Maryland, 30 but
the act in question was in the form of a general law, though it actually
-Md. Const. (1867) Art. III, § 33.
"t"Local laws 'apply to all persons within the territorial limits prescribed by
the act,' while a special law applies to particular persons or things of a class." State
v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 113 Md. 179, 77 At. 433, 435 (i91o).
"Crisfield v. Chesapeake & P. T. Co., 131 Md. 444, 1o2 Atd. 751 (1918) (general
law regulated telephone rates throughout the state; a later law, which gave one
city power to regulate their own rates, was held to violate Md. Const., Art. III, § 33);
State v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 113 Md. 179, 77 Atl. 433 (ig9o) (act of the legislature which required railroad to place safety gate at one particular crossing was
held to violate Md. Const., Art. III, § 33); Baltimore v. Starr Church, 1o6 Md. 281, 67
Ad. 261 (19o7) (where there was general law dealing with tax exemptions, law
which exempted specific piece of church property was in conflict with Md. Const.,
Art. III, § 33).
"Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465 (1927) (A statute
granted eminent domain powers to chautauqua associations which had been in
existence fifteen years, had annual programs of not less than sixteen days and had
leased timber lands for fifteen years. Those powers were not granted to other chautaugua associations, and the statute was declared unconstitutional as not based
on a reasonable classification.); State v. Walsh, 136 Mo. 400, 37 S. W. 1112 (1896) (A
statute which made it illegal to make book and sell pools at any other place than
on the premises of a race track was held to be unconstitutional). Contra: New York
v. Bennett, 113 Fed. 515 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 19o2).
mNeuenschwander v. Sanitary Commission, 187 Md. 67, 48 A. (2d) 593 (1946) (A
law relating to notice of suit to municipal corporation after injury exempted several counties from its operation. It was held to be a local law); Stevens v. State,
89 Md. 669, 43 Ad. 929 (1899) (A law made it an offense to have certain type game
in one's possession in certain areas and not in others. Here, there was no general law for this law to be in conflict with and also this law was held to be a
local one).
"5274 U. S. 387, 47 S. Ct. 595, 71 L. ed. 1112 (1927).
"Ark Const. (1874) Art. 5, § 25.
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applied only to one city. Thus, there was no special law enacted
where a general law was applicable. 37
It is well established that an affirmative sanction of illegal search
and seizure is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
amendment; 38 but since offending searchers and seizers were offered no
protection or immunity by the Maryland statute, the Court rejected
the contention of defendant that the legislation gave such affirmative
sanction. It would seem, however, that the obvious effect of the statute
is to encourage illegal searches and seizures.3 9 Originally Maryland
followed the common law rule admitting illegally obtained evidence.
Then the legislature by passing the Bouse Act saw fit to change the
rule that had been established by the courts. At this stage the policy
of the state was dogmatically declared to be opposed to the admission
of illegally obtained evidence. Still later, by amendment, the legislature withdrew Anne Arundel County from the scope of the act.
The effect of the action of the legislature must be to suggest to law
enforcement officers that the state does not object to the obtaining of
evidence by illegal means in the specified county for the specified
types of prosecutions. The legislature affirmatively sanctioned the use
of such evidence, and it certainly cannot be used unless it is first obtained.
The mere fact that gambling is more prevelant in one county than
in the others does not seem to justify this drastic legislation. Since it
is doubtful that the gamblers will change professions, one of the effects
of the act may well be that they will change locations. This prospect
is borne out by the Court in its statement that the increased gambling
in Anne Arundel County could be attributed to the fact that neighboring Baltimore had become so strict as to drive gambling operations
into adjoining areas. Thus, one county's problems are pushed on to
another county, which might result in another amendment making
illegally obtained evidence admissible in the second county. Ultimately
"The excessive use of special and local laws does not seem desirable. This
problem was recognized by the Indiana court when it stated: "The present legislative tendency toward special and local legislation under the guise and verbiage of
general laws should be checked, by the legislature itself, or by the courts if it fails
to do so; otherwise the body of the law will revert to the chaotic condition which
existed under the old constitution of 186...." Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199
Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 469 (1927).
""'Accordingly, we have no hesitation in saying that were a state affirmatively
to sanction police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of
the Fourteenth Amendment." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 28, 69 S. Ct. 1359,
1361, 93 L. ed. 1782, 1786 (1949).
3Note (1953) 33 B. U. L. Rev. 410, 413.
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the general law would be stripped of all effect. Also, the uniformity
provisions of state constitutions would become meaningless and
impotent as it would be possible for the legislatures to enact laws for
each individual county, city, town or even smaller political subdivision, justified, not by reasonableness, but by the rationale of the
principal case.
JOHN F. KAY, JR.

FEDERAL PROCEDURE-VENUE OF ORIGINAL ACTION AS SUPPORTING THIInPARTY PROCEEDING NOT MAINTAINABLE AS INDEPENDENT ACTION.

[Federal]
Though the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated for
the purposes of simplifying federal court procedure and of providing
for the adjudication of all facets of a controversy in a single suit,'
problems of jurisdiction and venue presented by these Rules have
threatened to reduce the ability of the courts to give effect to the
latter purpose. One area of controversy centers around the problem of
whether the venue of an original action is sufficient to support a thirdparty proceeding which could not be maintained as an independent
action because of improper venue. Neither the cases nor the legal
writers are in accord on this point. One group of authorities, the
"strict constructionists," maintains that a third-party proceeding provided for under Rule 142 must comply with jurisdictional and venue
requirements as if it were an original action.3 The cases following this

view rely in part on Rule 82 which states that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure "shall not be construed to extend or limit the juris4
diction of the district courts.., or the venue of actions therein."
The second group, "the liberal constructionists," holds that third-party
proceedings do not need independent grounds of jurisdiction and
'This intention is evidenced in Rule i, whith states in part that the rules "shall
be construed so as to secure the just, speedy, 'and inexpensive determination of
every action." [italics supplied.]
2
Rule 14(a) provides in part that "a defendant may move.., for leave as a
third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a person not a party
to the action who is or may be liable to him or to the plaintiff or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him."
3Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. C. Conn.
1939); King v. Shepherd, 26 F. Supp. 357 (W. D. Ark. 1938); Willis, Five Years of
Federal Third-Party Practice (1943) 29 Va. L. Rev. 981.
'King v. Shepherd, 26 F. Supp. 357, 358 (W. D. Ark. 1938).
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venue because they are ancillary to the original proceeding and are
supported by the jurisdiction and venue 5 of that proceeding.
The latest case to pass on this problem is United States v. Acord,6
decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Plaintiff, Acord, a resident of the Eastern District of Oklahoma,
brought an action in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma against the Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific
Railroad for injuries sustained when he was struck by a mail pouch
thrown from one of its trains passing through the Eastern District of
Oklahoma.7 The pouch was thrown by a mail clerk employed by the
United States, but suit was brought against the Railroad on the theory
that its station agent was negligent in failing to warn Acord of the
danger. The Railroad filed a third-party complaint against the United
States, seeking indemnity for all sums that might be adjudged against
it in favor of Acord. The United States moved to dismiss the thirdparty complaint on the ground that under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, upon which the claims for idemnity were based, the venue was in
the Eastern District and not in the Western District of Oklahoma.8
The motion was overruled, the case was tried by the court without a
jury, and the court entered judgment in favor of Acord against the
1

Moncrief v. Pennsylvania R., 73 F. Supp. 815 (E. D. Pa. 1947); United States
(2d) 709 (C. A. ioth, 1954). The cleavage on this question is
pointed up most graphically by two cases arising out of the same air accidentMorrell v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 757 (S. D. N. Y. 1939)
and Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. C. Conn. 1939)in both of which the defendant airline impleaded the United Air Craft Corp., and
the Bethlehem Steel Co., praying that it be allowed to recover from these thirdparty defendants such amounts as it may be compelled to pay as damages for the
death of the passengers. In the former of these two cases, a New York Federal district court held that the third party proceeding was "ancillary," and, therefore,
the venue requirements of an independent action need not be met. In the latter,
the Connecticut federal district court, after admitting that th action was "ancillary"
for jurisdictional purposes reached the conclusion that the third-party claim
Under Rule 14(a) must meet the requirements of an independent action.
62o9 F. (2d) 709 (C. A. ioth, 1954).
7The venue was properly laid in this action. 62 Stat. 935 (1948),28 U. S. C. A.
§ 1391(a) (195o) provides that "a civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only
on diversity of citizenship may. . be brought only in the judicial district where
all the plaintiffs or all the defendants reside." The jurisdictional basis of this action
is diversity of citizenship, and the Western District of Oklahoma is the residence
of the defendant.
"62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U. S. C. A. § 1402(b) (1950) provides that "Any civil
action on a tort claim against the United States ... may be prosecuted only in the
judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred in that district. Here the plaintiff was a resident of the Eastern
District of Oklahoma, and the act of omission complained of occurred in that district.
v. Acord, 2o9 F.
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Railroad, and in the third-party proceeding, against the United States
in favor of the Railroad in the amount awarded Acord.
On appeal by the United States, the Court of Appeals held that inasmuch as the third-party proceeding against the United States was
ancillary to the principal action against the Railroad, the venue in the
principal action would support the third-party proceeding, notwithstanding the requirement of the Federal Tort Claims Act that venue
of actions thereunder shall be the judicial district wherein the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurs.9
Judge Bratton dissented on the grounds that the decision of the court
nullifies the controlling special statute and gives no effect whatever to
Rule 82.1 0The Supreme Court denied certiorari."
The pivotal issue presented is whether a third-party proceeding
such as the one in the principal case is ancillary or whether it is an
independent action in which compliance with venue requirements is
necessary. The commentators generally agree that as to intervention of
right,12 compulsory counterclaims,' 3 and third-party claims, 1 4 no
independent ground of jurisdiction, as distinguished from venue, is
required. However, the cases so holding do not afford much aid to an
analysis of the ancillary concept since many of them have been
content merely to invoke the term "ancillary" as some kind of "magic
word," without attempting to explore its meaning.' 5
The foundation of third-party practice lies in the common law
doctrine of "vouching to warranty."' 6 This device was employed in
the situation in which A sold land to B with a warranty of title, and
C, a stranger, sued to recover the land. Under such circumstances,
B could vouch A in as warrantor and request that he defend the action
brought by C. If the vouchee came in as he was requested to do, no
independent jurisdictional grounds were required as to him since he
OThe judgment of the district court was reversed, however, on the ground that
under applicable Oklahoma law there is no contribution nor indemnity between joint
tort-feasors.
1
See United States v. Acord, 2og F. (2d) 7o9, 716 (C. A. ioth, 1954).
"Certiorari denied, 347 U. S. 975, 74 S. Ct. 786, 98 L. ed. 1114 (1954).
1-4 Moore, Federal Practice

(2d ed. 1950) § 24.18; Notes (1951) 64 Harv. L.

Rev. 968, 974; (1940) 13 So. Cal. L. Rev. 466, 47o.
"3 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948) § 13.15; Notes(195i) 64 Harv. L. Rev.
o .
968, 972; (1940) 13 So. Cal. L. Rev. 466, 47
4

See 3 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948) § 14.26 at 496 for an exhaustive
list of authorities so holding.
"5See Willis, Five Years of Federal Third-Party Practice (1943) 29 Va. L. Rev.

981, 999.
23 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948) § 14.02.
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III

would be bound by the outcome of the action regardless of whether or
not he availed himself of B's request.
By analogy to intervention, there seems to be a further basis for
regarding a third-party claim as ancillary. In a typical case of intervention of right, a third-party is allowed to come in without alleging
independent grounds of jurisdiction and venue, for by hypothesis he
should be in the action because he will be bound by the outcome. 17
Since the intervenor is almost forced to come in to protect his rights,
he would never object to the venue as applied to him. One of the
parties- already in court might object but would not be successful in
so doing since Rule 24 (a) of the Federal Rules provides that a
party shall be permitted to intervene when he may "be bound by a
judgment in the action." Superficially it may appear that intervention
and "vouching to warranty" differ from a third-party practice case
in that both the warrantor in the "vouching to warranty" situation
and the intervenor in intervention seemingly come in of their own
volition while in a third-party practice case, the third-party defendant
has no alternative. This difference is more apparent than real, however,
for in the former two cases, regardless of the permissive language
used, the third-party is bound by the results whether he comes into
the action or not, and so, in effect, he is forced into the action to
protect his rights.
It would seem, however, that the underlying basis for holding
that one proceeding is ancillary to another is the similarity of the subject matter of the two proceedings, rather than the identity, number,
and relationship of the parties involved.' 8 Speaking in a compulsory
counterclaim case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
asserted that it is a "well established principle that a Federal court
has 'ancillary' jurisdiction to complete adjudication of interrelated
matters where its jurisdiction has once been competently invoked."' 9
The matters involved in a third-party proceeding are closely related to
the main claim and may fairly be considered as ancillary to it; and this
conclusion is not weakened because the new parties are brought into
the overall proceeding, for "it has long been established that ancillary
"TAn example of an intervention of right is found in the case of United States v.
C. M. Lane Lifeboat Co., 25 F. Supp. 410 (E. D. N. Y. 1938). In that case the
government brought suit to recover on a bond. The party who had agreed to
indemnify the surety was allowed an intervention of right because he would
be bound by a judgment against the surety.
2nNote (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 449, 456.
' Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp., 144 F. (2d) 968, 973 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
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jurisdiction over the subject matter may obtain even though the
supplemental proceeding brings in new parties." 20 Moreover, it has
been noted that although a third-party suit is not always "in aid of"
the main action, it is always "subordinate to" the main action, thereby bringing it within the dictionary definition that ancillary means
"subordinate to or in aid of" another action. 21
It is submitted that the arguments which support the holding that

a third-party proceeding is ancillary for jurisdictional purposes, are
at least equally valid with regard to venue.22 In this connection,
it should be noted that lack of proper venue can be waived, whereas
the requirement for federal jurisdiction cannot. It may be argued,
therefore, that if a third-party action is exempt from the basic jurisdictional requirements which otherwise must be met, exemption
should even more surely follow in regard to venue, the requirements
of which can be waived by the defendant.
There can be no doubt that to apply the ancillary concept in the
field of third-party practice does involve an extension of its scope from
the traditional, restricted usage in actions of addition and substitu-

tion,23 but it has been appropriately observed that "however well
settled may be the general principle of federal ancillary jurisdiction,
nevertheless, it is sufficiently... 'amorphous' to afford a justification
for a considerable amount of desirable procedural reform." 24 Some
authorities regard this extension of the ancillary concept as unwarranted 25 because it operates to deprive a person of his statutory right
20

Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp. 29 F. Supp. 112, 115 (D. C. Conn.

1939)-

"Schram v. Roney, 3o F. Supp. 458, 461 (E. D. Mich. 1939).
="It seems difficult to discern why a proceeding which is regarded as ancillary
for the purposes of jurdiction should not likewise be ancillary for all other purposes, including venue." Holtzoff, Some Problems Under Federal Third-party
Practice (1941) 3 La. L. Rev. 408, 416. See also 3 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed.
1948) § 14.28; Notes (1954) 40 Va. L. Rev. 628; (1948) 46 Mich. L. Rev. 1o69; (1951)
64 Harv. L. Rev. 968; (1940) 13 So. Cal. L. Rev. 466; (1940) 26 Va. L. Rev- 376.
nIln these cases it has been held that where a defendant of the same state
as the plantiff is added or substituted, the court, having jurisdiction of the principal action, will not be divested of that jurisdiction by virtue of the addition or
substitution, even though in an original action between the parties the court
would not have jurisdiction on the basis of diversity. Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U. S.
236, 6 S. Ct. 714, 29 L. ed. 820 (1886); Hardenberg v. Ray, 151 U. S. 112, 14 S. Ct.
305, 38 L. ed. 93 (1894); Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U. S. 222, 56 S. Ct. 204, 8o L.

ed. 192 (1935); Harris v. Hess, io Fed. 263 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1882); United States
v. American Surety Co., 25 F. Supp. 700 (E. D. N. Y. 1938).
O'Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp., 144 F. (2d) 968, 974 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
25King v. Shepherd, 26 F. Supp. 357 (W. D. Ark. 1938); Lewis v. United Air
Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. C. Conn. 1939). See Tullgren v. Jasper, 27
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to be sued only in a certain district, 26 and because it involves a contravention of the express prohibition of Rule 82.27 To these criticisms of
a liberal interpretation of Rule 14, its defenders answer that a thirdparty residing outside of the district in which the action is brought
suffers no greater hardship in making his defenses there than that
which must be borne by a non-resident defendant in an original action.28 In addition they point to the fact that the third-party still
has the protection of Rule 4 (f) which provides that he must be served
with process within the state.20 To be sure, these particular factors are
irrelevant to the legal argument, but from a practical standpoint they
insure the non-resident defendant of a measure of protection. 30
It should be noted that no attempt has been made in this discussion to treat that provision of Rule 14 which makes it possible for an
original plaintiff to assert a claim against a third-party defendant. 31
In this situation most courts require independent grounds of jurisdiction and venue, at least where the third party defendant is of the same
citizenship as the plaintiff. As one court has stated: "It is difficult to
comprehend why this Court should now have jurisdiction over a claim
of a New York plaintiff against a New York defendant after they
are brought together through the circuitous means of a third party
complaint and then an amended main complaint... to accept jurisdiction herein might open the door to circumvention of the diversity
rule by use of a friendly original defendant." 32 There is some authority
F. Supp. 413, 418 (D. C. Md. 1939); Willis, Five Years of Federal Third-party
Practice (1943) 29 Va. L. Rev. 981.
-nWillis, Five Years of Federal Third-Party Practice (1943) 29 Va. L. Rev. 981.
"'This is the view taken by the dissent in the principal case. United States v.
Acord, 2o9 F. (2d) 709, 717 (C. A. ioth, 1954): "But Rule 82 provides that the rules
shall not be construed to extend the jurisdiction of the district court or the venue of

actions. Since the plaintiff resides in the Eastern District of Oklahoma and the
tort occurred in that district, it seems clear to me that to sustain jurisdiction of
the court in the Western District of Oklahoma to entertain the third-party complaint ...gives no effect whatever to Rule 82."
83 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948) § 14.28 at 504.
2Willis, Five Years of Federal Third-Party Practice (1943) 29 Va. L. Rev. 981
at 1oo9; 3 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948) § 14.28 at 5o4; Note (1940) 13 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 466 at 473.
'4A further practical consideration of great significance lies in the fact that the
complete adjudication in one action of all claims centering around a single occurence "renders the Federal courts some valuable assistance in their struggle
against crowded dockets." See Note (1954) 40 Va. L. Rev. 628, 63o.
31F.R.C.P., Rule 14 (a) provides in part that "The plaintiff may assert any
claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff...."
nHoskie v. Prudential Insurance Co., 39 F. Supp. 305, 306 (E. D. N. Y. 1941).
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that the same view should be taken as to venue, 33 but Professor Moore
contends that there is a clear distinction between venue and jurisdic34
tion in such a case.
The decision of the majority in the principal case seems to be
sustainable on every ground of consideration. As has been pointed out,
there is a sound basis for extending the concept of ancillary jurisdiction to third-party practice even though it does involve some broadening of the scope of federal ancillary jurisdiction. On the other hand,
those favoring a restrictive interpretation have advanced strong
arguments. There is still a conflict on this point although the weight
of authority, including several recent cases, 35 favors the expansion
view taken by the majority in the principal case. Added support is
gained from the decision in Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp.,o a recent counter-claim case, wherein it was held on facts almost identical to
the Acord case, that where a party asserting a compulsory counterclaim
seeks to bring in additional parties, no compliance with venue is
necessary between the counter-claimant and the added party.
In relation to the status of the authorities on this question, as
recently as 1948 it-was observed that: "It is unusual that a problem
that has caused so much comment among writers and has supplied
quite a fund of decisions in the district courts has not received fuller
treatment on the appellate level."3 7 For this reason it is to be regretted that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case 38 as here
was an opportunity to settle a point which has been the subject of
much controversy.3 9
GRAY C. CASTLE

33Habina v. Henry & Co., 8 F. R. D. 52 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
843 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed.) 1948 § 14.28 at 507.
"Leatherman v. Star, 94 F. Supp. 220 (E. D. Tenn. 195o) (the United States
could be impleaded as a third-party defendant even though the venue of the
third-party action would not have supported an original proceeding); Moncrief v.
Pennsylvania R., 73 F. Supp. 815 (E. D. Pa. 1947). For a complete listing of all
cases decided on this point see 3 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948) § 14.28.
6144 F. (2d) 968 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
3'Note (1948) 46 Mich. L. Rev. 1o69, 1079.
3Vhile the Supreme Court could not grant certiorari on the basis of two
courts of appeals being in conflict, it could have granted it on the basis of a court
of appeals having decided "an important question of federal law which has not
but should be settled by ... the Court." Rules of Supreme Court Relating to Appeals
and Certiorari, Rule 15 .
3Rule 14 has been a troublesome one in the courts, and questions as to the
propriety of procedure under it have been frequent." Judge McGranery in Moncrief v. Pennsylvania R., 73 F. Supp. 81 5 (E. D. Pa. 1947).
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PROCEDURE-APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA TO FINDINGS IN PRIOR LITIGATION NOT ESSENTIAL To DISPOSITION OF THAT CASE. [Virginia]

The doctrine of res judicata, grounded in the policies of protecting
the defendant from harassment by, and the courts from the burden of,
multiplicity of litigation, and designed to delimit relitigation of issues
and facts previously adjudicated,' declares that "an existing final
judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a
court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights, questions, and
facts in issue, as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in
'2
the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.
While the rule as stated would seem relatively simple in application,
the endeavors of the courts to interpret res judicata in consonance
with the equitable exigencies of each case has resulted in a large
number of exceptions to the general rule.3 In fact, these exceptions
2A terse statement of one of these factors is that "the interest of the state
requires that there be an end to litigation....R"eed v. Allen, 286 U. S. 191,
198, 52 S. Ct. 532, 533, 76 L. ed. 1054, 1057 (1932). Another similar statement in
a broader vein is that: ".. .of the two principles which it [res judicata] comprehends,
the protection from the annoyance of repeated litigation, which the individual
suitor is afforded, is, after all only an incident of the first principle, that the best
interests of society demand that litigation be concluded.... Economy of the time
of the courts is one of the obviously beneficial results of the doctrine ... but the
broader and even more important aspect of the public policy of res Judicata is its
promotion of peace and quiet in the community through the creation of certainty
in the relations of men." Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 299,
3oo. "The doctrine of res judicata is primarily one of public policy and only
secondarily of private benefit to the individual litigants. It has its roots in the
maxim that it concerns the public that there be an end to litigation...." Buromin
Co. v. National Alumniate Corp., 70 F. Supp. 214, 217 (D. C. Del. 1947). Adams v.
Pearson, 411 Ill. 431, 104 N. E. (2d) 267, 273 (1952), sets forth the two policies, protection for the defendant and the courts, as separate and distinct.

230 Am. Jur., Judgements § 161.
3There are various means by which the courts may avoid application of the
res judicata principle, even though theoretically res judicata should apply wherever
a subsequent suit involves the same cause of action and the same parties:
(a) it may be found that more than one cause of action arose from the same
facts. Troxell v. Delaware R. R. Co., 227 U. S. 434, 33 S. Ct. 274, 57 L. ed. 586 (1913).
This technique is used where separate rights are found to exist under different
statutes, or under a statute and the common law. In Carter v. Hinkle, 189 Va. 1, 52
S. E. (2d) 135 (1949) it was held that plaintiff could bring one action for property
damage and a second action for personal injuries arising from the same accident.
Thus, plaintiff was put in the position of getting two recoveries at the expense of
proving his case but once. Such is the minority American rule, founded on the fact
that normally, in the states allowing two causes of action, the statutes of limitations for the two actions are different, the claim for property damage survives
death of either party while the claim for personal injuries does not, and the claim
for property damage is assignable while claim for personal injuries is not. The
advantage of this minority approach (called the New York rule) is that serious
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have reached such proportion and sublety as to make the employment
of res judicata a task which the courts seem at times to find very perplexing.
An investigation of the present status of the res judicata principle
and the difficulties the courts experience in applying it can be effected
to some extent by an analysis of the recent Virginia case of Petrus v.
Robbins.4 While operating her husband's automobile, Mrs. Petrus
collided with Robbins' automobile and sustained personal injuries.
Both vehicles were damaged. As a consequence, Robbins instigated
suit in the Civil and Police Court against Mrs. Petrus for property
damage. Prior to the trial of that suit, Mrs. Petrus instituted the present action in the Corporation Court for personal injuries, and her
husband joined her in the action by suing for damage to his automobile. In Robbins' action in the Civil and Police Court, Mrs. Petrus
filed an answer and a counterclaim in which she demanded judgment
for the damage to her husband's automobile only. At the Civil and
Police Court trial, Mrs. Petrus admitted that she was not the owner
of the vehicle, and Robbins moved that the counterclaim be dismissed,
bodily ailments from an injury may not appear until after the property suit is
concluded. The majority, or the Minnesota rule, is that two law suits upon the
substantially the same facts between identical parties is abhorrent to the courts because not only could both claims be readily determined in one lawsuit without inconvenience to the court, jury, litigants, or attorneys, but also all concerned in the
litigation would be saved time and expense of a second suit. For further discussion of this general problem of one or two causes of action arising from one
incident see Notes (1950) 3 Okla. L. Rev. 444; (1954) 35 A. L. R. (2d) 1377.
(b) the courts may find that a prior action involved the election of a non-existent remedy. Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N. E. (2d) 67 (1943); Missildine v. Miller, 231 Iowa 371, 1 N. W. (2d) 11o (1941).
(c) the various equities involved may preclude invocation of res judicata.
Gentry v. Farruggia, 132 W. Va. 8o9, 53 S. E. (2d) 741, 742 (1949). In Adams v.
Pearson, 411 Ill. 431, 1o4 N. E. (2d) 267, 273 (1952), Justice Schaefer stated: "We
do not hold, as has been held, that exceptions to the application of the rule against
splitting a cause of action should be regularly recognized 'as the evident justice of
the particular case requires.'... This case, in which both parties would be barred
by ordinary application of the rules of res judicata with an unsatisfactory and perhaps inequitable result, presents a unique and non-recurrent situation. The policies
which underlie the doctrine of res judicata... are not applicable to the peculiar
facts here involved." Res judicata was not applied, although the parties and issues
were identical with those in the prior action. See Note (1952) 1o U. of Pa. L. Rev.
297.
(d) Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F. (2d) 35 (C. A. D. C. 1951), pointed out that the
discretion possessed by the courts to create exceptions to res judicata by holding
that the inviolability of the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship is
more important to the public than universal, consistent application to res judicata.
'195 Va. 861, 8o S. E. (2d) 543 (1954), rehearing 196 Va. 322, 83 S. E. (2d) 408
(1954).
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but no ruling was made at that time on this motion. The Civil and
Police justice found that both parties were negligent and accordingly
denied the counterclaim, dismissed the proceedings, and entered judgment on the warrant in favor of the defendant, Mrs. Petrus. This judgment became final. Subsequently, in the action in the Corporation
Court the defendant Robbins filed a plea of res judicata. The Corporation Court sustained the plea and dismissed the complaint, but on
appeal it was held that the lower court was in error, and the decision
there was reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court of Appeals reasoned that since the plaintiff was not the owner of the automobile,
her counterclaim for property damage should have been dismissed.
Thus, the trial court's finding, in its denial of the counterclaim, that
Mrs. Petrus was negligent was unnecessary to the disposition of the
case, and so was not res judicata in a subsequent action by her for
compensation for personal injuries. Upon the instance of Robbins'
petition for rehearing, however, the Supreme Court of Appeals decided
that a gratuitous bailee does have a cause of action in this situation, and
the court thus saw reason to reverse its earlier ruling and find the issue
of negligence to have been litigated conclusively in the lower court.
The circumstances surrounding the principal case have within
them at least one involvement not to be encountered in the normal
scope of res judicata. That is to say, the doctrine customarily refers to
the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action
upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action between the same
partiesG whereas in the Petrus case situation the second suit was an
'The Supreme Court accepted the rule of res judicata as being basically as
stated in Johnson Co. v. Wharton, 152 U. S. 252 at 257, 14 S. Ct. 6o8 at 61o, 38
L. ed. 429 at 432 (1894). Quoting from Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 198, 217 (U. S.
1849), the Court said: "'The case, therefore, falls within the general rule, that a
judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon the point is as a
plea, as a bar, or as evidence conclusive between the same parties or privies upon
the same matters when directly in question in another court'." At 3o Am. Jur., Judgments § 161, this statement is found: "To adopt the language of the English court
in announcing the doctrine in an early case, which has been frequently repeated
by the courts, the judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon
the point, is a plea, a bar, or as evidence, conclusive, between the same parties,
upon the same matter, directly in question in another court." [italics supplied.]
More recent cases reflect the normal lawyer's conception of res judicata: Hammitt v.
Straley, 338 Mich. 587, 61 N. W. (2d) 641 at 647 (1953) (holding that a judgment, in
order to constitute a bar to a claim in a subsequent action, must have been
rendered upon the merits, upon the same matter in issue, and between the same
parties or their privies); Mansker v. Dealers Transport Co., 16o Ohio St. 255, 116 N.
E. (2d) 3 at 6 (953) (indicating that the doctrine of res judicata rests on the principles that the same person should not be vexed twice over the same dispute, and
that litigation should end).
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assertion by Mrs. Petrus of a different cause of action than that which
she had asserted previously. Thus, the basic issue posed by the Petrus
case is one of ascertaining what findings in the prior case are binding
in this subsequent litigation. Inasmuch as the Virginia court on appeal and rehearing6 dealt exclusively with this aspect of the res judicata
principle (making unnecessary any consideration of the effect of the
husband's entry into the second suit),7 the specific point of interest
is the ultimate holding that Mrs. Petrus' negligence, as found in the
lower court, precludes a second suit on a different cause of action
arising from the same accident.
The phase of the res judicata problem which is here basically in
issue is considered in legal nomenclature as "collateral estoppel." This
doctrine arose apart from res judicata, but it is now considered only a
a facet of the broad generic res judicata concept.8 A victim of varying
6195 Va. 861, 8o S. E. (2d) 543 (1954), rehearing 196 Va. 322, 83 S. E. (2d) 408
(1954)'The complication which would have arisen from the husband's entry into
the suit could have come about only if the court had decided that the negligence
of Mrs. Petrus had been properly decided in the lower court. The problem would
then be one of determining whether the husband was in sufficient privity with his
wife as to be bound by the prior adjudication as to her negligence, thus being
precluded from pursuing this action for property damages.
The general rule is that while in a situation in which both bailor and bailee
in successive suits attempt to recover for injury to the bailed property, privity
between them may exist based upon their common interest in the bailed chattel, no
common liability of bailor and bailee for injury caused by the bailed chattel is
recognized for the purpose of giving them the relation of privies.
Thus, a judgment against the bailee of a motorbus entered in an action by
a third person for the damage to the latter's automobile caused in a collision
with the motorbus, to which action the bailor of the bus was not a party, was
held not be constitute a bar to an action brought by the bailor against the third
person for damages to the bus caused in the same accident: Hudson Transit Corp.
v. Antonucci, 61 A. (2d) 18o, 4 A. L. R. (2d) 1374 (N. J. 1948). Collateral estoppel
was there held inapplicable, as there was no such identity or privity of parties
as to render the former judgment conclusive of the issue of negligence. It was said
that the judgment invoked as a bar was not one in favor of the bailee for the
injury to, but against the bailee for damage caused by, the bailed chattel. Accord:
Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, 133 F. (2d) 143 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1943), reversing 41 F. Supp. 847 (W. D. Pa. 1941).
"Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 12o F. (2d) 82 (C. C. A.
3d, 1941) discussed a collateral estoppel problem as thought it was purely one of res
judicata; Scott, Collerateral Estoppel by Judgment (1942) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2;
Restatement, Judgments (1942) § 68, Comment a, which reads "a. Merger, bar and
collateral estoppel. It is important to distinguish the effect of a judgment as a
merger of the original cause of action in the judgment or as a bar to a subsequent
action upon the original cause of action from its effect by way of collateral estoppel
in a subsequent action between the parties based on a different cause of action." It
is thus seen that res judicata and collateral estoppel are treated together, though
distinguished of necessity, by the American Law Institute.
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terminology, the doctrine has been masqueraded before the courts and
in decisions under such aliases as "estoppel by record," 9 "estoppel by
2
findings," 10 "estoppel by verdict,"11 and "estoppel by judgment,'
among others. A general statement of the doctrine of collateral estoppel
is that parties are precluded from relitigating issues that have been
litigated and decided of necessity in a prior suit on a different cause of
action. 13 Conversely, issues which might have been raised in a prior
litigation, but were not, are not conclusively determined for the purpose of a subsequent trial between the parties involving a second and
different cause of action.' 4 Thus, while those issues necessarily litigated
and determined in the prior cause may not be relitigated in the second
action, the parties are not precluded from relying upon new claims or
'This is one of the most ambiguous terms applied. United States v. Accardo, 113
F. Supp. 783, 786 (D. C. N. J.) aff'd 208 F. (2d) 632 (C. A. 3d. 1953), used the
term to indicate that an alien's plea of guilty in a prosecution constituted an estoppel of record in subsequent proceedings for revocation of his naturalization.
Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata (1940) 35
IIl.
L. Rev. 41, traces the development of collateral estaoppel, and points to derivation of that term from the Germanic principle that it was the "record" which
gave rise to the preclusion. The "estoppel by record" term has been used in an
inclusive sense where the author described estoppel by former judgment as preventing relitigation of the same cause of action and estoppel by verdict as the rule
"that a point once determined between the same parties or those under whom they
claim, may be relied upon as an estoppel in any cause of action." Bigelow, Law of
Estoppel (6th ed. 1913) 1o.
'Turner v. Bragg, 117 Vt. 9, 83 A. (2d) 511, 512 (1951).
"Goodman v. McLennan, 334 Ill. App. 405, 8o N. E. (2d) 396, 4o6 (1948); Hierl
v. McClure, 238 Minn. 335, 56 N. W. (2d) 721, 723 (1953). Illinois courts use the term
"estoppel by judgment" to describe the effect of merger or bar in res judicata and
the term "estoppel by verdict" to describe the effect of collateral estoppel-e.g.,
Skidmore v. Johnson, 334 Ill. App. 347, 79 N. E. (2d) 762, 769 (1948).
"Gordon v. Gordon, 59 S. (2d) 40, 43 (Fla. 1952), cert. denied 344 U. S. 878
(1952); Robertson v. Robertson, 61 S. (2d) 499, 502 (Fla. 1952), using "estoppel by
judgment" to describe preclusive effect in a second and different cause of action.
"Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theaters Corp., 347 U. S. 89, 74 S. Ct.
414, 98 L. ed. 301 (1954), rehearing denied 347 U. S.931, 74 S. Ct. 527, 98 L. ed. 433
(1954); United States v. Cathcard, 70 F. Supp. 653 (D. C. Neb. 1946); Buromin Co. v.
National Aluminate Corp., 70 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D. C. Del. 1947); Equitable Life
Assur. Soc. v. Gillan, 70 F. Supp. 64o, 646 (D. C. Neb. 1945); Stone v. William
Steinen Mfg. Corp., 70 A. (2d) 8o3 (N. J. 1949); Talbot v. Power Co., 152 Va. 864,
148 S. E. 869 (1929); Restatement, Judgments (1942) §§ 68, 70.
"Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theater Corp., 1o3 F. Supp. 954 (N. D. Ill.
1952); Buromin Co. v. National Aluminate Corp., 70 F. Supp. 214 (D. C. Del.
1947); Gordon v Gordon, 59 S. (2d) 40 (Fla. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U. S.878 (1952).
The burden of establishing that issues presented in the subsequent action were
actually litigated and decided in the prior proceedings rests upon the party contending that collateral estoppel precluded reinquiry. Peckham v. Family Loan Co..
196 F. (2d) 838 (C. A. 5 th, 1952).
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defenses not previously litigated between them.15 Inherent in these
broad statements are several troublesome problems, 16 each involving
definition of part of the phrase "issues necessarily litigated and determined." The varying interpretations given this nebulous phrase by
the courts may be explained by the proposition that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel is sufficiently flexible to adapt itself to the achieving of justice under any given set of circumstances.' 7
"E. g., Gordon v. Gordon, 59 S. (2d) 40 (Fla. 1952) cert. denied, 344 U. S.
878, 73 S. Ct. 165, 97 L. ed. 68o (1952). The Virginia courts have also held that
in a plea of collateral estoppel it is essential that the identical question upon
which it is invoked was in issue in the former proceeding. C & 0 Ry. Co. v. Rison,
99 Va. 18 at 34-35, 37 S. E. 320 at 325 (igoo). Also in that general vein: Sawyer v.
City of Norfolk, 136 Va. 66, 116 S. E. 245 (1923); Shumate v. Supervisors, 84 Va. 574,

5 S. E. 570 (1888).
"(a) The problem of defining the content of the "issue" previously determined
makes it necessary to analyze the scope of the prior decision to ascertain the presence or absence of identity of issues in the prior and subsequent actions. The
attempt to define the "issue" determined in the prior action is somewhat analogous
to the problem posed in determining what constitutes a cause of action. Restatement,
Judgments (1942) § 68, comment a.
(b) There is also the problem of determining what is required in the way of
"actual litigation." Thus, matters put in issue by the pleadings of both parties
but not actually litigated during the trial may be given conclusive effect if such
issues were necessary to the ultimate judgment. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. McKeithen, 13o Fla. 568, 178 So. 127 (1938).
(c) It is apparent that in the determination of some cases not all matters
litigated nor all findings of the court are "necessary" to the decision. Those matters
brought into controversy which are collateral and not needed to support the decision are not conclusively determined for the purpose of the second suit. E. g.,
Guardianship of Leach, 3o Cal. (2d) 297, 182 P. (2d) 529 (1947); Turner v. Bragg,
117 Vt. 9, 83 A. (2d) 511 (1951). But see Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Gillan, 70
F. Supp. 64o, 649 (D. C. Neb. 1945) (a prior decision of the state court in favor of
an insured was predicated on an estoppel resulting from the insurers' previous actions. Nevertheless, the opinion of the court in that preceding case "finding" that
the insured had fraudulently procured the policy was stated by the federal district court, in deciding subsequent litigation, to be "deliberate, purposeful and
courageous and not to be denied effectiveness" in a subsequent action.)
The United States Supreme Court has stated tnat the estoppel extends to all questions "distinctly put in issue and directly determined," and the court found in the
case from which the quote is derived that the verdict on a prior conviction of
conspiring to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act determined actual
coercion as well as conspiracy. Emich Motors v. General Motors Corp., 340 U. S.
558, 569, 71 S. Ct. 408, 414, 95 L. ed. 534, 544 (1951). The United States Court
of Appeals in a previous decision on the same case required that the point in
issue be "essential" to the first judgment, and not merely evidentiary, and therefore,
gave prima facie effect only on the issue of conspiracy. 181 F. (ad) 70, 75 (C. A. 7 th,
1950).
17"..when the circumstances are different [from the normal litigation in the
courts] so that application of the doctrine in all its rigor is inappropriate, the doctrine may be relaxed in any desired degree without destroying its essential service.
The doctrine need not be applied altogether or rejected altogether." Davis, Admin-
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It was originally thought proper that the application of collateral
estoppel should be restricted to "the determination of the facts in
issue," and that it should not extend to "merely evidentiary facts."'Is
Through the influence of Judge Learned Hand,19 judicial opinion, as
reflected in the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law,
was revised to indicate that the "rules stated" are applicable to the
determination of "those facts upon whose combined occurrence the
law raises the duty or the right in question [ultimate facts] but not to
the determination of merely evidentiary or mediate facts" 20 supporting the ultimate fact. This revision was construed by Judge Hand to
mean that findings of ultimate facts in a prior action should be conclusive only as to ultimate facts in the subsequent action, not decisive
as to mere evidentiary facts in the second suit.21 In a less technical
vein, the possibility has been suggested that the doctrine be limited
to those instances where the preclusive effect in subsequent actions
reasonably may be foreseen. 22 Apparently, under such a test, the findings in an action for property damage from an automobile accident
would not be binding in a later action for personal injuries from the
same accident, which injuries had not been known at the time of the
initial litigation.
istrative Law (1951) 612. In connection with the applicability of the doctrine to findings of administrative boards see Notes (1953) 20 U. of Chi. L. Review 570; (1953) 39
Va. L. Rev. 1097 [comment on Evans v. Monaghan, 282 App. Div. 382, 123 N. Y. S.
(2d) 662 (953).
"Restatement, Judgments (1942) § 68, comment p.
The noted jurist expressed his views on the subject in The Evergreens v.
Nunan, 141 F. (2d) 927, 928 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 720 (1944):

" . a 'fact' may be of two kinds. It may be one of those facts, upon whose combined
occurence the law raises the duty, or the right, in question; or it may be a fact, from
whose existence may be rationally inferred the existence of one of the facts upon
whose combined occurence the law raises the duty, or the right. The first ... we
shall ... call an 'ultimate' fact; the second, a 'mediate datum'."
-'Restatement, Judgments (1948 Supp.) 336.
'The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F. (2d) 927, 929 (C. C. A, 2d, 1944), cert. denied,
323 U. S. 720 (1944). Judge Hand noted that where the preclusion is limited to
facts ultimate in the second suit "the field is at least somewhat restricted, particularly because the causes of action to which it can apply are apt to be already
in existence." He thus indicated that: "What jural relevance facts may acquire is
often impossible even remotely to anticipate."
nAlso a doctrine pronounced by Judge Hand in The Evergreens v. Nunan,
141 F. (2d) 927 at 929 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 720 (1944). The
desirability of such a test is manifest if it is apparent that the coercive effect of
forcing litigants to a full-scale effort over minor disputes acts to increase rather
than contract the extent of litigation.
Thus, it is suggested that "where the subsequent litigation does not arise out of
the same transaction or was not reasonably foreseeable" collateral estoppel should
not apply. Developments in the Law-Res Judicata (1952) Harv. L. Rev. 818, 841.
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An application of the preceding principles to the Petrus decision,
keeping in mind their attributes of flexibility to accomplish justice,
suggests that the Virginia Court of Appeals, in its original decision,
relied upon a very strict interpretation of what constitutes an "ultimate" factual determination within the purview of collateral estoppel.
Of the trial court's holding in the first action that Mrs. Petrus was
negligent, the Court of Appeals in its first decision, quoting from
Corpus Juris Secundum, said: "'General expressions in an opinion
which are not essential to the disposition of the case cannot control
the judgment in subsequent suits; nor does a remark made obiter or
arguendo operate as an estoppel on the point averted to'." 23 The application which the court obviously made of the quote was that the
finding of Mrs. Petrus' negligence was mere dictum, not determinative
of her conduct as it might be brought in issue before any other tribunal. As previously shown, the Restatement of the Law of Judgments
is phrased in the same general language as the original holding in
the principal case to the effect that a finding is res judicata only when
it is essential to the judgment rendered, 24 and under this rule the
finding of negligence on the part of Mrs. Petrus in the prior case must
be considered mere surplusage, because the decision in her favor was
based on the negligence of Robbins alone. The strange result to which
the original holding gave rise is that in the earlier case involving
Robbins and Mrs. Petrus, the negligence of Mrs. Petrus, upon which
Robbins' cause of action was grounded, was not finally determined
even though the court expressly found her negligent. That is to say,
Mrs. Petrus would have remained free to contend in the principal case,
or any other subsequent case, that she was free from negligence in the
accident. The question arising would appear to be whether final judgment based on the negligence of plaintiff Robbins should reduce the
determination of the primary issue of Robbins' action against Mrs.
Petrus-i.e., the negligence of Mrs. Petrus-to the status of dictum.
Apparently, the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Appeals was that
the judgment was only against Robbins on his claim for property
damage, and that the trial court need not have found Mrs. Petrus
negligent in order to defeat Robbins' claim if it appeared Robbins
was also negligent. The Supreme Court of Appeals appears to have
initially overlooked, however, that the lower court's failure to dismiss
the counterclaim immediately, however erroneous that ruling might
23Petrus v. Robbins, 195 Va. 861, 867, 8o S. E. (2d) 543, 547 (1954). The court was
quoting from 50 C. J. S., Judgments § 726, p. 215.
2Restatement, Judgments (1942) § 68 (1).

19551

CASE COMMENTS

have been, left the negligence of Mrs. Petrus very much in issue in the
prior hearing in regard to Robbins' liability on the counterclaim,
and that the parties were therefore given ample reason and opportunity
to litigate conclusively the issue of negligence.
Though it was actually aside from the collateral estoppel aspect
of Petrus v. Robbins, the focal point-and the one which prompted
the rehearing-of the original decision of the court was the necessary
implication in that holding that a gratuitous bailee could not maintain a cause of action for damage to a bailed chattel while in his
possession 25-for the original holding was sustainable only so long as
Mrs. Petrus' counterclaim in the Civil and Police Court was deemed
improper. As such a ruling would have been wholly out of consonance
with the prevailing view, 26 the Court of Appeals on the rehearing
was explicit in specifying the Virginia law to allow a bailee in possession to sue and recover for wrongful damage or destruction by another of the bailed property.
It is to be noted, however, that the court did not recant its
original ruling as to what findings of fact would justify invoking
collateral estoppel. Yet, one statement of the Virginia law on that
subject made in the second opinion in the principal case was: "'Where
-The Supreme Court of Appeals in its first opinion said in this regard:
"The Justice of the Civil and Police Court should have dismissed the counterclaim
of Mrs. Petrus, since there was no necessity for him to give it any consideration.
She had no cause of action for damages to the automobile either in that court or
in the Corporation Court. Her claim was not susceptible of proof, and did not
present any issue subject to adjudication." 195 Va. 861, 869, 80 S. E. (2d) 543, 548
(1954) (italics supplied).
If the dogmatic fashion in which the Court here denied a cause of action for
damages to a gratuitous bailee of a damaged chattel had been allowed to stand, the
conclusion is inescapable that one of two results would stem from the holding: (i) a
wife in Virginia could not be considered a gratuitous bailee of her husband's
vehicle, or, (2) a gratuitous bailee no longer would have a cause of action in Virginia
for damage by a third person to the chattel while in the bailee's possession. The
failure of the Court to amplify the meaning of its decision relative to bailments
poses the query of whether the Court considered that aspect of the case. The
decision on rehearing proves that if counsel had argued that facet of the case
before the court, the initial decision would have been different.
-1In Harris v. Howerton, 169 Va. 647, 661, 662, 194 S. E. 692, 698 (1938), the
Court, through the opinion of Justice Spratley (who wrote the first opinion in the
Petrus case), said: "It seems to be well settled that a bailee of personal property
may recover compensation for any wrongful injury to the article while bailed in his
possession." 3 R. C. L. 127, 6 C. J. 1168, 6 Am. Jur. 419 [now 430]. Accord: New
England Box Co. v. C. & R. Constnction Co., 313 Mass. 696, 49 N. E. (2d) 121,
15o A. L. R. 152 (1943) (where mere possession was sufficient); Jordan v. Phoel, 36 N.
Y. S. (2d) 176 (1942); Mitchell v. Vande, 169 Misc. 63, 289 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (1936). See
Smyth v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 326 Pa. 391, 192 Ad. 640, 644, 111
A. L. R. 481, 486 (1937).
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there has been litigation which has in fact determined the point in
the controversy, and there has been a final judgment, the judgment
is conclusive. Where the subject-matter is identical and the evidence
is the same, the question cannot be reopened'." 27 If such is to be accepted as a correct statement of the Virginia law of collateral estoppel,
it is difficult to understand why its application to the principal case
would not make the finding of negligence binding upon Mrs. Petrus,
irrespective of the validity of her counterclaim.
The conclusion seems inevitable that if the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is to perform its intended function of minimizing litigation,
it must be clarified substantially. The instant case is ample demonstration that the technicalities of the principle are capable of so clouding
the basic and controlling issues of litigation as to perpetrate miscar28
riages of justice.
WILLIAM B. PoFF

STATUTE OF FRAUDS-RIGHT

OF VENDOR

To

COLLECT ON CHECK GIVEN

AS DOWN PAYMENT ON ORAL LAND SALE CONTRACT REPUDIATED BY

VENDEE.

[Arkansas]

Whether the Statute of Frauds is regarded as rendering an oral
contract for the sale of land void or merely voidable, it is generally

agreed that the vendor cannot by legal action either compel the vendee
'196 Va. 322, 329, 83 S. E. (2d) 4o8, 412 (1954) quoting from Eagle, Star &
British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 99, 140 S. E. 314, 319, 57 A. L. R.
490, 497 (1927).
nAn interesting sidelight in the Petrus v. Robbins decision was the comment of the court concerning its earlier decision of Carter v. Hinkle, 189 Va. 1,
52 S. E. (2d) 139 (1949). There the court was called upon to decide whether one
who has suffered both damage to his property and injury to his person as the
result of a single wrongful act may maintain two separate actions therefor, or
whether a judgment obtained in the first action is a bar to the second. Over the
dissent of two Justices, the American minority rule on the subject was adopted,
whereby the injured party has two separate and distinct causes of action, one for
the property damages and one for personal injuries, and judgment in favor of
the injured party on his property damage action is not a bar to a later action for
personal injuries. Obviously that case was not controlling in the Petrus situation,
but it was originally contended by counsel for Robbins that the decision was in
point and should be overruled. The Supreme Court of Appeals was thereby given
an opportunity at least to express itself as not wholly satisfied with the Carter
v. Hinkle rule, and Virginia attorneys in the future would not seem far amiss in
attempting to have the decision supplanted; the case does not seem presently in
judicial favor in this state. For example, the court quoted approvingly from
Rhode Island and New Jersey cases which applied collateral estoppel in situations
comparable to Carter v. Hinkle. See: 196 Va. 322, 330, 331, 83 S. E. (2d) 4o8, 413
(1954).
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to pay the purchase price or recover damages for his failure to perform
the contract.' However, where the vendee, pursuant to a contract not
conforming to the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, has voluntarily paid part of the purchase price or given earnest money before repudiating the contract, and the vendor remains ready, willing and
able to perform, the majority of the courts do not allow the vendee
to recover the part of the purchase price or the earnest money already
paid.2 This result is reached in jurisdictions in which the contract is
held to be void, 3 as well as those in which it is only voidable. 4 The
rationale of these decisions is that since the vendor is willing to convey,
there has been no failure of consideration, and consequently there is
no basis upon which the law can imply a promise by the vendor to
repay the money received,2 as it does where the vendor is the one who
repudiates the partly performed contract. 6 In the words of an early
New York case: "The payment was a voluntary one, made with a full
knowledge of the facts... the money was not received as a loan; but
as a payment; and so long as the vendor is able and willing to perform the contract on his part, he holds the money as owner, and not as
debtor."7 It is further argued that since the contract, though void
under the Statute of Frauds, is not illegal, immoral or in violation
of public policy, and since the partial performance has been carried
out without fraud or mistake, the courts should leave the parties
in the position which their own voluntary performance has placed
them.8
'In re Robert's Estate, 202 Minn. 217, 277 N. W. 549 (1938); Lloyd v. Smith,
150 Va. 132, 142 S. E. 363 (1928); Brown v. Gray, 68 W. Va. 555, 70 S. E. 276 (1911).
See note 18, infra, for a possible qualification to this generally accepted rule.
-Keystone Hardware Corp. v. Tague, 246 N. Y. 79, 158 N. E. 27, 53 A. L. R.
61o (1927); Lanham v. Reimann, 177 Ore. 193, 16o P. (2d) 318 (1945); Jackson v.
Frier, 118 S. C. 449, 11o S. E. 676 (1922); Cook v. Griffith, 76 W. Va. 799, 86 S. E.
879 (1915); Thomas v. Brown, i, Q. B. D. 714 (1876); 2 Corbin, Contracts (1950) § 332.
3Rochlin v. P. S. West Const. Co., 234 N. C. 443, 67 S. E. (2d) 464 (1951);
Schechinger v. Gault, 35 Okla. 416, 13o-Pac. 3o5 (1913); Woodward, The Law of
Quasi Contracts (1913) § 99; Note.(1952) 3o N. C. L. Rev. 292.
'Perkins v. Allnut, 47 Mont. 13, 13o Pac. 1 (1913); Keystone Hardware Co.
v. Tague, 246 N. Y. 79, 158 N. E. 27, 53 A. L. R. 61o (1927); Thomas v. Brown,
i Q. B. D. 714 (1876); Woodward, The Law of Quasi Contracts (1913) § 98.
rCollier v. Coates, 17 Barb. 471 (N. Y. 1854); Abbott v. Draper, 4 Denio 51
(N. Y. 1847).
OHilker v. Curdes, 77 Ind. App. 466, 133 N. E. 851 (1922); Barrett v. Greenall,
139 Me. 75, 27 A. (2d) 599 (1942); Smith v. Dunn, 165 Ore. 418, 107 P. (2d) 985
(1940).
7Abbott v. Draper, 4 Denio 51, 54 (N. Y. 1847).
"Collier v. Coates, 17 Barb. 471, 475 (N. Y. 1854): "And as long as the defendant [vendor] is willing to do what he agreed to do, in consideration of the pay-
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There is a minority line of decisions which allows the vendee to
recover his payments or earnest money, on the ground that the contract is void and can be the foundation for no legal rights whatsoever. 9 The reason advanced for this view in jurisdictions where the
contract is merely voidable, is that there is a lack of mutuality of obligation and remedy because the vendor could not have been required to convey the land, and therefore it would be inequitable for
the vendor to retain the benefits of the vendee's partial performance
for which the vendor gave nothing in return.' 0
An intermediate ground suggested by the Restatement of Contracts," a leading writer,12 and a few cases,13 is that the defaulting
vendee should not be liable to the vendor for more than the amount
of damages which the vendor has suffered from the vendee's breach,
and the burden of proof should be placed on the defaulting vendee
4
to prove that the damages were less than the part payment.'
In the recent case of Sturgis v. Meadors'5 the Arkansas court,
which had previously, by way of dictum, approved the majority view
denying the vendee's right of recovery of the purchase price already
ment, the law will not presume any promise to repay it, but will leave the parties
to stand where they voluntarily placed themselves by their arrangement ..."
9Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418, 12 Am. Rep. 311 (1873); Reedy v. Ebsen, 60 S. D. 1,
242 N. W. 592, 594 (1952): "This court, as before stated, is committed to a literal
construction of the statute of frauds. A contract within the statute is not merely voidable, but is in all respects a nullity." Affirmed on rehearing, 61 S.D. 54, 245 N. W.
9o8 (1932). Merten v. Koester, 199 Wis. 75, 225 N. W. 750 (1929); Durkin v. Machesky,
177 Wis. 595, 188 N. W. 97 (1922); Thomas v. Sowards, 25 Wis. 631 (1870); Brandeis
v. Neustadtl, 13 Wis. 158 (186o). Note (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 286. [Though not
overruled, the Wisconsin cases are of doubtful authority due to the recent case of
Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N. W. (2d) 489 (1953)]. Hooper v. First Exch.
Nat. Bank, 53 F. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931) (applying Washington State law).
Contra: Johnson v. Puget Mill Co., 28 Wash. 515, 68 Pac. 867 (1902).
"Nelson v. Shelby Mfg. Co., 96 Ala. 515, 11 So. 695 (1892); Brown v. Pollard,
89 Va. 696, 17 S.E. 6 (1893). The Virginia court cited and approved Scott v.
Bush, 26 Mich. 418, 12 Am. Rep. 311 (1873). However, the Virginia case is of
doubtful authority due to the later case of White v. Alleghany Mountain Corp.,
159 Va. 394, 165 S. E.505 (1932), which cited with approval Cook v. Griffith, 76 W.
Va. 799, 86 S.E. 879 (1915) which is contra to Brown v. Pollard and Scott v. Bush.
"Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 355 (4), Illustration 8. However, Restatement,
Contracts (1932) § 357 (2)and Illustration 6 seem to be in conflict with § 55 (4);
but in § 357 (2) earnest money rather than part payment is mentioned, which may
account for the difference.
"Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Instalments
Paid (1931) 40 Yale L. J. 1013.
1
Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N. W. (2d) 489 (1953). See Massaro v.
Bashara, 91 Ohio App. 475, io8 N. E. (2d) 85o, 853 (1951).
"4Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N. W. (2d) 489 (1953).
1a66 S. W. (2d) 81 (Ark. 1954).
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paid, 16 was faced with an unusual issue regarding the rights of a
vendee repudiating a land sale contract which was void under the
Statute of Frauds. The defendant vendee agreed to purchase the
vendor's farm for $26,ooo, and as part payment gave his check for
$i,ooo to be applied to the purchase price if the sale was completed,
but to be forfeited in the event the vendee failed to perform the
agreement. A contract was signed but it was invalid for reasons not
material to the present controversy, and before the check was cashed
or negotiated, payment was stopped by the vendee. In the vendor's
suit to recover $i,ooo from the vendee, the original complaint was
based on the written contract, but after defendant entered a motion
alleging the invalidity of the contract, plaintiff amended the complaint to allege the oral contract and the vendor's willingness to convey. Defendant's demurrer and motion for directed verdict were overruled, and judgment was rendered in the trial court for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the judgment, with two Justices dissenting.
Both factions of the court agreed that the oral contract was void
under the Arkansas Statute of Frauds, but the majority denied that
the vendor was here "attempting to enforce performance of a contract."'17 Ignoring the fact that the vendor was the plaintiff in the
action, and that the complaint was based on the oral contract to
sell land, the majority proceeded to treat the case as one in which
a defaulting vendee was seeking to recover cash payments made on
the purchase price from a vendor willing and able to perform.
The dissenting Justices contended that the situation of the parties
was not the same as where a defaulting vendee attempts to regain his
part payment, since payment of the check was stopped before it was
cashed. They asserted that: "Narrowed down to its essentials, this is
an attempt by the vendor to enforce a single clause-the promise
to pay earnest money-contained in an invalid contract for the sale
of land. The vendee relies, not offensively but defensively, upon the
statute of frauds, as he has a perfect right to do."' 8
"See Venable v. Brown, Yi Ark. 564, 566 (1876).
'17Sturgis v. Meadors, 266 S. W. (2d) 81, 83 (Ark. 1954).
'-See Sturgis v. Meadors, 266 S. W. (2d) 81, 84 (Ark. 1954). Several references
in the majority opinion suggest that the court took the position that the Statute of
Frauds is for the protection of the vendor only and that he alone can assert the
unenforceability of an oral contract. If the majority actually meant to base its decision on such a view, it acted contrary to the great weight of authority, Fraser v.
Jarrett, 153 Ga. 441, 112 S. E. 487 (1922); Central Land Co. v. Johnston, 95 Va. 223,
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The court's treatment of the principal case is in effect an assertion
that the giving of a check is the same as a cash payment, a position
which cannot be reconciled with the universal rule applied in other
circumstances that a check is merely conditional payment unless a
contrary intention is shown. 19 The Arkansas court had previously
declared: "It is settled law that giving a promissory note for a debt
is not payment of the debt, unless, by agreement of the parties, the
note is taken in payment of the debt."20 Accepting the fact that a
28 S. E. 175 (1897); Brown v. Gray, 68 W. Va. 555, 70 S. E. 276 (1911), as well as
an earlier Arkansas decision, Jones v. School Dist., 137 Ark. 414, 208 S. W. 798
(1919).
Statutes often specify that in order to be enforceable the contract must be in
writing and signed "by the party to be charged thereon." Most courts have interpreted this and similar phraseology as meaning that the obligation of the contract cannot be enforced against the party defendant, be he vendor or vendee, if there is no
writing signed by that party. Central Land Co. v. Johnson, 95 Va. 223, 28 S. E.
175 (1897). Thus, the vendee can assert the statute in defense to a suit to collect
the purchase price which he agreed to pay under the oral contract, just as the
vendor can defend under the statute when sued for damages for failure to convey.
It is true that some Statutes of Frauds specify that only the vendor is required to
sign a written contract to make it enforceable. Pangburn v. Sifford, 216 Mich. 153,
184 N. W. 512 (1921); Krohn v. Dustin, 142 Minn. 3o4, 172 N. W. 213 (1919);
Campbell v. Kewanee Finance Corp., 133 Neb. 887, 277 N. W. 593 (1938). Furthermore, a few courts have interpreted "the party to be charged thereon" to mean
that the vendor, and only he, is required to sign the contract to make it enforceable. Benjamin v. Dinwiddie, 226 Ky. io6, 10 S. W. (2d) 620 (1928); Patterson v.
Davis, 28 Tenn. App. 571, 192 S. W. (2d) 227 (1946). However, Professor Williston has questioned whether this view is adhered to in such a manner as to leave
the vendee without any right to invoke the Statute of Frauds. "How far this may
involve the consequence that the vendor can always enforce an executory contract
against the purchaser, because of his ability to write a memorandum of the bargain and sign it himself is not always made clear, but probably it would generally,
if not universally, be necessary that the purchaser should have indicated his assent
to the writing either by accepting it or otherwise." 2 Williston, Contracts (Rev.
ed. 1936) 1689. The following cases tend to support Professor Williston's conclusion. National Bank of Kentucky v. Louisville Trust Co., 67 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A.
6th, 1933); Dickenson v. Wright, 56 Mich. 42, 22 N. W. 312 (1885); Wier v. Batdorf,
24 Neb. 83, 38 N. W. 22 (1888). If the Statute of Frauds is for the protection of
either party to the contract, then the argument of the majority of the court in the
principal case to the effect that the vendee becomes a wrongdoer by pleading the
statute in defense against an attempt by the vendor to collect the purchase price is
untenable. If the statute makes the contract unenforceable against him because it
is not in writing, then surely he is not at fault in asserting the privilege which
the statute affords him to refuse to perform the contract.
2OBank of Hatfield v. Bruce, 164 Ark. 576, 262 S. W. 665 (1924); Hume v. Indiana
Nat. Life Ins. Co., 155 Ark. 466, 245 S. W. 19 (1922); Publicker Comm. Alcohol
Co. v. Harger, 129 Conn. 655, 31 A. (2d) 27 (1943); Hunter v. Hunter, 327 Mo. 817,
39 S. W. (2d) 359 (1931); Pennick v. American Nat. Bank, 226 Ore. 615, 268 Pac.
1012 (1928); 8 C. J. 568.
OStarling v. Hamner, 185 Ark. 93o, 50 S. W. (2d) 612, 614 (1932).
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check is only conditional payment, it follows that the dissenting
Justices were correct when they stated: "Even though the check is
negotiable it is of course subject to defenses as between the original
parties to the instruments. Hence, in this case, the fact that the vendee's
promise is evidenced by an uncashed check rather than by the in21
valid agreement itself adds no strength to the vendor's position."
However, at least three other courts are in accord with the reasoning in the Sturgis case that the same principles apply to the vendor's
suit on the vendee's check as to a defaulting vendee's suit to recover
22
his cash part payment made pursuant to an oral land sale contract.
Those cases are still open to the objection that a check is only conditional payment, and further they might be distinguished from the
Sturgis case, since in those cases the oral contracts were only voidable. 23 Approximately the same number of courts have denied re-

covery to the vendor on the oral contract on the ground that there
is a lack of mutuality of obligation and remedy.24 This reasoning is
obviously not compelling when the vendor has alleged that he is
25
ready and willing to convey the property.
In most of the cases with fact situations similar to Sturgis v.
Meadors, the vendor has brought his action, not on the oral land sale
contract, but on the check, and has alleged the oral contract merely
as consideration for the check. By proceeding on this theory the
vendor has precluded the vendee from pleading the Statute of Frauds,
since the check is not a contract for the sale of land. The vendee's
2'See Sturgis v. Meadors, 266 S. W. (2d) 81, 84 (Ark. 1954).
- Garbarino v. Union Savings & Loan Ass'n, 107 Colo. 140, iog P. (2d) 638,
642, 132 A. L. R. 1480, 1485 (1941): "Obviously here the defendant [Vendee] is
in the same position, legally, as if he was [sic] seeking to recover $1,ooo paid on
the purchase price, instead of resisting payment of the check given for such
purpose." McGowen v. West, 7 Mo. 569, 38 Am. Dec. 468 (1842); Jones v. Jones,
6 M & W 84, 161 Eng. Rep. 331 (84o); Williams, Availability by Way of Defence
of Contracts Not Complying With the Statute of Frauds (1934) 50 L. Q. Rev. 532.
2'Whether the oral land sale contract under the Statute of Frauds is void or
voidable seems to be more of a difference in terminology than substance; however,
the defaulting vendee has a better chance to prevail where the oral contract is void
rather than voidable. Woodward, The Law of Quasi Contract (1913) § 99.
"Hooper v. First Exch. Nat. Bank, 53 F. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931); Kraak v.
Fries, 21 D. C. 1oo, 18 L. R. A. 142 (1892); Ryan v. Dunphy, 4 Mont. 342, 1 Pac. 710
(1882). See Lewis v. Starlin, 267 P. (2d) 127, 13o (Mont. 1954); Brown v. Pollard,
89 Va. 696, 17 S. E. 6, 8 (1893).
2-Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861, 862 (1922): "If there ever was a
rule that mutuality of remedy existing, not merely at the time of the decree, but
at the time of the formation of the contract, is a condition of equitable relief, it
has been so qualified by exceptions that, viewed as a precept of general validity, it
has ceased to be a rule to-day." Walsh, Equity (1930) §§ 68, 69, 7o.
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defense is that there has been a failure of consideration because
the oral land sale contract did not conform to the requirements of the
Statute of Frauds, but most courts have regarded the contract as sufficient consideration for the check, 26 and have allowed the vendor
to recover even where the contract is considered void.2 7 However,
under the principles of ordinary contract law, a void contract is not
28
consideration for another contract, whereas a voidable contract is.29

The Kentucky court, which does not allow a defaulting vendee to
recover his part payment when paid in cash,3 0 has handed down the
only decisions found denying the vendor recovery on the check on
the ground that the void oral land sale contract was not sufficient
consideration. 31 In a few cases the vendor has made the error of
proceeding on the theory that the check was a sufficient memorandum
to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, 32 but the courts have universally decided that a check or note given in connection with the sale of land,
2

1Schierman v. Beckett, 88 Ind. 52

(1882);

Fletcher v. Lake,

121

Me. 474, 118 Ad.

321 (1922); Phelan v. Carey, 222 Minn. 1, 23 N. W. (2d) 1o (1946); Little v. Dyer,

181 Minn. 487, 233 N. W. 7 (1930); Ott v. Garland, 7 Mo. 28 (1841); Murman v.
Manning, 125 Misc. 83o, 211 N. Y. Supp. 575 (1924); Fleischman v. Plock, 19 Misc.
649, 44 N. Y. Supp. 413 (1897); Barton v. Simmons, 129 Ore. 457, 278 Pac. 83 (1929);
Wilkinson v. Sweet, 93 S. W. 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 19o6); Crutchfield v. Donathon, 49

Tex. 691, 3o Am. Rep. 112 (1878); 2 Corbin, Contracts (1950) § 286; Brown,
Statute of Frauds ( 5 th ed. 1895) § 122b; Note (1946) 3o Minn. L. Rev. 647.
-"Phelan v. Carey, 222 Minn. 1, 23 N. W. (2d) 10 (1946); Little v. Dyer, 181
Minn. 487, 233 N. W. 7 (1930); 2 Corbin, Contracts (195o) § 286.

Blair Engineering Co. v. Page Steel & Wire Co., 288 Fed. 662 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1923);
Houff v. Paine, 172 Va. 481, 2 S.E. (2d) 313 (1939); Restatement, Contracts (1932) §
8o, Illustration (3); x Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) § 1o3E.
2Wright v. Buchanan, 287 Ill. 468, 123 N. E. 53 (1919); Pinner v. Leder,
115 Misc. 512, 188 N. Y. Supp. 818 (1921); Trevillian v. Bullock, 185 Va. 958, 40
S. E. (2d) 920 (1947); Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 84 (e), Illustration (8). For
a further discussion on the conflicting views as to what amounts to consideration
see: Arant, Suretyship (1931) § 30; Beutel's Brannan, Negotiable Instrument Law
(7th ed. 1948) § 25; 1 Corbin, Contracts (195o)

§ 140; Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed.

1936) §§ 1o3B, io3E, 104. See: Corbin, Non-Binding Promises as Consideration (1926)
26 Col. L. Rev. 550.
3'Watkins v. Wells, 303 Ky. 728, 198 S. W. (2d) 662, 169 A. L. R. 185 (1946).
3iReese v. Bailey, 199 Ky. 504, 251 S. W. 633 (1923); Duteil v. Mullins, 192 Ky.
616, 234 S. W. 192, 2o A. L. R. 361 (1921); Fite v. Orr's Assignee, 8 Ky. L. Rep.

349, 1 S. W. 582 (1886). Montana might be added due to Eccles v. Kendrick, 8o
Mont. 120, 259 Pac. 609 (1927).

Cf. Ryan v. Dunphy, 4 Mont. 342,

1 Pac. 710

(1882). There are a few decisions that seem to indicate that if the vendee were in
possession of the land there would be sufficient consideration for the note. Gillespie
v. Battle, 15 Ala. 276 (1849); Rhodes v. Storr, 7 Ala. 346 (1845); Curnutt v. Roberts,
ii B. Mon. (5o Ky.) 42 (185o). Contra: Bates v. Terrell, 7 Ala. 129 (1844).
2Killarney Realty Co. v. Wimpey, 30 Ga. App. 390, 118 S. E. 581 (1923); Davis
v. Dilbeck, 232 S. W. 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
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which contains no reference to the essential terms of the contract of sale,
does not constitute a sufficient memorandum. 33 The importance of
basing the suit on the proper theory is indicated by the decisions of
the Texas court, which has allowed the vendor to recover when he
brought his action on the check and alleged the oral land sale contract as consideration, 34 but refused to allow him to recover when he
merely alleged that the check was a sufficient memorandum to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds.35
Even if the check is to be regarded as the equivalent of a cash
payment so that the case is to be governed by the same rules which
apply when a vendee is seeking to recover his cash payments, it is
still arguable that the vendee should not be liable to the vendor
for more than the amount of the damages which the vendor has suffered from the vendee's breach of the oral land sale contract.36
The vendor's recovery would then be limited to the extent of his
damages, but in no case would recovery be greater than the amount of
the check, and the defaulting vendee should bear the burden of proving the damages to be less than that amount.37 Where, as in the
principal case, the contract contained an express agreement that the
vendee shall forfeit the part payment in case of default, the parties
have attempted to provide for liquidation damages. 38 If the contract
had conformed to the Statute of Frauds and the vendor had chosen not
to seek specific performance but rather to keep the payment as damages
for the breach, the vendee would have had an opportunity to avoid
the forfeiture by showing that the damages provided for by the contract were so unreasonable as to amount to a penalty.3 9 In situations
'Allen v. Thompson, 169 Ark. 169, 273 S. W. 396 (1925); Howie v. Swaggard,
142 Miss. 409, 107 So. 556 (1926); Notes (1944) 153 A. L. R. 1112 at 1119; (1922) 20
A. L. R. 363 at 367.
"Wilkinson v. Sweet, 93 S. W. 702 ('rex. Civ. App. 19o6); Crutchfield v. Donathon, 49 Tex. 691, 3o Am. Rep. 112 (1878).
3-Davis
v. Dilbeck, 232 S. W. 927 ('rex. Civ. App. 1921).
2
=Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N. W. (2d) 489 (1953); Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 355 (4); Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution
of Instalments Paid (1931) 40 Yale L. J. O13.
3Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N. W. (2d) 489 (1953)-Gregory v. Nelson, 147 Kan. 682, 78 P. (2d) 889 (1938); Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich.
418, 12 Am. Rep. 311 (1873); Shields v. Early, 132 Miss. 282, 95 So. 839 (1923);
Pippin Bros. v. Thompson, 292 S. W. 618 ('rex. Civ. App. 1927); 3 Sedgwvick,
Damages (9th ed. 1920) § 1026.
'Federal Land Bank v. Bridgeforth, 233 Ala. 679, 173 So. 66 (1937); Moumal v.
Parkhurst, 89 Ore. 248, 173 Pac. 669 (1918); 1 Sedgwick, Damages (9th ed. 192o)
§§ 405, 407.
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like the principal case, the vendee certainly should not be placed in
a worse position merely because the contract was oral.
Though the Sturgis case is one of the few decisions which allows the
vendor to recover by pleading the oral land sale contract, the result
reached is in accord with the weight of authority, and perhaps the
Arkansas Court was justified in not denying recovery to the vendor
merely because he had sought relief on the wrong theory. However,
the court would have been on much sounder ground if, rather than
treating the case as an action by the vendee to recover cash payments
made on the purchase price, it had recognized it as the equivalent
of an action by the vendor on the check with the oral contract being
asserted only as consideration for the check. Under such a theory of
action the courts can, ignoring the artifical distinction between void
and voidable contracts, appropriately allow recovery in the amount of
the check unless that sum is so unreasonably large as to constitute
a penalty for failure to perform the oral contract.
RICHARD E. HILL

SuRETYsHIP-RIGHT OF SURETY OF BANK AGAINST Loss FROm FORGERY

To RECovER ON SUBROGATION THEORY AGAINST DEPOSITORY BANK

GUARANTEEING FORGED INDORSEMENTS ON CHECKS. [New Jersey]

In the recent case of StandardAccident Insurance Co. v. Pellecehial
the New Jersey Supreme Court has followed a growing trend of authority which allows an indemnitor under fidelity bonds securing a bank
against loss from forgery to recover through subrogation from a second
bank which has guaranteed a forged endorsement on a check. For
several years while plaintiff's fidelity bonds were in effect, the vicepresident and counsel of the defrauded obligee bank had looted it of
over $8oo,ooo, although in this action only some $5oo,ooo was involved. Fifteen checks drawn by the obligee bank upon itself and
payable to the order of persons who were later discovered to be fictitious and non-existent were endorsed by the defrauding officer in
the names of the payees for deposit in the defendant bank. These deposits were credited to the officer's checking account in the defendant
bank, but he soon withdrew the stolen funds. In the meantime, defendant bank, having stamped the checks "prior endorsements guaranteed," forwarded them for collection to the obligee bank, which
115 N. J. 162, 1o4 A. (2d) 288 (1954).
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credited defendant bank with the amounts they represented. When
the peculations were discovered, plaintiff indemnitor paid $2oo,ooo,
the total extent of liability under the fidelity bonds. Later the obligee
bank compromised for $175,000 whatever claim the obligee might

have against defendant bank on the latter's contractual guaranty of
the defrauding officer's endorsements. Plaintiff indemnitor refused
to be bound by that settlement and instituted this action against
defendant bank,2 claiming to be subrogated to the rights of its obligee
against defendant bank to the extent of the $2oo,ooo paid the obligee
under the fidelity bonds.
The trial court granted defendant bank's motion for summary
judgment,3 declaring that the right of subrogation "is not coextensive with the right of the obligee" 4 against defendant bank but exists
only when the indemnitor shows that the "third person" (defendant
bank) was a tortfeasor with respect to the obligee and that defendant
bank was innocent in equity. Plaintiff's claim was denied on the
ground that the "right of subrogation... is conditional, and the
condition, namely, a superior equity to that of [defendant bank], is nowhere demonstrated in the pleadings, proof or inferences therefrom." 5
An appeal was certified to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, which
reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for trial. 6
Concluding that there were three possible solutions where a surety's
action in subrogation against a "third person" is based on the latter's
contractual liability to the insured, 7 the Supreme Court adopted the
-"The trial court's ruling that as a matter of law the settlement of [defendant
bank] with [obligee bank] and the subsequent release of [defendant bank] by [obligee bank] do not constitute a bar to the action by [plaintiff] is sound." 15 N. J. 162,
104 A. (2d) 288, 295 (1954).
1
Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 27 N. J. Super. 189, 98 A. (2d) 706
(1953)'27 N. J. Super. 189, 98 A. (2d) 706, 71o (1953).
12-7 N. J. Super. 189, 98 A. (2d) 7o6, 71, (1953).
615 N. J. 162, 1o4 A. (2d) 288 at 295 (1954).

"(i) To prohibit recovery by the surety against the third person, who is
thus in effect given the benefit of insurance on which he has not paid any
premium and where there is no direct contractual or other relationship between
him and the surety.
"(2) To allow the insured to recover from both the surety and the third
party and thus to be doubly indemnified-a situation which the law has always
deemed contrary to public policy not only by reason of its unfairness but because of its incitement to fraud.
"(3) To give the surety the benefit of the contractual obligation of the insured
against the third party by allowing subrogation." 15 N. J. 162., o4 A. (2zd) 288, 302
(1954). These were among four possible alternative solutions suggested by disputes between sureties and third persons whose liability to insured parties rests
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view which "gives the surety the benefit of the insured's contractual
rights against the third person,"8 because such a view (a) gives force
to the contractual relations and (b) is in accord with the rules of subrogation in "all other forms of insurance." 9
The recognized principle that a drawee bank which pays a check
without knowledge that the endorsement of the payee has been forged
may recover the sum paid from the collecting bank which had guaranteed or warranted the prior endorsement thereon' 0 has been extended to protect the bank which has issued a cashier's check or draft
drawn upon itself." Even the negligence of the drawer whereby payment on the instrument was made proximately possible is no defense
to an action by the drawee bank against the collecting bank, since
the drawee's payment was induced by the collecting bank's false
warranty of the fraudulent endorsement.' 2 In all such cases the forger
should be pursued by the collecting bank which warranted his endorsement, rather than by the drawee bank which relied on the warranty for the correctness of the endorsements.' 3 The courts have described the liability of the collecting bank for losses suffered by subupon rules of law independent of contract or upon a contract whose purpose is not
suretyship. Langmaid, Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the Law of Suretyship and Insurance (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 976 at 977-978.
815 N. J. 162, 1o4 A. (2d) 288, 302 (1954).
915 N. J. 162, xo4 A. (2d) 288, 3o2 (1954). The right of subrogation exists in
all types of indemnity insurance contracts, including liability, theft, and guaranty
policies, upon the theory that the insured is under no circumstances entitled to
receive any profit by reason of insurance and should not recover for the loss from
both the insurer and the person primarily liable to the insured for the loss. However, the right of subrogation does not exist in life and accident insurance policies
because these are not contracts of indemnity. See 2 Richards, Insurance (5 th ed.
1952) 656; Vance, Insurance (3rd ed. 1951) 104, 79o . The insurer is subrogated to
claims against tortfeasors whose actions were the legal cause of the insured's loss,
and the opinion in the principal case shows the evolution of subrogation upon the
contractual obligations of a third person in favor of the insured. See 15 N. J.
162, 104 A. (2d) 288 at 296-299 (1954); Campbell, Non-Consensual Suretyship (1935)
45 Yale L. J. 69; King, Subrogation Under Contracts Insuring Property (1951) 3o
Tex. L. Rev. 62; Langmaid, Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the Law of
Suretyship and Insurance (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 976; 2 Richards, Insurance ( 5 th
ed. 1952) §§ 185, 189-193; Vance, Insurance (3rd ed. 1951) 786.

"GAmerican Exch. Nat. Bank v. Yorkville Bank, 122 Misc. 616, 204 N. Y. Supp.
621 at 625 (1924). See 5B Michie, Banks and Banking (2d ed. 1950) §§ 266, 294.

nHartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Riverside Trust Co., 123 Conn. 616, 197
Atl. 766 at 771 (1938). See

5B

Michie, Banks and Banking (2d ed. 1950) 47, 158.

"State Bank v. Mid-City Trust & Say. Bank, 232 Ill. App. 186 (1924). See 5 B
Michie, Banks and Banking (2d ed. 1950) 16o-161.
"3Home Ind. Co. v. State Bank, 233 Iowa 103, 8 N. W. (2d) 757 (1943). See 5 B
Michie, Banks and Banking (2d ed. 1950) 45-46.
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sequent endorsees as "absolute,"' 14 and it has been suggested that in
accepting the forged instrument the collecting bank is guilty of the
"first fault."'15
However, the policy of the law is to protect the depositor-drawer
above all endorsees of a fraudulently endorsed check, including the
drawee bank.' 6 The relationship that exists between a depositor and
a depository bank is usually one of creditor and debtor, since the depositor has given up money in return for a chose in action against the
bank. 17 Because the depository bank has contracted with the depositor
to pay over the latter's claim against it only in accordance with his
directions, it is generally held that the drawee bank pays a forged
check at its peril.'.8 When the drawee honors a check, it is paying out
its own money and not that of the depositor. 9 The drawee bank must
ascertain the validity of all signatures, including the endorsements
of the payee and other endorsers, and even though it relies upon the
warranties of the collecting bank as to the correctness of the payee's
endorsement, if that endorsement is fraudulent, the drawee must
recredit the drawer's account in fulfillment of the drawee's promise to
20
pay only in accordance with the drawer's instructions.
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, where a trustee or
other fiduciary deposits a trust fund in a bank, the ordinary relation
" 1Manufacturers' Trust Co. v. Harriman Nat. Bank Trust Co., 146 Misc. 551, 262
N. Y. Supp. 482 (1932).
' 1 Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Farmers' & Traders' Bank, 159 Ky. 141, 166 S. W.
986, L. R. A. 1915A, 77 (1914). See Star Fire Ins. Co. v. New Hampshire Nat. Bank,
60 N. H. 442 at 447 (1880).
"Lieber v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 137 Mo. App. 158, 117 S. W. 672, 678 (199o):
"The very fact that the defendant paid these checks was an assurance on which the
plaintiff had a right to rely that the defendant bank had assured itself of the
genuiness of every one of the preceding indorsements...." Accord: Union Trust
Co. v. Soble, 192 Md. 427, 64 A. (2d) 744 (1949). However, the depositor must have
exercised due diligence in the matter of examining his cancelled checks and in
giving the bank timely notice of the forgery, or the bank need not recredit the
depositor's account when the fraudulent endorsement is uncovered. City of Indianapolis v. National City Bank, 80 Ind. App. 677, 141 N. E. 249 (1923). See generally
5 B Michie, Banks and Banking (2d ed. 1950) §§ 276, 277a, 280-286.
1 llis Weaving Mills, Inc. v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank, 91 F. Supp. 943
(W. D. S. C. 1950); Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 198 Misc. 82, lOO
N. Y. S. (2d) 840 (195o).
"Home Ind. Co. v. State Bank, 233 Iowa 1O3 , 8 N. W. (2d) 757 (1943); Greenville Nat. Exch. Bank v. Nussbaum, 154 S.W. (2d) 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
'0 Pennsylvania Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 30 F. Supp. 982 (E. D. Pa. 1939);
First Nat. Bank v. Pease, 168 Ill. 40, 48 N. E. i6o (1897).
'Atlanta Nat. Bank v. Burke, 81 Ga. 597, 7 S. E. 738, 2 L. R. A. 96 (1888);
Jordan Marsh Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 201 Mass. 397, 87 N. E. 74 o , 22
L. R. A. (N. s.) 250 (199o).
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of creditor and debtor is established between the depositing fiduciary
and the bank,21 although the trust attaches to the chose in action held
by the fiduciary against the bank. 22 While the depository bank will
not ordinarily be liable to the beneficial owners of the trust deposit
for a diversion thereof by the fiduciary for his personal benefit, 23 it may

be liable for a breach of the contract of deposit 24 or for participation
in the breach of trust if it applies the fund to the payment of the
fiduciary's individual debt to the bank or if it assists the fiduciary
to accomplish a diversion with knowledge or notice that the fraud
is being committed.25 Thus the liability of the depositories of trust
funds arises from their participation in the breach of trust with the
fiduciary.
Despite the clarity of the legal principles which are applicable
in the described situations, the great majority of courts, in invoking
the equitable doctrine of subrogation, do not necessarily follow these
principles when the insurer of the defrauded party is seeking recovery
for its payment of the loss to the insured. Treating the defrauding
forger or the embezzling fiduciary as primarily responsible to the
defrauded obligee, the courts agree that the surety or indemnitor
is subrogated to all of the legal rights of the obligee against the fraudulent principal as soon as the total loss to the obligee has been recovered. 26 However, under the majority view, the right of subrogation
will not be enforced against a third person, such as a depository bank
or a collecting bank or other subsequent endorser of negotiable paper,
where the equities of the third person are superior or even equal to
21

In re Battani, 6 F. Supp. 376 (E. D. Mich. 1934). See 5 A Michie, Banks and
Banking (2d ed. 1950) 131.
2Cady v. South Omaha Nat. Bank, 46 Neb. 756, 65 N. W. 9o6 (1896). See 5 A
Michie, Banks and Banking (2d ed. 1950) 132-133.
nAmerican Sur. Co. v. Waggoner Nat. Bank, 13 F. Supp. 295 (N. D. Tex. 1934);
Bank of Hartford v. McDonald, 107 Ark. 232, 154 S. W. 512 (1913).
2
4Martin v. First Nat. Bank, 51 F. (2d) 840 (D. C. Minn. 1931); Charleston Paint
Co. v. Exchange Banking & Trust Co., 129 S. C. 290, 123 S. E. 83o (1924). See 5A
Michie, Banks and Banking (2d. ed. 1950) § 57a.
nChilds v. Empire Trust Co., 54 F. (2d) 981 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); Cocke's Adm'r v.
Loyall, 150 Va. 336, 143 S. E. 881 (1928). See Restatement, Trusts (1935) § 324.
2American Sur. Co. v. Robinson, 53 F. (2d) 22, 23 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1931): "It [subrogation] is freely applied in favor of a surety who discharges his principal's obligation, or makes good his default. It operates to enable the surety to enforce
all his principal's rights of reimbursement against others, and all the rights of the
creditor against the principal and all securities held for the obligation." Accord:
United States F. & G. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 172 F. (2d) 258 (C. A. 5th, 1949),
noted (1949) 35 Va. L. Rev. 647; Louisville Trust Co. v. Royal Ind. Co., 23o Ky. 482,
2o S. W. (2d) 71 (1929); Northern Trust Co. v. Consolidated Elevator Co., 142 Minn.
132, 171 N. W. 265, 4 A. L. R. 510 (1919).

19551

CASE COMMENTS

those of the surety or indemnitor in respect to the liability.27 Thus, the
right of the surety or indemnitor to recover against third persons
through equitable subrogation is not coextensive with the conceded
right of the obligee himself to recover against these parties in a suit
28
at law.
When the trial judge finds that the equities between the surety
and the third person are "equal," the capricious choice of the obligee in selecting the source of his recovery as between the surety and
the third person will govern, for the courts will deny subrogation to
the party selected by the obligee to reimburse him for his loss, upon
the notion that "equality of equities is fatal to subrogation." 29 The
courts which adopt the majority view are in accord that the equities
of the third person are not equal or superior to those of the surety
when the third person's conduct with respect to the obligee includes
"tort-feasance and conduct in the nature thereof, including fraud,
negligence, culpable knowledge, conspiratorial participation, implied
knowledge or even omission of duty"3 0 and in those cases allow the
surety to recover against the third person. 31 But where the third person
1

United States F. & G. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 172 F. (2d) 258 (C. A. 5 th, 1949);
Washington Mechanics' Say. Bank v. District Title Ins. Co., 62 App. D. C. 194,
65 F. (2d) 827 (1933); New York Title &-Mort. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 51 F. (2d)
485, 77 A. L. R. 1052 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); American Sur. Co. v. Citizens' Nat.
Bank, 294 Fed. 6o9 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Meyers v. Bank of America Nat. Trust
g&Say. Ass'n, ii Cal. (2d) 92, 77 P. (2d) 1084 (1938), noted (1938) 27 Calif. L. Rev.
88, (1939) 12 So. Cal. L. Rev. 49o; National Cas. Co. v. Caswell & Co., 317 Ill. App.
66, 45 N. E. (2d) 698 (1942); Southern Sur. Co. v. Tessum, 178 Minn. 495, 228 N.
NV. 326, 66 A. L. R. 1136 (1929); Oxford Production Credit Ass'n v. Bank of Oxford,
196 Miss. 5o, 16 S. (2d) 384 (1944); Green v. Ruffin, 197 N. C. 345, 102 S. E. 634
(1920). See generally Steams, Suretyship ( 5 th ed. 1951) § 11.3.
2eUnited States F. 8&G. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 172 F. (2d) 258, 263 (C. A. 5 th, 1949):
"Subrogation is an equitable remedy, and, while a surety may become subrogated
to the rights and remedies of the creditor against the principal, he stands, in
respect to the right of recovery against a third person, upon a different footing from
that upon which he would stand with respect to the right to recover from a
principal." Accord: Northern Trust Co. v. Consolidated Elevator Co., 142 Minn.
132, 171 N. W. 265, 4 A. L. R. 51o ('gig); National Sur. Corp. v. Edwards House
Co., 191 Miss. 884, 4 S. (2d) 340, 137 A. L. R. 697 (1941); American Bonding Co.
v. State Say. Bank, 47 Mont. 332, 133 Pac. 367, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 577 (1913)2OLangmaid, Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the Law of Suretyship and
Insurance (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 976, 979. Accord: Washington Mechanics' Say.
Bank v. District Title Ins. Co., 62 App. D. C. 194, 65 F. (2d) 827 (1933); Meyers v.
Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n, ii Cal. (2d) 92, 77 P. (2d) 1084 (1938).
See American Sur. Co. v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 294 Fed. 6o9 at 616 (C.CA. 8th, 1923).
mStandard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 27 N. J. Super. 189, 98 A. (2d) 7o6, 711
(1953).
"Anacostia Bank v. United States F. & G. Co., 73 App. D. C. 388, 119 F. (2d) 445,
134 A. L. R. 995 (1941); Fidelity &: Dep. Co. v. Citizens Nat. Bank, xoo F. (2d)
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has engaged in no conduct toward the obligee which can be catagorized
as tortious, most courts would deny the surety the right to be subrogated
to the remedies at law of the obligee against such a third person whose
32
only obligation to the obligee is founded in principles of contract.
807 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1939); Burke Grain Co. v. St. Paul-Mercury Ind. Co., 94 F. (2d)
458 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); Fidelity & Dep. Co. v. Bank of Smithfield, 11 F. Supp.
904 (E. D. Va. 1932); Fidelity & Dep. Co. v. Cowan, 184 Ark. 75, 41 S. W. (2d) 748
(1931); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Sampson, 40 Cal. App. (2d) 119, 104 P. (2d) 374 (1940);
Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116, 95
A. L. R. 258 (1934); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Heitman Trust Co., 317 Ill. App. 256, 46 N.
E. (2d) 155 (1942); Randell v. Fellers, 218 Iowa 1oo 5 , 252 N. W. 787 (1934); Baker
v. McIntosh, 294 Ky. 527, 172 S.W. (2d) 29 (1943); American Bonding Co. v. National
Mechanics' Bank, 97 Md. 598, 55 At. 395, 99 Am. St. Rep. 466 (19o3); National
o
Sur. Co. v. Webster Lumber Co., 187 Minn. 50, 244 N. W. 29 (1932); United States
F. & G. Co. v. First State Bank, 116 Miss. 239, 76 So. 747 (1917); Empire State Sur.
Co. v. Cohen, 93 Misc. 299, 156 N. Y. Supp. 935 (1916); Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Gough, 146 Ohio St. 305, 65 N. E. (2d) 858 (1946); Akers v. Gillentine, 191 Tenn.
35, 231 S. IV. (ad) 369 (1948); Fenner v. American Stir. Co., 156 S. W. (2d)
279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Webb v. United States F. & G. Co., 165 Va. 388, 18a
S. E. 577 (1935); United States F. & G. Co. v. Hood, 12a W. Va. 157, 7 S.E. (2d)
872 (1940).
3American Sur. Co. v. Bank of California, 133 F. (ad) i6o (C. C. A. 9th, 1943);
New York Title & Mort. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 51 F. (ad) 485, 77 A. L. R. 1052 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1931); National Sur. Co. v. Arosin, 117 C. C. A. 313, 198 Fed. 605 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1912), later appeal in National Sur. Co. v. State Say. Bank, 84 C. C. A. 187,
156 Fed. 2 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o7); Jones v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 49 Cal. App. (ad) 115, 121 P. (ad) 94 (1942); National Cas. Co. v. Caswell &
App. 66, 45 N. E. (ad) 698 (1942); Baker v. American Sur. Co., 181
Co., 317 Ill.
Iowa 634, 159 N. W. 1o44 (1916); Commonwealth, for the use of Coleman v. Farmers Dep. Bank, 264 Ky. 839, 95 S. W. (ad) 793 (1936); Southern Sur. Co. v. Tessum,
178 Minn. 495, 228 N. W. 326, 66 A. L. R. 1136 (1929); Oxford Production Credit
Ass'n v. Bank of Oxford, 196 Miss. 5o, 16 S. (ad) 384 (1944); American Bonding
Co. v. State Say. Bank, 47 Mont. 332, 133 Pac. 367, 46 L. R. A. (N. s.) 557 (1913);
Fidelity & Dep. Co. v. Atherton, 47 N. M. 443, 144 P. (ad) 157 (1944); Western Sur.
Co. v. Walker, 44 S. D. 112, 182 N. W. 635, 24 A. L. R. 1519 (1921); United States
F. & G. Co. v. Home Bank for Savings, 77 W. Va. 665, 88 S. E. 1o9 (1916).
The right of a fidelity insurer which had paid the insured a loss resulting from
the forgery of checks by the employee and payment thereof by a bank in which
the insured carried his deposits to recover from the bank has been sustained
under an assignment by the insured to the insurer of the former's cause of action
against the bank. Grubnaw v. Centehnial Nat. Bank, 279 Pa. 5oi, 124 Atl. 142
(1924). Accord: National Sur. Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 21o Iowa 323, 228 N. W.
635 (193o); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 261 Mich. 450, 246
N. W. 178 (1933). However, the weight of authority sustains the proposition that
a written or oral assignment adds nothing whatever to the substantive rights of
the surety. American Sur. Co. v. Lewis State Bank, 58 F. (ad) 559 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932);
New York Title & Mort. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 51 F. (ad) 485, 77 A. L. R. 1o52
(C. C. A. 8th, 1931), noted (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. Soo; Meyers v. Bank of America
Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n, 11 Cal. (ad) 92, 77 P. (ad) 1084 (1938); Louisville Trust
Co. v. Royal Ind. Co., 230 Ky. 482, 20 S. W. (ad) 71 (1929); Oxford Production Credit
o
Ass'n v. Bank of Oxford, 196 Miss. 5 , 16 S. (ad) 384 (x944); American Bonding
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The holding of the New Jersey Supreme Court that as between the
surety and the "innocent third person" the surety should prevail without the necessity of proving a superior equity represents a growing
minority rule in American decisions wherein equitable subrogation
is invoked. 33 In many of these decisions no reference is made to the
lack of fault or tortious conduct on the part of the third person against
whom subrogation is allowed. Occasionally it is suggested that any
bank, particularly a collecting bank, which accepts a check without
requiring the identification of the presentor is negligent or fails to
meet the standard of care which the law requires. 34 The fact that the
indemnitor or surety was paid to assume the risk of loss is not mentioned or is discounted by the contention that the bond premiums are
computed upon the expectancy that a recovery over is possible in many
cases.3 5 Beyond this, the principal case intimated that the loss of the
defendant bank will ultimately fall upon its own insurer, which bonded
the bank against loss through negligent acts of employees. 36 At least
Co. v. State Say. Bank, 47 Mont. 332, 133 Pac. 367, 46 L. R. A. (N.S.) 557 (1913). For
a discussion of the conflicting results of these two lines of authority, see Langmaid,
Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the Law of Suretyship and Insurance (1934)
L. Rev. 967 at 981-982.
47 Harv.
13
Boserine v. Maryland Gas. Co., 112 F. (2d) 409 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940); "First Nat.
Bank v. American Sur. Co., 71 Ga. App. 112, 30 S. E. (2d) 402 (1944); First & TriState Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 102 Ind. App.
361, 2oo N. E. 449 (1936); Home Ind. Co. v. State Bank, 233 Iowa 1O3, 8 N. W. (2d)
757 (1943); Royal Ind. Co. v. Poplar Bluff Trust Co., 223 Mo. App. 9o8, 2o S. W.
(2d) 971 (1929); Maryland Gas. Co. v. Chase Nat. Bank, 153 Misc. 538, 275 N. Y.
Supp. 311 (1934); National Sur. Co. v. National City Bank, 184 App. Div. 771, 172
N. Y. Supp. 413 (1918); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 151 Tex. 12,
245 S.W. (2d) 237 (1951). Although assignments of the insured parties' claims were
executed in some of these cases, the recoveries were not conditioned upon this
fact as they were in the cases following the doctrine of the Grubnaw case. See note
32, supra.

""'I cannot find that the bank has a superior equity. There are only two
parties at fault here, [the forger) and the bank [depository]." Dissenting opinion of
Justice Alexander in Oxford Production Credit Ass'n v. Bank of Oxford, 196 Miss.
50, 16 S. (2d) 384, 394 (1944). See also the dissenting- opinion of Chief Justice
Smith, 196 Miss. 50, 16 S. (2d) 384 at 392-393 (1944).
=Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 15 N. J. 162, 104 A. (2d) 288 at 302 (1954).

While the fact of compensation is not generally held to diminish the rights of a
compensated surety as compared with a gratuitous surety-e.g., Bench Canal Drainage Dist. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 278 Fed. 67 at 8o (C. C. A. 8th, 1921)-some opinions
stress the fact of compensation in weighing the respective equities of the surety
and the third person. "The surety may have taken into consideration the heretofore
assumed right of the insurer to recover... and determined the premiums accordingly." Note (1939) 12 So. Cal. L. Rev. 490, 492. But see 2 Richards, Insurance
(sth ed. 1952) 184-185, especially n. ii.
C3 5 N. J. 162, 104 A. (2d) 288 at 303 (1954).
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one court has suggested that the depository bank is not a "third person" as to the depositor but is the principal or primary party liable
to the depositor when it debits his account with a fraudulently
endorsed check. 37 Furthermore, some courts now treat both suretyship contracts for the fidelity of employees and policies which guarantee bank deposits or secure banks against loss through forgery the
same as ordinary indemnity contracts.38 As discussed before, in the
case of most indemnity policies, the indemnitor, upon payment of the
loss, is subrogated to any legal rights-including contract rightswhich belong to the insured at the time of the loss by virtue of which
he might have compelled another to make compensation in whole or
in part for such a loss. 39 In general, the minority view places emphasis
upon the liability of the depository or collecting bank to the insured
which exists at law, 40 the argument being that unless subrogation is
allowed the plain policy of the law will be thwarted, and the bank
which is contractually liable to the insured will escape liability when,
but for the single fact that the insured carried a fidelity policy or
depositor's insurance, the bank would have had to suffer the initial
loss. 41
The majority rule creates extremely varied results when it is
applied to the three situations described earlier. Usually the surety
of a fiduciary or public officer, upon payment of the loss brought
about by the infidelity to the beneficiaries, is allowed to recover
against the depository bank which participated in the breach of
trust, the same as the beneficiaries might have proceeded against the
depository in the first instance. Thus, the result under the majority
view of equitable subrogation that the equities of the surety are superior to those of the bank corresponds to the result at law that the
participant in the infidelity should respond for the loss. Where the
surety or insurer of a bank depositor, after payment by the depository
31First Nat. Bank v. American Sur. CO., 7V Ga. App.

112,

30 S. E. (2d) 402 at 407

(1944).
38

See the opinion in the principal case, 15 N. J. 162, 1o4 A. (2d) 288 at 302
(1954). Accord: Boserine v. Maryland Cas. Co., 112 F. (2d) 409 at 414 (C. C. A. 8th,

1940).
'See note 9, supra.
"0See principal case and cases cited in note 33, supra.
"1 Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 15 N. J. 162, io4 A. (2d) 288 at 303 (1954).
See dissenting opinion of Justice Alexander in Oxford Production Credit Ass'n v.
Bank of Oxford, 196 Miss. 50, 16 S. (2d) 384, 394 (1944): "...equity should follow the law and recognize the legal principles, and enforce them as such."
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bank of fraudulently endorsed checks, seeks subrogation to the rights
of the insured against the depository bank, the result under the majority
view which denies subrogation might also be justified as in harmony
with the principles of law. As pointed out, in paying fraudulently
endorsed checks, the drawee bank gives up its own money, and not
that of the depositor, whose claim against the drawee remains unaffected, unless the drawer was negligent or is estopped to set up the
forgeries. Since the depositor has suffered no loss, there was no occasion for his surety or indemnitor to honor any claim and hence no
basis for allowing subrogation. On the other hand, if the drawer was
negligent, as for example in not promptly notifying the drawee bank
that its payee had not received the check although someone had
cashed it after forging the payee's signature, and the depository bank
is not obliged to recredit the drawer's account, the drawer's insurer
should not be subrogated, and is not under any view. The true reason
for that result should be that since the drawer could not recover against
the depository bank, the insurer, having no greater rights than the
insured drawer, may not recover the loss which it was required to
pay the insured from the depository bank. Although the result is
correct, many courts reason upon the theory that the insurer's "equities"
are not superior to those of the depository bank, when actually the
depository bank is not liable at law to anyone for the loss. Finally,
under 'facts similar to those in the principal case, when an insurer
of the drawer or drawee bank seeks equitable subrogation to the
rights of the insured against the collecting bank or endorser which
warranted the forger's endorsement, the application of the majority
view which denies subrogation leads to a result which is squarely
contrary to the rule of law that the warrantor of the endorsement,
even though he acted without negligence, should suffer the loss and
pursue the forger. On the other hand, sensing that the results under
equitable subrogation and at law should be harmonious and that
differing conclusions would lead to inequitable results, the New
Jersey court and those jurisdictions which support the minority view
that subrogation should be allowed feel that tortious or unconscionable
conduct is not the only basis for liability in subrogation suits and that
contractual obligations are as deserving of enforcement in equity as
at law.
MARVIN

H.

ANDERSON
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TORTs-LIABILITY OF OWNER LEAVING AUTOMOBILE UNATrENDED IN
VIOLATION OF STATUTE FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE OF UNAUTHORIZED

DRIVER. [Illinois]

Common experience has demonstrated that when drivers leave
automobiles unattended in public places without taking the ordinary
precautions of stopping the engine, locking the ignition, removing
the key, and locking the doors, they should reasonably foresee the
possibility that unauthorized persons, such as thieves or irresponsible
juveniles and adults, may tamper with or drive away in the automobiles. Often such unauthorized use of automobiles leads to drastic results in property damage,' personal injuries, 2 and fatalities, 3 because
those who take it upon themselves to operate motor vehicles without
permission are often incapable of driving or are unappreciative of, or
indifferent to, the damage which may result if the vehicles are not
carefully operated. Frequently the intermeddling drivers are insolvent
or otherwise incapable of compensating parties who have suffered
damages occasioned by the fault of the drivers.
Consequently, the courts for over fifty years have been faced with
the problem of whether to compensate the injured plaintiff by imposing liability on the owner of the automobile when an unauthorized
driver is at fault in causing harm to plaintiff's person or property.
As early as 19o3 a New York court was confronted with this dilemma
in the case of Berman v. Schultz, 4 where, during the absence of the

owner, several boys played about his parked automobile, causing
the machine to move and strike the plaintiff's horse and wagon. The
court ruled that "[i]t was the duty of the defendant to exercise such
care as a person -of ordinary prudence would use under the circumstances;" 5 but it was decided that defendant met this duty by turning
off the motor and setting the brake, and that the proximate cause of
the injury complained of was the intervening act of a third party. 6
Through the years the courts have generally continued to deny
recovery from the car owner on the theory that the unauthorized
driver's acts are independent, intervening acts which are not reasonably
Pesaty v. James A. Hearn & Son, Inc., 2o2 N. Y. Supp. 264 (1923); Frashella v.
Taylor, 157 N. Y. Supp. 881 (1916).
2
Dostie v. Wellman, 144 Me. 36, 63 A. (2d) 926 (1949); Roberts v. Lundy, 3oi
Mich.726, 4 N. W.

(2d) 74 (1942); Walter v. Bond, 292 N. Y. 574, 54 N. E. (2d) 691

(1944); Mann v. Parshall, 229 App. Div. 366, 241 N. Y. Supp. 673 (1930).
3Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 S. (2d) 573 (La. App. 1951).
484 N. Y. Supp. 292 (193o).
584 N. Y. Supp. 292, 293 (1903).

"See 2 Restatement, Torts (1934) § 448.
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foreseeble and which necessarily break the chain of causation between the negligent act of the car owner and the resulting injury to
7

the plaintiff.

The increase in automobile thefts in recent years, together with
the increased destructiveness of modem automobiles when recklessly driven, have led to legislation designed to compel car owners to
exercise a greater degree of care when they leave their vehicles unattended. A statute of this nature in Illinois provides: "(a) No person
driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and
removing the key, or when standing upon any perceptible grade without effectively setting the brake thereon and turning the front wheels
to the curb or side of the highway. (b) No person shall operate or
'8
drive a motor vehicle who is under fifteen years of age."
7

Castay v. Katz & Besthoff, Ltd., 148 So. 76 (La. App. 1933); Anderson v. Thiesen,
Minn. 369, 43 N. V. (2d) 272 (195o), noted (195o) 35 Minn. L. Rev. 8; see 2
Restatement, Torts (1934) § 448.
However, some of the later decisions have indicated that the intermeddling
acts of a third party may be regarded as a foreseeable risk. Spanko v. Spitalnick,
1o N. J. L. 5, 127 At. 663 (1925); Tierney v. New York Dugan Bros., Inc., 288
N. Y. 16, 41 N. E. (2d) 161, 14o A. L. R. 534 (1942) (truck left with safety switch
unlocked, and children playing nearby set truck in motion; question of due care was
submitted to the jury); Bullock v. Dahlstrom, 46 A. (2d) 370 (D. C. App. 1946)
(though automobile may not have been left "unattended" within meaning of
statute, recovery was allowed on other grounds: that leaving the taxicab with a
strange passenger in it and the key in the ignition was negligence, and such
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision that followed). Liability
may be imposed when the owner acted in an extremely careless manner in leaving
automobile under conditions inviting intermeddling, as in Lomano v. Ideal Towel
Supply Co., 25 N. J. Misc. 162, 51 A. (2d) 888 (1947), where an unattended truck
was entered by ten-year old boys who backed it into plaintiff. Liability was
predicated upon the driver's carelessness in leaving the vehicle susceptible to interference by third parties when he knew that on several previous occasions
children had meddled with defendant's trucks left unattended in that area.
8I1. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1950) c. 95 1/2, § 189. This statute embodies the
substance of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, Art. XIV, § 52, one
of four separate acts which comprise the Uniform Motor Vehicle Code, first approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1926 and revised in 193o. The Uniform Act provides: "No person having control or charge of a motor vehicle shall allow such vehicle to stand on any highway
unattended without first
effectively setting the brakes thereon and stopping
the motor of said vehicle, and when standing upon any perceptible grade without
turning the front wheels of such vehicle to the curb or side of the highway."
11 Uniform Laws Ann. (Thompson, 1938) 50. It would seem that any application of
this type of statute in the courts to civil liability for acts of a thief would have to
be based on the intention of the legislature of the individual state, rather than on
any intention to that effect demonstrated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. For a list of states which have adopted the statute
with the section requiring the driver to lock the ignition and remove the key,
231
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The courts have the difficult duty of ascertaining whether the legislature, in enacting a statute which embodies such requirements and
provides only a criminal sanction, intended that violation thereof
would also render the owner civilly liable for the injuries caused by
the acts of intermeddling drivers. In the recent Illinois case of Ney v.
Yellow Cab Co.,9 plaintiff alleged that defendant taxicab owner violated the statute by negligently permitting its taxicab to remain unattended on a Chicago street without locking the ignition and removing
the key, and that as a result, a thief stole the vehicle and, while in
flight, ran into and damaged plaintiff's automobile. Defendant moved
to dismiss the complaint on the theory that his acts or omissions in
violation of the statute did not constitute actionable negligence and
were not the proximate cause of the damage. The trial court entered
judgment for plaintiff, which was affirmed in the appellate court and
finally by the Illinois Supreme Court, with one Justice dissenting.
The latter court analyzed the case as presenting the following issues:
(a) What was the legislative intention as to the scope of the statute?
(b) Was the violation of the statute the proximate cause of the injury? (c) Was the act of the thief an intervening, independent efficient
force which broke the causual connection between the original wrong
and the injury?
Although such statutes as that in effect in Illinois are enacted for
the broad purpose of regulating traffic on the highways, 1° the legislatures have merely provided that failure to comply with any rule
or regulation is a misdemeanor, punishable by either a fine or imprisonand those which do not have this "key" section, but which have the other requirements in regard to leaving an unattended vehicle, see Note (1954) 38 Marq. L. Rev. 99
at io5.
The Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways and the other three uniform
acts comprising the Uniform Motor Vehicle Code were declared obsolete in 1943
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. In 1946 the
Conference endorsed the Uniform Vehicle Code Revised, which has been approved by the National Conference on Street and Highway Safety and the National
Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances. This later model act embodies the same requirements for leaving an unattended motor vehicle as did the
original uniform act, plus the provision requiring that the ignition be locked and
the key removed. See Uniform Vehicle Code Revised (1954) Art. 9, § 11-11o, p.
11o. The addition of the "key" provision, evidently copied from many state
statutes, indicates that perhaps the authors of the model act intended that drivers
should guard against the possible meddling of a thief, although the act contains
no express provision regarding civil liability.
92 Ill. (2d) 74, 117 N. E. (2d) 74 (1954).
1
Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd,
1950) c. 95 "/2, § 98.
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ment or both.1 In the principal case, defendant took the position that
the statute is not an "antitheft measure," but instead, is purely a
"traffic regulation," the violation of which could impose no civil
liability on the owner of the vehicle for the misconduct of a thief.
The plaintiff, however, contended that the statute is a safety measure
for the benefit of the public, that its violation was prima facie evidence
of negligence, and that reasonable persons might foresee that its violation could result in the consequences which occurred. The Supreme
Court of Illinois, observing that "[l]abeling of the statute does not
solve the problem,"' 2 attempted to determine the legislative purpose
by analyzing the various provisions of the act. It was conceded that
the requirement that the brakes be set and the wheels turned to the
curb on a grade is not a theft deterrent, but the further provision
which prohibits minors under the age of fifteen from operating a
vehicle was regarded as clearly showing that the legislature was
thinking about danger to the public. Consequently, the court concluded that the entire section of the statute under review is a public
safety measure passed for the "protection of life, limb and property
by prevention of recognized hazards."' 3 It is to be noted that the
Massachusetts court has construed a similar statute' 4 as an antitheft
measure, but still'denied recovery to the plaintiff on the ground that
his injury was not the proximate result of the violation of the statute. 5
On the other hand, the District of Columbia court ruled, consistent
with the principal case, that the purpose of the enactment is to protect the public from a thief's negligent management of a stolen automobile, and allowed plaintiff to recover for the injury sustained. 16
It would seem, therefore, as the Illinois court pointed out, that the
label with which a court classifies the statute does not explain why
uIll. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1950) c. 95 1/2, § 234(a) and (b).
'Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 II. (2d) 74, 117 N. E. (2d) 74, 77 (1954).
"Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. (2d) 74, 117 N. E. (2d) 74, 78 (1954). The dissenting Justice was disturbed that the "majority opinion is contradictory within itself," in that it first finds that the statute is not an antitheft measure but rather
is a public safety regulation, but then declared that it was intended to prevent
accidents caused by thieves while stealing automobiles. See 2 Ill. (2d) 74, 117 N. E.
(2d) 74, 80 (1954).
2 3 Mass. Laws Ann. (1954) c. 90 § 13: "No person having control or charge
of a motor vehicle shall allow such vehicle to stand in any way and remain
unattended without first locking or making it fast ... "
"Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N. E. (2d) 33o (1945).
"Ross v. Hartman, 139 F. (2d) 14 (C. A. D. C. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 790,
64 S. Ct. 790, 88 L. ed. 1o8o (1943), noted (1944) 92 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 467.
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civil liability may or may not be predicated on a violation of such a
provision.
The Illinois Court, having determined in the Ney case that the
statute is a "public safety measure," the violation of which may give
rise to civil liability, ruled: "The violation of the statute is prima facie
evidence of negligence.... This in itself creates a liability"17-provided
that the violation is the direct and proximate cause of the injury.
Most American courts hold that violation of such a statute, which
8
makes a certain course of conduct criminal, is negligence per se.'
Under this view, if the jury in a civil action finds that defendant did
the acts prohibited, or failed to do the acts required, by statute, then
a finding of negligence is mandatory, as the legislature has already
set the standard of due care.' 9 Under the principal case view that a
showing of violation of the statute establishes a prima facie case of negligence, if the defendant offers rebuttal evidence to show that his actions were reasonable under the circumstances, 20 the jury will decide
the issue of negligence on the basis of all the evidence. 21 However, if
the defendant makes no attempt to show that he exercised due care,
some courts treat a prima facie case as having the same effect as a
'full presumption of negligence, in which event the jury must find
defendant negligent if he fails to offer any rebutting evidence.2 2 On
the other hand, the majority of courts following the prima facie
rule take the seemingly better view that a prima facie case creates
only an inference of negligence and that the jury may, but is not required to, find defendant negligent if lie fails to offer any rebutting
23
evidence.
IlL. (2d) 74, 117 N. E. (2d) 74, 78 (1954).
Ross v. Hartman, 139 F. (2d) 14 (C. A. D. C. 1943); Rosner v. Harrel Drilling
Co., 261 S. W. (2d) 19o (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), following the Texas approach to
statutory violation set out in Texas and Pac. R. Co. v. Baker, 215 S. W. 556, 557 (Tex.
Cim. App. x9i9); Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 1o3, 105, 41 N. W. 543, 544, 12 Am.
St. Rep. 698 (1889); Note (1935) 19 Minn. L. Rev. 688.
0See Prosser, Torts (1941) 274; Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes
to Tort Liability (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 453.
1
2 See 2 Ill. (2d) 74, 117 N. E. (2d) 74 at 8o (1954). The court suggests some
examples of evidence of due care defendant might have offered: that he left a
reliable person to watch the car for him, or left it in view of a police officer, or
that the intervening third party drove the car carefully.
"Johnson v. Pendergast, 3o8 Ill. 255, 139 N. E. 407 at 409 (1923).
2Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School District, 29 Cal. (2d) 581, 177 P. (2d) 279
72
18

(1947); Landry v. Hubert, 101 Vt. 111, 141 At. 593 (1928).

"Harsha v. Bowles, 314 Mass. 738, 51 N. E. (2d) 454 (1943); Santa Maria v.
Trotto, 297 Mass. 442, 9 N. E. (2d) 540, 111 A. L. R. 1253 (1937); Roberts v. Neil,
o
138 Me. 105, 22 A. (2d) 135 (1941); Evers v. Davis, 86 N. J. L. 196, 9 Ad. 677
(1914).
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The Illinois court's position in this case is not dear, since in
successive sentences it declares that "violation of the statute is prima
facie evidence of negligence .... This in itself creates liability." 24 In

previous cases also, Illinois courts have failed to take a definite stand
on this issue. In Ostergard v. Frisch,25 involving the same statute, the
court based liability largely on causation rather than on the character
of defendant's negligence in violating the statute. In Cockrell v. Sullivan,20 another Illinois appellate court asserted that violation of this
statute is prima facie evidence of negligence, but said: "The trial court
erred in failing to find as a matter of law, that there was no evidence
that defendant could reasonably foresee that harm might result to the
property of another by reason of his violation of the statute in question. '27 Thus, it would seem that the intermediate Illinois courts
have had a tendency to pass over the negligence aspect and to base
liability on the causation factor. In the instant case, the Illinois Supreme Court cited its earlier decision in Johnson v. Pendergast,28 in
support of the statement that violation of a statute is prima facie evidence of negligence. Though the Johnson case expressly adopted that
view, it seems to say that in the absence of any rebutting evidence the
jury must find for the plaintiff on the negligence issue, thus treating
the prima fade case as creating a full presumption of negligence.2 9
Thus, since the opinion in the Ney case does not indicate that defendant offered any evidence of due care on his part, the statement
that the prima facie case "in itself creates liability" may have been the
court's way of saying that the negligence issue must be resolved against
defendant.
Having decided that the statute is a basis for civil liability, and
that negligence of the defendant can be found by the jury on the prima
facie case established by showing violation of the statute, the court then
proceeded to the question of whether defendant is liable for the
212Ill. (2d) 74, 117 N. E. (2d) 74, 78 (1954).
'-333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N. E. (2d) 537 (1948), noted (1949) 6 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
133.
'0344 Ill. App. 620, loi N. E. (2d) 878 (1951).
'7344 Ill. App. 620, 1o N. E. (2d) 878, 88o (1951).
"3o8 Ill. 255, 139 N. E. 407 (1923)
""The existence of the prima facie case is provisional, and does not change
the burden of proof, but only the burden of introducing further evidence. It
means only that a determination of a fact shall be sufficient to justify a finding of
a related fact in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. The only effect is to
create the necessity of evidence to meet the prima facie case created, and which,
if no proof to the contrary is offered, will prevail." Johnson v. Pendergast, 308 Ill. 255,
139 N. E. 407, 409 (1923).
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specific injury to this plaintiff occurring under these special circumstances. Both the majority and dissenting Justices considered this issue
from the proximate causation approach. The majority held that the
statute does not require the court to rule, as a matter of law, that
proximate causation did or did not exist, but that this question was
properly left for the jury to determine under the foreseeability test.
The dissent argued that the harm was caused by the intervention of
an independent criminal agency, and that at common law the original
negligence cannot be the proximate cause of the injury where such
an independent agency intervenes. Apparently the dissenting Justice
thought that this conclusion must be reached as a matter of law under
the facts of this case. This view gains support from the decision in
Slater v. T. C. Baker Co.,30 where the Massachusetts Supreme Court,
on very similar facts, sustained a directed verdict for the defendant
on the ground that acts by a thief were intervening, independent acts
which the defendant was not bound to anticipate. It would seem that
the dissenting Justice in the Ney case and the Massachusetts court in
the Slater case are still reluctant to require an automobile owner to
contemplate criminal acts of another even though it is common know31
ledge that the number of car thefts is on the increase.
On the other hand the District of Columbia court took a different
approach to the question dealt with by the Illinois court in causation
terminology. In Ross v. Hartman,32 which was decided in the only other
jurisdiction where recovery has been allowed under facts similar to
those of the Ney case, it was denied that proximate causation is material. Instead of considering that issue, the court resorted directly
to statutory construction to deal with the issue of whether the legislature intended the risk of the intervening acts of a thief to be included within the liability imposed by statute. Under this view if the
plaintiff falls within that group of persons which the court finds the
30261 Mass. 424, 158 N. E. 778 (1927). The most recent Massachusetts case, Gailbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N. E. (2d) 560 (1948) found the owner of an unregistered car not liable for damages caused by a thief, expressly repudiating Malloy v. Newman, 31o Mass. 269, 37 N. E. (2d) iool (1941), which case was thought to
have indicated a possible trend toward imposing liability on a car owner for the acts
of an independent agency. Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N. E. (2d) 33o (1945),
also denied that injuries were a proximate result of the car owner's negligence.
mNote (1954) 38 Marq. L. Rev. 99, citing a publication of the Milwaukee Police
Department showing car thefts to be rapidly increasing in frequency.
82139 F. (2d) 14 (C. A. D. C. 1943). In R. W. Clayton, Inc. v. Schaff, 169 F. (2d)
303 (C. A. D. C. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 871, 69 S. Ct. A68, 93 L. ed. 415 (1948),
the dissenting judge branded this view as unsound and pledged his efforts to obtain its overruling.
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statute is designed to protect and if the injury is that type which the
court finds the statute is designed to prevent, liability will be imposed,
irrespective of the fact that an independent agency intervened. The
Ross decision went further than to require that the defendant foresee
a specific dangerous situation; it imputed a general knowledge to the
defendant that "every one knows now that children and thieves fre33
quently cause harm by tampering with unlocked cars."
Since the courts are in disagreement not only as to whether
to allow recovery in a civil action for violation of this penal statute, but
also as to the approach to the problem when they do allow recovery,
it seems that the legislatures should make a clear declaration of intention in this regard. It would not be difficult to phrase the penal
statutes so as to indicate whether civil liability is to be imposed on an
automobile owner for the intermeddling of a third party resulting
in personal or property injury to some member of the public. However, if the legislatures should express their intention to impose civil
liability for a violation of the statute, it would seem that the Illinois
approach would be the more feasible one to follow. This view would
allow the defendant to offer evidence of due care, even though he had
violated the statute, and to have this evidence considered in the determination of the negligence issue. Under the negligence per se approach there is an automatic finding for the plaintiff on the negligence issue if the hazard was of the nature the statute was designed
to prevent. This allows the defendant only the defense that violation
of the statute is not the legal cause of the injury.
BEVERLY G. STEPHENSON

ToRTs-NEcEssITy OF PROVING PROXIMATE CAUSATION To OBTAIN RECOVERY

FOR PERSONAL

INJURIES

UNDER RAILROAD

FIRE STATUTE.

[Oklahoma]
For a century, American courts and legislatures have been concerned with the problem of the liability of railroads for personal
injuries resulting from fires originating on the railroad's right of way.,
2Ross v. Hartman, 139 F. (2d) 14, 15 (C. A. D. C. 1943). See Note (1944) 92 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 467 at 469.
'Seale v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., 65 Tex. 274 at 280, 57 Am. Rep. 602 at 605 (1886).
A statute was applied in Toledo, P. & W. Ry. v. Pindar, 53 Ill.
447 at 451, 5 Am.
Rep. 57 at 59 (1870).
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The rigid application of general common law principles to railroad
fire cases has often left the injured party without adequate recovery
for his losses because of the difficulties of the plaintiff in proving the
fault of the defendant, 2 in rebutting the evidence of the defendant
that the plaintiff's actions constituted contributory fault,3 and in overcoming the reluctance of the courts to place liability for personal injuries on the railroads, inasmuch as such injuries could not be ex4
pected to follow from the original setting of a fire.
In proving the fault of the railroad-ordinarily through negligent
conduct-the plaintiff is at a disadvantage, because much of the necessary information regarding the method of conduct of the railway's
operations is in the hands of the defendant and difficult for the plaintiff to acquire. 5 If the plaintiff overcomes this difficulty, he may still
lose his case unless the court or jury can be convinced that he was
free from contributory fault. Though a person whose property is
threatened with fire is under a legal duty to act affirmatively to protect his property, yet if he takes unreasonable risks while so acting,
he is barred from recovery for the personal injuries sustained thereby.6
The plaintiff must further establish that legal causation exists be'See Goodgame v. Louisville & N. R. R., 2iS Ala. 507, 119 So. 218 at 219 (1928);
Reuter v. San Pedro, L. A. : S. L. R. R., 37 Cal. App. 277, 174 Pac. 927 at 928 (1918);
Green & Flinn, Inc. v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 32 Del. 72, 119 At. 837 at 839 (1921);
Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Olivent, 89 Ga. App. 403, 79 S. E. (2d) 435 at 436 (1953);
Palmetto Moss Factory v. Texas & P. Ry., 145 La. 555, 82 So. 7oo at 703 (1919);
Young v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 273 Mass. 567, 174 N. E. 318 at 319 (1931);
St. Louis, S. Ry. of T. v. Jones, 138 S. W. (2d) 577 at 578 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
3See Braden v. St. L.-S. F. R. R., 223 Ala. 659, 137 So. 663 at 664 (1931); Whitman
v. Mobile & 0. R. R., 217 Ala. 70, 114 So. 912 (1927); Berg v. Great N. Ry., 7o Minn.
272, 73 N. W. 648 at 649 (1897); Pegram v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 139 N. C. 303, 51 S. E.
975 at 976 (19o5); Allison v. St. L., S. Ry. of T., 257 S. W. 959 at 96o (Tex. Civ. App.

(1924).
'See Braden v. St. L.-S. F. R. R., 223 Ala. 659, 137 So. 663 at 664 (1931); Whitman
217 Ala. 70, 114 So. 912 (1927); Berg v. Great N. Ry., 70
Minn. 272, 73 N. W. 648 at 649 (1897); Allison v. St. L., S. Ry. of T., 257 S. W. 959
at 960 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Seale v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., 65 Tex. 274 at 28o, 57
Am. Rep. 602 at 605 (1886).
'Difficulties in proving fault involve, inter alia, such facts that fires often start
at unfrequented places and that the fire may have started from some natural or
foreign cause rather than from any fault of the railroad. Also, the practical difficulty that most of the available information is in the hands of the defendant railroad and the problem of explaining technical devices to the jury complicates
plaintiff's task. Favorable presumptions may help the plaintiff just as circumstantial
evidence aids him, but these are at most minor assists. See cases in note 2, supra.
6llinois C. R. R. v. Siler, 229 Ill. 390, 82 N. E. 362, 15 L. R. A. (N.s.) 819 (1907).
See Logan v. Wabash Ry., 96 Mo. App. 461, 70 S. W. 734, 735 (1902); Bingham,
Some Suggestions Concerning Legal Cause at Common Law (igog) 9 Col. L. Rev. 136
at 146.

v. Mobile & 0. R. R.,

1955]

CASE COMMENTS

tween the defendant's fault and his own injury. In doing so, he must
not only meet the initial test of showing that the injuries were the
natural consequence of the wrongful act, 7 but must also refute any
claim that an "intervening cause" occurred to break the chain of legal
causation. If an "intermediate cause disconnected from the primary
fault and self operating" is proved by the defendant to have been
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm, then the defendant's fault
cannot be the "proximate" or legal cause of the plaintiff's injury.8
Recognizing that serious losses to property and persons were frequently being suffered without adequate compensation, the legislatures
of nearly half of the states enacted statutes to reduce in some degree
the obstacles to recovery against railroads for fire damage. 9 The extent to which such statutes may be applied in aid of plaintiff's attempt to recover for personal injuries suffered as a result of a railroad
fire on his premises is indicated by the recent decision of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in St. Louis-S. F. R. R. v. Ginn.10 One of defendant's
trains in some unexplained manner had set fire to a meadow on plaintiff's farm. Plaintiff, having discovered the fire shortly after it was
started, secured his tractor, and, in accordance with custom and prudence, plowed a "fire break" to contain the fire. After he had completed this operation, he was removing the tractor and plow to a
safe place, when, without fault on his part, the tractor, plow, or some
other portion of the apparatus struck a root or limb which flew up
and hit him in the face and eye, severely injuring him. In the subsequent action for personal injuries, after plaintiff had introduced
evidence, defendant demurred, but the trial court overruled the de7Sira v. Wabash Ry., 115 Mo. 127, 21 S. W. 905, 37 Am. St. Rep. 386 (1895).
Accord: Gregory v. Layton, 36 S. C. 93, 15 S. E. 352, 31 Am. St. Rep. 857 (1892).
8
Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 475, 25 L. ed. 256, 259 (1876).
Courts soon receded from the position that plaintiff's act of attempting to save
his property from the fire is an intervening cause, and admitted that if the injuries
were sustained while plaintiff was acting reasonably in the performance of a duty
to minimize damages, proximate causation was not interrupted. This approach seems
to be founded on the doctrine that a responsible human act is not an intervening
cause. Mead v. Chickasha Gas & Electric Co., 137 Okla. 74, 278 Pac. 286 (1929).
'These include, inter alia: 6 Ark. Stat. Ann. (Bobbs-Merrill, 1947) § 73-1014;
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1954) c. 114, § 96; 1o Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1951)
§ 55-3504-3505; 1 Iowa Code (1946) § 479.126; 5 Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1948) c.
16o, § 234; 3 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) § 466.16; 6 Miss. Code Ann. (Harrison, 1942)
§ 7805; 2 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) § 537.380; 2 N. H. Laws (1942) c. 300, § 1; 5 Ohio
Rev. Code (Banks-Baldwin, 1954) § 4963.37; 2 Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 2, § 748; 4
S. C. Code (1942) § 8362; 8 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 56-428; 1 Wis. Stat.
(1947) § 192-44.
1264 P. (2d) 351 (Okla. 1953).
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murrer. Defendant refused to produce further evidence, whereupon
the court (jury having been waived) made its own findings and rendered judgment for plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed the judgment by a four to three decision, applying a state
statute which provides that: "Any railroad company operating any
line in this State shall be liable for all damages sustained by fire originating from the operation of its road." ' "
It is to be noted that the statute does not expressly mention the
matter of proving fault of the railroad, or the inclusion of personal
injuries within the railroad's liability, or the effect of proximate
cause principles on the plaintiff's claim. However, the majority of
the court resolved all of these ambiguities in favor of the plaintiff.
Because of the positive language of the statute, the court apparently
assumed that no showing of fault was needed to impose liability on the
defendant. The opinion contains no specific statement that the railroad is liable without fault, but there is no reference to any proof
12
that negligence of the defendant started the fire.

The words in the statute, "shall be liable for all damages," are
broad enough to justify the further assumption that the railroad
should be held liable for personal as well as property injuries.' 3 This
view was indirectly supported by the court's reasoning that since plaintiff was under a legal duty to try to minimize the property damages, he
should be compensated for personal injuries sustained while acting
reasonably in the defendant's behalf. This phase of the opinion indicates a confusion of contributory negligence and proximate cause
considerations, in that the personal injuries suffered were regarded by
the court as legally "caused by" the fire so long as the plaintiff did
112 Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 2, § 748.
1

2The court points out that there is "no allegation or suggestion that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence to any degree." 264 P. (2d) 351, 353 (Okla.
1953). In order to arrive at the problem of contributory negligence, the court
must have passed over the problem of primary negligence, resolving it in the
plaintiff's favor. However, the opinion does not point out specifically just what
reasoning was used in handling the primary negligence issue.
"Similar statutes were interpreted to cover personal as well as property injuries in: Missouri P. R. R. v. Johnson, 198 Ark. 1134, 133 S. W. (2d) 33 (1939);
Illinois C. R. R. v. Siler, 229 Ill. 39 o , 82 N. E. 362, 15 L. R. A. (N. s.) 819 (1907);
Illinois C. R. R. v. Thomas, 109 Miss. 536, 68 So. 773 (1915). See also Berg v. Great
N. Ry., 70 Minn. 272, 73 N. W. 648 (1897) (statute was assumed to cover personal
injuries although recovery was denied due to the contributory fault of defendant in
undergoing great risks to save a haystack); Mellette v. Atlantic C. L. Ry., 181 S. C.
62, 186 S. E. 545, 547 (1936) (dictum to this effect, although recovery under the
statute was denied, since counsel for plaintiff failed to except to the ruling of the
trial court that the statute did not apply to personal injuries).
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not undertake any unreasonable risk to his person while fighting the
fire. That point having been made, the majority opinion ignores the
further issue raised by the defense as to whether the specific injury was
such a remote and unforeseeable consequence of the setting of the fire
that the chain of legal causation had been broken. The majority opinion mentions the "equities" of the plaintiff's position in order to refute the defendant's claim that the injury was the result of an independent, intervening cause. 14 Presumably, the thought was that it
would be unjust to deny plaintiff's recovery for personal injuries suffered in attempting to fulfill the legal duty imposed upon him to minimize damages from a railroad fire threatening his property. The court
has evidently attempted to reach its concept of "ultimate justice,"
but the interposition of an "equitable" doctrine in a tort case so as to
deny defendant the protection of the common law proximate cause rule
can only be justified by the unexpressed assumption that the legislature had such an intention when it enacted the statute.
Three judges, however, delivered a vigorous dissent, denying that
any "equitable considerations are involved,"'1 and maintaining that
the only question before the court was whether the railroad's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Thus, the fire
statute was interpreted by the dissent as working no change in common law proximate cause rules. In the view of the dissent, "independent events broke the chain of causation from the original wrongful
act,"' 6 in this case, because "it cannot be said.., that one guilty of
negligence is required to anticipate that injury may occur from some
unknown and unidentified force not actively concerned with or identified as being a part of the result of defendant's negligence."'17 The dis1
"Equitably the plaintiff should not be required to bear the loss resulting
from his personal injuries." 264 P. (2d) 351, 353 (Okla. 1953).
'St. Louis-S. F. R. R. v. Ginn, 264 P. (2d) 351, 354 (Okla. 1953).
"St. Louis-S. F. R. R. v. Ginn, 264 P. (2d) 351, 354 (Okla. 1953). Justice Corn
arrived at this conclusion by applying the facts to the definition quoted from 38
Am. Jur., Negligence § 68, which states: "An act which only furnishes the opportunity for the infliction of an injury is not the proximate cause of the injury, where
the latter occurs as the direct result of some intervening force. Thus, where a
negligent act creates a condition which is subsequently acted upon by another,
unforseeable, independent, and distinct agency to produce the injury, the original
act is the remote and not the proximate cause of the injury, even though the
injury would not occur except for the act."
"7 St. L.-S. F. R. R. v. Ginn, 264 P. (2d) 351, 355 (Okla. 1953). It is conceivable
that the court could have reached the result of holding defendant liable even by
applying common law rules. In Missouri P. Ry. v. Johnson, 198 Ark. 1134, 133 S. W.
(2d) 33 (1939), the trustees of a tuberculosis patient who had been in precarious
health and who died as a result of inhaling smoke which had been blown by the
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sent points out with some alarm that the rule of the majority opinion
can be extended to make the railroad a "positive insurer of the safety
and wellbeing of one who acts in response to the original negligence
from the time the danger is apparent until he returns to the shelter of
his own roof."' 8
In a few jurisdictions, the courts have indicated that the legislative intent in enacting railroad fire statutes was merely to relieve
the plaintiff of the necessity of proving that the fire was caused through
fault of the railroad, and that the plaintiff must still prove the other
factors necessary for a recovery at common law, such as proximate
wind and which originated from a railroad fire were allowed to recover for her
additional medical bills and increased suffering. In this case, though a railroad
fire statute existed at the time, the action was brought on a common law theory.
The court found that proximate causation existed since the injuries sustained were
a direct result of the fire and since there had been some risk of some harm to
someone. The court reasoned that there was always risk of personal injury to
someone from such a fire. Glanz v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., i19 Iowa 6 11, 93 N. W.
575 (igo3) applied Iowa Code (1897) § 2o56, which removed a presumption of
negligence placed upon the railroad for fires it originated [the presumption of negligence having resulted from an earlier statute, Iowa Code (1873) § 1289] and
which restored the common law rules. The court held that plaintiff could recover
for sickness resulting from overexertion sustained while fighting a railroad fire,
since the sickness and overexertion were the proximate results of defendant's
proven negligence. The court reasoned that there had been some risk of some harm
to someone as a result of the negligent act of defendant and that plaintiff's acts
in trying to prevent the spread of the fire were not such intervening causes as to
bar recovery for such injuries.
However, most courts would conclude that such injuries are too remote to
fall within the concept of proximate causation. In Seale v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry.,
65 Tex. 274 (1886), the plaintiff's intestate died from burns received while fighting
the fire. Although there was a definite, actual, causal connection between defendant's negligence and the death, the court held that no reasonable man should anticipate such a result, since it was extremely unlikely that it would occur. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained upon the theory that proximate causation had
been interrupted. The same result was reached in Whitman v. Mobile & 0. Ry., 217
Ala. 70, 114 So. 912 (1928), in which plaintiff injured herself by wrenching her
back and shoulder while procuring buckets of water with which to fight the fire.
This injury, it was held, was "not known by common experience to be naturally
and reasonably in sequence and the injury does not according to the ordinary
course of events follow from the act, they are not sufficiently connected to make the
act a proximate cause." 217 Ala. 70, 114 So. 912 (1927). Nor was recovery allowed
in Braden v. St. L.-S. F. Ry., 223 Ala. 659, 137 So. 663 (1931) for the injuries sustained by a fall from a ladder which plaintiff was climbing while attempting to
put out a fire started by defendant railroad. The court stated that the complaint
showed on its face that the act of defendant was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. None of these three cases turned on the contributory negligence
doctrine; but, in all of them, especially in the Seale case, the injury was a more
direct actual result of the fire than in the principal case. Yet, in each of them
the court found that proximate causation was interrupted.
18
St. Louis-S. F. R. R. v. Ginn, 264 P. (2d) 351, 355 (Okla. 1953).
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causation.' 9 In Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Washington,2 0 the Mississippi
court, impliedly overruling a case 21 decided two years before, held that
22
the statute "in no way affects any liability for personal injuries,"
and therefore, an action for personal injuries or death had to be
brought under the common law theory which includes proof of both
negligence and proximate cause. Further, the Minnesota court in
Carrv. Davis23 held that, though under the railroad fire statute there
is no necessity of proving negligence, the proximate causation rule is
still applicable. The same court had previously declared that the
railroad "may escape liability by showing that a new cause of plaintiff's
injury intervened between the wrongful act and the final injurious
result thereof, provided such intervening cause was not under the
wrongdoer's control, could not by the exercise of reasonable diligence
be anticipated as likely to occur, and except for which the injury
'24
would not have been done to plaintiff.
On the other hand, a large number of the decisions have regarded
the statutes as remedial in nature,2 3 and would therefore concur with
"See Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Washington, 113 Miss. 1o5, 73 So. 879 at 881
(1917); Union P. Ry. v. De Busk, 12 Colo. 294, 2o Pac. 752 at 755, 3 L. R. A. 35o at
352 (1889). In Lowden v. Shoffner Mercantile Co., 1o9 F. (2d) 956 at 958 (C. C. A.
8th, 1940), construing the Arkansas statute, and in Martin v. Railroad, 62 Conn.
331, 25 Ati. 239 at 240 (1892), the courts expressly found that proximate cause
did exist, although they did not rule that the plaintiffs had to establish it for
recovery. In the Martin case, the court said: "It will be presumed that the court
below found as a fact that the injury was direct, and we cannot dispute that finding." 62 Conn. 331, 25 At. 239, 240 (1892). The question was held to be whether
or not the company caused the damage to plaintiff. In Illinois C. R. R. v. Thomas,
109 Miss. 536, 68 So. 773, 775 (1915), where a question of concurrent causation was
presented, the court found that the "setting out of the fire was a proximate cause
of [plaintiff's] injury." A "concurrent negligence" statute allowed recovery in such
a situation. It must be noted, however, that two years later, the Mississippi court
reversed its position in Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Washington, 113 Miss. 105, 73 So.
879 (1917), see this comment, infra.
no'13 Miss. 105, 73 So. 879 (1917).
"'Illinois C. R. R. v. Thomas, 1o9 Miss. 536, 68 So. 773 (1915).
22113 Miss. 1o5, 73 So. 879, 881 (1917).
2359 Minn. 485, 199 N. W. 237 at 239 (1924).
'See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N. W.

45, 48

(1920).

2St. L.-S. F. R. R. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1, 17 S. Ct. 243, 41 L. ed. 611 (1896);
Lyman v. Boston & W. R. R., 58 Mass. 288 (1849); Hart v. Western R. R., 54 Mass.
99 (1847). See Eastern R. R. v. Relief Fire Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 420, 422 (1868); Note
(1910) 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1017. The Mathews case indicated that the English common
law rule of strict liability for fires set by railroads, unless clearly altered by statute,
was not adopted by the courts in the New World, which, instead, placed such
actions under the regular negligence rules. Statutes, such as that of Oklahoma,
took the place of the common law rules of the courts on this side of the Atlantic
with regard to railroad fires. Such statutes are remedial in nature. They place a
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the principal case decision interpreting such a law liberally, as creating liability without fault for all damages actually flowing from the
occurrence of the fire.20 This liberal construction flows from the primary objects of the statutes, which are "to afford protection and indemnity.., against the dangers to which [one] ... is necessarily exposed from the conduct of the business which the railroad corporation
is authorized by law to carry on for the benefit of the public and its
own profit," 27 and to relieve the injured party who is exposed to
greater hazard "than ought to be left to the ordinary common law
remedies." 28 In Fraser-PattersonLumber Co. v. Southern Ry.,2 9 a
federal court, applying a South Carolina railroad fire statute, granted
a motion to strike the defense of contributory negligence as an intervening cause. The court reasoned that at most contributory negligence
was a concurrent cause which would not remove liability, since, "in an
action brought under this statute, the question as to negligence, proximate cause or remote cause is eliminated, and the only inquiry is
whether the case falls within the terms of the statute.30 ... [U]nder
the terms of the act, there can be no necessity for an inquiry as to
whether the fire caused by the company or its agents was the proximate or remote cause of the [injury]."31
special and exceptional liability upon railroads for any damages done to the
property (or person) of another by fire communicated from locomotive engines;
and, as such, it must clearly appear that those who invoke it, and those against
whom it is invoked, are covered by its terms. Southern Ry. v. Power Fuel Co.,
152 Fed. 917, 12 L. R. A. (N. s.) 472 (C. C. A. 4 th, 19o7); Hunter v. Columbia,
N. & L. Ry., 41 S. C. 86, 19 S. E. 197 (1894).
2'Hines v. Rittenberg, 262 Fed. 87 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1919); Fraser-Patterson Lumber
Co. v. Southern Ry., 79 F. Supp. 424 (W. D. S. C. 1948); Boston & M. R. R. v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 252 Mass. 432, 147 N. E. 904 (1925); Safford v. Boston 8 M.
R. R., io 3 Mass. 583 (1870); Midland V. R. R. v. Barton, 191 Okla. 359, 129 P. (2d)
1007 (1942); Hunter v. Columbia, N. & L. R. R., 41 S. C. 86, 19 S. E. 197 (1894);
Thompson v. Richmond & D. R. R., 24 S. C. 366 (1866). See also Pittsburgh, C., C. &
St. L. Ry. v. Chappell, 183 Ind. 141, io6 N. E. 403 at 405, Ann. Cas. 19 18A, 627 at
630 (1914); Virginia Ry. v. London, 148 Va. 699,-139 S. E. 328 at 329 (1927).
2Eastern R. R. v. Relief Fire Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 420, 423 (1868).
2Lyman v. Boston & W. R. R.,-58 Mass. 288,' 291 (1849).
"79 F. Supp. 424 (W. D. S. C. 1948).
"'79 F. Supp. 424, 425 (W. D. S. C. 1948).
1179 F. Supp. 424, 426 (W. D. S. C. 1948). "The terms of the law ... having
eliminated all inquiry into the question of negligence and into the question of
proximate and remote cause." Thompson v. Richmond & D. R. R., 24 S. C. 366, 368
(1866). The words, "by fire," in a South Carolina statute almost identical to the
Oklahoma act were held to remove proximate cause considerations, and, if the
fire originated from the railroad, the question was solely whether or not there
was causation in fact, "for [the statute] ... declares in absolute terms, without any
qualification, that the company shall be liable for [injury] ... by fire which originated ... [from the railroad]." 24 S. C. 366, 370 (1866).
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Under the broad view of the statute as adopted in these latter
cases, the decision in the principle case is legitimate if the legislature
intended to modify or abrogate the common law rules of proximate
causation as, the Oklahoma court believed it did. 3 2 The fact that the

railroads are in possession of extensive powers and privileges granted
by the states and that the use of these powers and privileges is necessarily attended with dangers to persons and property along the line
of the road may justify the imposition of a broad liability. It is not unjust for railroad companies to compensate all who suffer personal injuries and property damage from fires which the railroads originated,
so long as the injured parties acted reasonably to save their property.
In the final analysis, the risk is not placed on the railroad merely
because it is in a better financial position to bear the loss. "[I]n reality
the risk is not wholly nor largely on them. They have the means of
protecting themselves by insurance.... But, more than that, they have
the means of indemnifying themselves, to some extent at least, by
increased rates for passengers and freight. Presumptively, they adjust
their tariff of charges in view of this liability."3 3 By such means the
risk of loss is passed on to those who ultimately bear it-the public,
which through the legislature, levies this "indirect tax" upon itself to
pay for these losses. Thus, the statute is designed to relieve the individual victim of the railroad fire from the hazards of litigation which may
prevent him from recovering for his loss and to spread the cost of the
loss over the entire public. The statutes may also stimulate the railroads
to exercise a very high degree of care in operating trains and may promote efforts to improve five prevention appliances, thereby serving
34
the public interest by avoiding needless destruction of property.
GEORGE S. WILSON, III

"Construing the same statute as that involved in the principal case, the Oklahoma court had previously held that expenses incurred in removal of cattle from
a burned-over field, and in hauling them feed, were not too remote to be compensable. The court declared: "Where the law gives a remedy for a wrong done, the
compensation should be equal to the injury sustained and the latter is the standard by which the former is to be measured and that the injured party is to be
placed as nearly as may be in the situation which he would have occupied had
not the wrong been done." Midland V. R. R. v. Barton, 191 Okla. 359, 129 P. (2d)
1007, 1010 (1942).

3Martin v. R. R. Co., 62 Conn. 331, 25 ALI. 239, 241 (1892).
31St. Louis-S. F. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1, 17 S. Ct. 243, 41 L. ed. 6ii (1896).
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